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 Foreword 
This report is the result of the RIESCA project (Rescuing of Intelligence and 
Electronic Security Core  Applications), which serves as a ‘toolbox’; a series of 
procedures for the evaluation and development of critical systems and the secu-
rity management of events. 
The report is divided into three Parts. Part I introduces the student centred R&D 
work and research methods used in the RIESCA project. The student-centric re-
search and development work is integrated into  learning as an actualisation in-
stance of the Learning by Developing (LbD). The learning activities have shifted 
the focus of traditional teaching methods to learning by taking part in authentic 
R&D. In this way the  students are participating in authentic R&D and they oc-
cupy  the main active role in Laurea’s collaborative R&D processes. 
Parts II and III present the results of the student-centred R&D in the RIESCA 
project. Part II deals with methods for evaluating and developing systems that 
are critical for  the functioning of Finnish society. Part III studies critical events 
(mass events, high level political meetings, crisis situation) and their security 
management and  communication systems. The Parts are divided into Chapters 
that are classified according to the topics of Laurea’s work package for RIESCA. 
The outcomes of the student-centric section of the RIESCA project are mainly 
qualitative. The generally high level of the results indicates  that student-centric 
R&D is a significant development for the field of pedagogy at universities of ap-
plied  sciences. Among universities of applied sciences in Finland, Laurea pro-
duces the  highest number of ECTS credits from R&D. In addition, the students' 
participation in  publications, project preparation and even project management 
activities proves that  they are central actors in Laurea's R&D operations. 
The particular strengths of the student-centric model are related to equality, trust 
and the role of students as central actors and holders of responsibility.  The 
used model maintains and supports open interaction through the operating envi-
ronment it creates, its agility in  responding to the needs of the environment, and 
the functionality of its  management model. The recognised challenges in learn-
ing are related to the uniqueness of the actualisation; “the spirit and perspective 
of learning and teaching is unique”. 
Espoo in May 2010 
Rauno Pirinen and Jyri Rajamäki 
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PART I 
Introduction 
The purpose of Part I is to present the RIESCA project and demonstrate why 
and how student centred R&D is applied in the project. 
In their article, Hanna-Miina Sihvonen, Juha Knuuttila and Jyri Rajamäki intro-
duce the RIESCA project. Ms Sihvonen was the project manager for the consor-
tium, Lic.Sc. Knuuttila acted as the manager for Laurea’s RIESCA work, and 
D.Sc. Rajamäki was the research work supervisor at Laurea. 
Outi Kallioinen in her article describes Mode 2 knowledge which  is a type of 
work-integrated research and learning that can provide a novel response to the 
 increasing demand for education relevant to the global knowledge economy. In 
the interpretation of the Learning by Developing, Mode 1 knowledge refers to a 
conventional knowledge production method in line with the so called old para-
digm; knowledge is produced and created in a researcher-oriented way within a 
specific discipline. This type of knowledge is mostly theoretical or experimental, 
hierarchical and static. The research problems are set and solved within a scien-
tific community. Mode 2 knowledge is built through research and development 
work carried out in authentic contexts that use  applications and services devel-
oped by collaborators. Then, students on a collaborative work term are faced 
with real world research agenda, scopes and problems, like those faced by 
 practitioners and organisations in the normal course of events and practice. 
Rauno Pirinen in his article describes the research framework used in the actu-
alisations of the integrative studies in RIESCA. The perspective and integrative 
learning activities  of RIESCA also address collaboration and foundation issues 
within the Finnish innovation system’s co-creation processes. The student-
centred approach is presented as evidence of the challenge of producing high 
 valued competences and  research activities that generate expertise (comple-
ments of Mode 2 and Mode 1 knowledge) in competence development and  in 
the  every day practice of the Master and Bachelor of Business Administration 
 studies at Laurea University of Applied Sciences. 
The actualisations of the studies are part of a larger innovation system value 
network, in which a single intervention is  part of a larger network of transactions 
and international transformations related to the RIESCA project. In this actuali-
sation almost all instances of strategies, agreements and objectives are man-
aged using bottom-up  and student-centred principles. 
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Chapter 1 
RIESCA, Rescuing of Intelligence and Elec-
tronic Security Core  Applications 
Hanna-Miina Sihvonen, Juha Knuuttila & Jyri Rajamäki 
RIESCA (Rescuing of Intelligence and Electronic Security Core  Applications) 
project was a Tekes Safety and Security Programme funded project, which be-
gan on October 1st, 2007 and ended on March 31st, 2010. The Riesca project's 
focus areas were on the following Tekes Safety and Security Programme points: 
 National safety and security covers items in the defence, boarder guard, 
police, first response and fire fighting as well as customs operations 
 Industrial safety and security deals with full agenda of corporate needs 
and respective solutions 
Finnish society is highly dependent on different critical information systems that 
support society. Business secrets, patient records and the credit card data of 
citizens, to name but a few, are kept in electronic form and it is obviously impor-
tant that such information is kept confidential and protected from unauthorised 
access. Therefore, it is crucial that information systems and software applica-
tions function in the correct way in case of attempted hacking or human error. 
Successful hacking or even coffee spilt on a computer may result in a system 
not functioning as required. 
There are a number of systems, such as railway and power, hydro-power and 
nuclear power stations, that  are critical for the functioning of society in Finland. 
When assessing possible risks, it is only seldom  taken into account that power, 
hydropower and nuclear power plants are critically dependent on the  reliability 
and security of information systems. Information security is often enhanced by 
purchasing  technical solutions without any systematic planning and knowledge 
of how to protect the different  segments of the system. In this case, the risk is 
not only the investing of information security resources in  the wrong targets but 
the fact that the unplanned integration of systems and the related information 
security  components may even create new security risks. In consequence, sys-
tems that are critical for society  may not work as they should. 
The RIESCA project aimed to solve this problem. The research project 
 developed information security management methods that can be used to en-
sure the proper functioning  of critical systems in all circumstances. The research 
partners in the project are the University of  Oulu, University of Eastern Finland 
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(formerly University of Kuopio), and Laurea University of Applied Sciences. The 
international research partners were Georgia State University, USA; J. Mack 
College of Business, USA;, the Department of Computer Information Systems, 
USA; the University of Arizona, USA; and The Central Information Technology 
Services Department (ZID) of the University of Innsbruck, Austria. The project 
also involved small to medium enterprises (SMEs), major industrial businesses 
and public authority  partners. The project ran until the end of March 2010. The 
project’s budget was over 950 000 EUR from 2007 to 2010. 
University of Oulu 
The work package of the University of Oulu aimed at developing a Corporate 
Governance (CG) approach to  information security related to the critical informa-
tion systems of society. In order to achieve that goal, the  information security 
risks of critical systems were analysed and methods for applying and implement-
ing  security aspects were developed. During the RIESCA project, researchers 
from the University of Oulu performed  joint research with other participating re-
search organisations in analysing existing standards and  frameworks, and 
evaluating their applicability for the safeguarding of critical information systems. 
The goal was  to  develop a method, applicable for managing critical information 
systems in-formation security by utilising,  as  widely as possible, existing meth-
ods and standards. The method was piloted in organisations  participating in  the 
project. The method was further developed based on the solutions produced in 
the  project. The  concrete result was a “tool box”; a series of information security 
practices, which are  applicable to the  safeguarding of critical information sys-
tems.  
University of Kuopio  
The work package of University of Kuopio aimed at developing methods for in-
creasing the reliability of  society’s  critical information systems. In order to 
achieve the goal, methods were analysed and developed  for  improving, imple-
menting and measuring reliability from the perspective of both system providers 
and  customers. Reliability engineering was implemented in software develop-
ment whereas customers can use  numerical reliability requirements when ac-
quiring critical core software. Methods were piloted in  participating organisations. 
A tangible result gained from the project was an approach with which both sys-
tem  providers and customers could measure and adjust a systems’ reliability to 
an adequate level by taking into  account the whole software process lifecycle. 
Laurea University of Applied Sciences  
The work package of Laurea aimed at developing further evaluation methods on 
systems that were critical to  the functioning of the society. To reach that aim in 
the project, there was an analysis of the  methods that evaluate these systems’ 
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continual development. Special attention was given to moving from  normal situa-
tion to crisis situations, and recovering from the crisis to a normal state. The 
other aim was to  further develop different critical events (mass events, high level 
political meetings, crisis situation) security management and  communication 
systems and assess methods for evaluating their functionality. 
Chapter 2 
Mode2 Knowledge in Student-Centered R&D 
Outi Kallioinen 
In the past few years there has been an increasing emphasis on starting to pro-
duce new knowledge in the networked  communities of the universities of applied 
sciences in Finland. Laurea University of Applied Sciences in the greater 
 Helsinki region is especially focused on creating longstanding value networks in 
the region. However, the co-creation of  knowledge within the region is challeng-
ing and also a fairly new way to operate for a higher education institution. In 
 order to fulfil this objective Laurea has been developing a new operating model 
for higher education pedagogy called,  Learning by Developing (LbD), and has 
done so since 2000. In the LbD-model the integration of pedagogy,  regional de-
velopment and R&D is operationalised in an effective way so that the students 
as research colleagues  play an essential role. 
The OECD's theme for the analysis of higher education policy from 2006 on-
wards states that, as far as R&D is concerned, Finland has  gained recognition 
throughout Europe for its innovative research activities and R&D strategies that 
particularly focus  on the knowledge economy (Davies, et al. 2006). The national 
goal is to turn Finland into a world class leader in  scientific and technological re-
search, especially in applied research. 
From the perspective of regional development, the OECD researchers highlights 
the fact that new knowledge is created in the  context of the employment sector 
as well as at institutes of higher education, and that undergraduates should be 
 placed at the heart of R&D activities. Referring to R&D at universities of applied 
sciences, Davies et al. (2006) mention  Mode 2 knowledge production, which has 
a strong user-orientation and arises from genuine problem solving.  According to 
the OECD study, the R&D activities of universities of applied sciences should 
specifically promote regional  economic, social and cultural development. In this 
development the students’ role is highly important. 
The focus of the student and client orientation at Laurea specifically refers to the 
fact that the students are positioned at  the centre of activity and that they are the 
most important interest group for Laurea. The realisation of this value was 
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 notified in the assessment feedback provided by the Finnish Higher Education 
Evaluation Council, when Laurea was  appointed as a Centre of Excellence in 
Education for the years 2005 and 2006 (Salminen & Kajaste 2005, 81) and as a 
Centre for Excellence in Regional Development for 2006-2007 (Käyhkö et al. 
2006, 87). Only last  November Laurea was nominated as a Centre of Excellence 
for student-centred R&D integrated into learning for 2010-2012 and in the feed-
back on FINHEEC (Kajaste et al. 2010). 
The purpose of this ‘reflective nutshell article’ is to discuss Mode 2 knowledge 
production in student centred R&D in the  universities of applied sciences. Stu-
dents, at the core of R&D activities, create a pool of innovators, resources and 
actors  that are needed in the transdisciplinary process of producing new knowl-
edge, inventions, innovations and methods for  the innovation environment and 
value networks. In the universities of applied sciences it is worth exploring the 
impact  of Mode 2 knowledge (Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny, Schwartzman, Scott 
& Trow 1994; Nowotny, Scott & Gibbons  2001; Scott 2005) on innovations plat-
forms. 
Mode 2 knowledge production allows operators to steer within universities of ap-
plied sciences when planning R&D  processes for more participatory, dynamic 
and creative forums, which aim to result in the production of new competences. 
It is believed that  transdisciplinarity, in particular, can produce something totally 
new – something which conventional disciplines cannot achieve. 
According to Gibbons et al. (1994), the prerequisites for Mode 2 knowledge pro-
duction are : (1) new technologies, rapid communication, virtual spaces for inter-
action and communication; (2)  the crucial importance of communication and 
communication density, where expanding communication leads to a greater di-
versity of knowledge; (3)  the possibility to utilise previous investments for knowl-
edge infrastructure; (4)  the expansion of higher education; (5)  increased levels 
of communication and the use of new technology applications; and (6)  the prolif-
eration of sites with knowledge competences, whereby the knowledge surplus 
created supports the  emergence of Mode 2. 
Gibbons et al. (1994) characterise knowledge as follows: Mode 1 knowledge re-
fers to a conventional knowledge production method in line with the so called old 
paradigm; knowledge is produced and created in a researcher-oriented way 
within a specific discipline. This type of knowledge is mostly theoretical or ex-
perimental, hierarchical and static. The research problems are set and solved 
within a scientific community. 
MacLean, MacIntosh and Grant (2002, 191) state that the context of application 
in Mode 2  knowledge  production means that the desired factor is to produce 
useful knowledge and competence in a pragmatic  way, and that this is reflected 
when the research objectives, questions and practices are discussed in  mutual 
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negotiations when setting up the projects. Mode 2 knowledge is produced (usu-
ally demanding participation by users) in the context of application.  Knowledge is 
 created in a transdisciplinary and multidisciplinary framework. Knowledge can be 
 characterised as heterogeneous and  heterarchical (organisational heterarchy), 
and is produced in social  processes. Social accountability and/or responsibility, 
 reflexivity and new forms of quality control are related to Mode 2 knowledge pro-
duction, the five principles of Mode 2 knowledge are presented in following Ta-
ble:  
Mode 2 Knowledge 
1 context of application 
2 transdisciplinarity 
3 heterogeneity and organisational diversity 
4 social accountability and reflexivity 
5 quality control 
 Mode 2 does not carry the traditional meaning of 'applying knowledge to prac-
tice', where theory is tested and  developed further by means of practical applica-
tions. Conceptually, application is closely linked with discovery, which  brings 
about new perceptions, knowledge, innovation and competence. Thus, a clear-
cut distinction between science and  technology becomes increasingly difficult. 
This is evident in the creation of innovation; the competitiveness of the 
 innovation system is challenged by models for both cooperation and competition 
between producers of new  knowledge and competence (Gibbons et al. 1994). 
Mode 2 knowledge breaks the boundaries of conventional applied  research and 
leads towards new competence and innovation, which cannot be foreseen at the 
start of the process. 
The Mode 2 approach seeks to describe the way in which the ability of individu-
als and groups to create new things,  transcends traditional boundaries, com-
bines diverse sources of information and competence, and means the ability to 
 innovate become increasingly important in the future (Novotny, Scott and Gib-
bons 2001). The essence of 'knowing'  therefore changes from an act of remem-
bering and repeating to an ability to find and utilise information. To this end, 
Jorgensen  (2005, 51) strongly integrates a collaborative element, whereby utilis-
ing information, knowledge and competence  together with others produces suc-
cess, which at the same time creates social capital. 
Mode 2 knowledge brings specific added value when developing applications for 
new innovations and  producing new innovations. The study on knowledge crea-
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tion by Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) contains the same basic  elements as Mode 
2 knowledge; the abundance and density of interaction, knowledge processing 
and production among  organisations and companies, and the shared ownership 
of knowledge. 
In transdisciplinary problem solving MacLean et al. (2002, 191) argue that the 
skills of the participants are integrated  within the framework of the activity, where 
interwoven empirical elements and a theoretical consensus arise and  develop 
throughout the process as practical solutions and theory construction. These 
features cannot be distinctly categorised  into certain disciplines. The results from 
the process are reflected and transferred to the subsequent activities of those 
 involved in the project; this creates unpredictable dynamics, which are difficult to 
steer. This can be described as  'problem solving capability on the move'. Gib-
bons et al. (1994) summarise the four distinct features of transdisciplinarity:  
Transdisciplinarity 
1 An evolving framework for problem solving, which steers endeavours for problem solving, i.e. issues  are  not finalised beforehand 
2 A contribution to the knowledge: development of one’s own theoretical structures, research methods and  practices, which may not be applicable 
to a traditional scientific field 
3 Knowledge is transferred and diffused during the production, which there-fore demands  participation. The results are circulated and developed 
faster in new problem solving situations  than  through professional jour-
nals or conferences 
4 Transdisciplinarity consists of dynamic activity in which interaction net-works are maintained by both  official and unofficial means. The dynamic 
and changeable character of research makes it difficult to  forecast new 
contexts of application 
These prerequisites clearly emphasise the recent development and importance 
of information flow and management  as well as the active utilisation of virtual 
possibilities, which form a clear distinction compared to knowledge generated by 
the  traditional academic, theoretical research. However, Mode 1 and Mode 2 
knowledge coexist, and Mode 2 knowledge  develops from Mode 1 knowledge. 
Mode 2 knowledge production requires a theoretical basis constructed in multi-
 disciplinary interaction. Without Mode 1 knowledge there cannot be true scien-
tific new knowledge. At some point of  the knowledge creation process Mode 1 
and Mode 2 are intertwined. Mode 2 knowledge production is not the same as 
 any experimental activity; it is a question of utilising research-based knowledge 
within a new type of mutual  competence production process. 
Universities of applied sciences have excellent possibilities to develop R&D ac-
tivities in a way that brings Mode 2  knowledge and new competence production 
increasingly to the fore. The structures of research activities already  exist, as 
does the need for working life transformation. Strengths include a high standard 
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of competence, close  employer partnerships and most of all a flexibility regard-
ing research activities. Networking is important for universities of  applied sci-
ences, which in itself promotes official and unofficial interaction channels that 
characterise Mode 2  knowledge. A potential challenge of Mode 2 knowledge 
production may involve its transdisciplinary approach;  solutions are sought in 
unconventional ways by working cooperatively with actors that represent com-
pletely different  starting points. The evolving framework for problem-solving and 
related unpredictable dynamics requires a  readiness to change and, as far as 
the research process is concerned, an ability to operate and make decisions ac-
cording to the situation. Further conflict may be caused by the creation of new 
R&D methods and practices that bring  about new discoveries, which may not 
have a counterpart in the field of conventional science. Similarly, fail-proof crite-
ria  do not exist for evaluating the impact and reliability of Mode 2 knowledge. As 
a result, particular responsibility and  ethical awareness become important in 
creating functional criteria and practices for evaluating Mode 2 knowledge as 
 well as in applying current evaluation criteria for R&D project processes that 
produce Mode 2 knowledge. All these  elements have a strong influence on the 
student-centred R&D process and call for the accountability of each participant. 
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Chapter 3 
Research and Development is integrated to 
Learning within RIESCA 
Rauno Pirinen 
Student-Centred R&D Work is Integrated to Learning 
The relationship between society and higher education institutions is changing; 
the higher education institutions are seen as an area for investment that can co-
create research-based knowledge and added value in collaboration with an in-
novation system. This current change can be seen also in the reformation of the 
higher education field in Finland, for which this publication provides a sample of 
evidence of the actualisations of this new integrative paradigm, while giving a 
collected overview of integrative student-centred authentic  research and devel-
opment work in RIESCA. 
Laurea’s innovation of Learning by Developing (LbD) as a cultural framework 
and model of learning has been created in a social and collective process in 
2002 - 2007. In recent years the focus of the LbD dimensions has shifted from a 
pedagogical orientation to authentic Research and Development work centred 
on students (the integration of learning and research), which means and has led 
to an inter-operative model in which student-centred learning is integrated within 
authentic and national and regional level research and development agendas 
and work. 
Participation in the Centre of Excellence evaluation of education indicates that 
Laurea wants to further develop the student-centred R&D model (integrative re-
search, development and learning culture) and subject it to constructive evalua-
tion. Furthermore, Laurea wants to participate in the higher education and inno-
vation discussion about the integration of learning and R&D, international activi-
ties and the leadership of higher education institutions. 
Design Research 
Different terms have been used to describe the most commonly used form of re-
search in RIESCA, such as Design Research and Design Science Research 
(Hevner, March and Ram, 2004). Design Research (DR) consists of activities 
concerned with the construction and evaluation of technological artefacts to 
meet organisational needs as well as the development of their associated theo-
ries. 
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Consequently, design research is concerned with artificial rather than natural 
phenomena and is rooted as a discipline in the sciences of the artificial (March 
and Smith, 1995). Design Research is rooted in pragmatism in discussion 
(Haack, 1976). For the pragmatist, truth and utility  are indistinguishable as truth 
lies in utility. For Design Research (DR), the relevance is evaluated by the  utility 
provided to the organisation and developers. Thus DR must pass both the tests 
of  science and practice (Markus, Majchrzak and Gasser, 2002). One set of 
guidelines for the conducting and evaluating of a DR is the seven elements of 
‘design research criteria’ (Hevner et al., 2004). 
DR makes a dual contribution to epistemic and practical utility. Any piece of re-
search should add to existing theory in order to make a worthwhile scientific con-
tribution and the research should assist in solving the practical problems of prac-
titioners, specifically problems that are either current or anticipated. Two re-
search methods in the information systems field with this dual orientation are 
Design Research (Hevner et al. 2004) and Action Research (AR) (Baskerville 
and  Wood-Harper, 1998),  which both take place in the student-centred RIESCA 
research cases. 
DR consists of activities concerned with the construction and evaluation of tech-
nology artefacts to meet organisational needs as well as the development of 
their associated theories. In brief, behavioural science is concerned with theories 
that explain human or organisational behaviour, while DR is concerned with cre-
ating new and innovative artefacts (Hevner et al., 2004). The similarities of the 
fundamental characteristics of AR and DR are presented by Järvinen (2007). 
In student-centred integrative learning and action different types of designs and 
development are integrated into an environment, practice and action. All sus-
tainable AR phases include design e.g. economic design, service design, prod-
uct design, system design and action design. Thus, AR (focus on change of ac-
tualization and organisation) is similar to but differs slightly from DR (focus on 
building, co-creating and evaluation) in view of integrative learning and action. 
Action builds bridges from knowledge to competence and bridges design to the 
development and making of a commercial product, although this involves differ-
ent processes, goals and theoretical assumptions. Integrative action connects 
an innovation system to these perspectives through the behavioural sciences i.e. 
psychological, sociological and educational; the focus is obviously on learning. 
Service Design as Development Method 
The earliest contributions of Service Design to the perspective of marketing and 
management disciplines are connected to Shostack’s (1982) article “How to De-
sign a Service”. It describes the integrated design of material components, 
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namely products and immaterial components services. A design process can be 
documented and codified using a “service blueprint” to map the sequence of 
events in a service and its essential functions in an objective and explicit man-
ner. Effective service marketing requires the recognition of the complex combi-
nation of products and services which make up a simple service (Shostack, 
1982).  
The Service Design Network was launched by Köln International School of De-
sign in 2004. Currently, the international service design network (from the per-
spective of marketing and management) extends to service designers around 
the world, professional service design agencies and educational institutions such 
as Laurea. The Service Design of Information System in Integrative Action is 
mainly based on the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL v.3) and 
it describes Service Design’s principles, processes, technology related activities, 
tools, implementation and risks. 
The framework of used methods is illustrated in following figure (proposed by 
Pirinen 2008): 
DESIGNING
CONSTRUCTING
Constructs
Models
Instantiations
KNOWLEDGE
DEVELOPMENT
FOR
IMPROVING
ACTION RESEARCH
DESIGN RESEARCH
DESIGN SCIENCE
SERVICE DESIGN
Method
Artifacts
CASE STUDIES
CREATIONS
- mind’s point of view
- social interaction
- creative learning
- nature (bio-eco-techno)
technological
social - sociotech.
information based
nature based
DEVELOPMENT
- evolution models
- phase models
 
Pirinen R. 2009. Research Framework of Integrative Action in America’s Confer-
ence on Information  Systems (AMCIS 2009). 
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Action Research 
The discipline of information systems is an appropriate  field for the use of action 
 research methods. Action research methods are clinical in nature according to 
Baskerville and  Wood-Harper (1998)  and Baskerville and Mayers (2004), and 
place researchers in co- operative and  co-creative roles.  Action research aims to 
solve current practical problems while expanding scientific knowledge. The ac-
tion researcher’s  aim is to bring about organisational change while simultane-
ously studying the process. It is strongly oriented toward  collaboration and 
change and involves both researchers and subjects. 
In the RIESCA cases, action research is often iterative in scope and a continu-
ous  research process that capitalises on learning by both researchers and 
learners and expert  participants in workplaces. It is a research method that 
places researchers and learners in  a co-operative and co-creative role. In this 
environment, a theoretical genealogy of action research is based on “diversity in 
information  systems action research methods” (Baskerville and Wood-Harper, 
1998). Action Research assumes that a complex social  process is best studied 
by introducing changes in that process and by observing their effects. 
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PART II 
Methods for Evaluating and 
Developing Critical Systems 
 During the project  Laurea’s researchers and students, as research colleagues 
in co-operation with other  RIESCA project researchers, analysed existing stan-
dards  and methods. They evaluated their applicability  for evaluation and devel-
opment in critical system and event  security management. The target of the 
 project was to create a process for evaluating and developing  security manage-
ment during critical  systems and events. This was done by making use of exist-
ing methods and  standards whenever  possible. The pilot projects on these 
methods were carried out, where possible, with organisations that  took  part in 
the project, although some pilot projects were executed with other organisations. 
The whole  process (operations model) was supplemented with resolutions that 
were  developed during this project. 
Parts II and III present the results of student-centred R&D in the field of the RI-
ESCA project including the abstracts of the student-centred journals, conference 
papers and several M.A. theses and some previously unpublished articles. The 
abstracts and articles are divided into Chapters according to the RIESCA work 
package topics. 
Chapter 4 deals with modelling, simulation and developing the methods of criti-
cal infrastructures (CI) and contains four abstracts. Firstly, Pirinen and Rajamäki 
describe the RIESCA project and propose a new data collection and analysis 
model for CI evaluation as well as the creation of new evaluation methods. The 
second study is based on the first one and it (1) describes the RIESCA project; 
(2) proposes enhanced data mining collection and an analysis architecture 
model for critical systems evaluation; (3) includes a Business Continuing Man-
agement (BCM) method creation perspective for the context of critical systems 
and (4) describes RIESCA’s action and process implementation model. It is not 
unusual that a critical system is connected to the Internet. Mikkola’s thesis stud-
ies people’s strong identification with certain web-services with regard to the fi-
nance sector. Several critical systems are entirely reliant on ICT systems; also 
the ICT supply process is crucial to critical systems. Nissilä’s thesis designs, 
builds and evaluates new ICT supply processes. In Chapter 5, Helenius and 
Nissilä present this ICT supply process in more depth. 
The security of supply in Finland is secured by a public-private partnership. More 
and more of the operators of critical infrastructures are small and medium size 
 20 
entrepreneurs (SMEs). In Chapter 6, Noroviita and Uusitalo suggest a new con-
tinuity management model for SMEs. Chapter 7 studies IT continuity and the risk 
management of CI. Firstly, Arnell in his thesis creates an enterprise risk man-
agement policy for the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority. The next 
two theses deal with the IT continuity management of large Finnish technology 
companies. Syrjänen describes an IT continuity management maturity model for 
a company that invests strongly in IT due to its high dependency on the avail-
ability of information systems. Lalla’s case study describes how a newly merged 
global company managed to build a functional IT continuity management pro-
gramme. Chapter 8 presents Syrjänen’s action and design research on maturity-
based IT continuity management. 
National security consists of external and internal security and the protection of 
CI. Chapter 9 includes two theses that discuss internal security management 
cooperation with public organisations. An essential part of security work is coop-
eration with different authorities and local community operatives. Rusanen ex-
plores how security could be managed in state administration premises that 
have multiple tenant organisations representing different fields of state admini-
stration. 
Chapter 10 investigates how new technologies and procedures could improve 
border security. Two studies carried out by Rajamäki, Turunen, Harju, Heikkilä, 
Hilakivi and Rusanen, deal with facial recognition systems (FRS); one dissects 
FRS as a maritime security tool, the other widens its context to airport security. 
Viitanen, Happonen, Patama and Rajamäki address the problems that law en-
forcement authorities (LEAs) encounter with regard to cross-border operations. 
The study explains how these differ from other operations and what kind of new 
procedures are needed. 
Today, LEAs as well as fire and rescue services are increasingly dependent on 
mobile ICT systems. Chapter 11 includes three studies concerning this phe-
nomenon. Two studies carried out by Rajamäki and Villemson; cover the design-
ing of emergency vehicles’ ICT integration solutions. The first study illustrates 
the operating environment and describes the main ICT systems of an emer-
gency vehicle and presents a new mobile platform for a police car. The second 
study e.g. outlines a new service model that could be outsourced to 3rd party 
vendors and the methods that could be used to refine these models. Satellite 
tracking is one of the critical systems for LEAs. Kamppi’s, Rajamäki’s and Guin-
ness’ study covers the main satellite tracking system information security vul-
nerabilities and gives guidelines on how to make systems more secure. 
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Chapter 4  
Modelling, Simulation and the Development of 
Critical Infrastructures 
Modelling and Simulation of Critical Infrastructures 
Case: Rescuing of Intelligence and Electronic Security 
Core Applications (RIESCA) 
Rauno Pirinen and Jyri Rajamäki: In the Proceedings of the 2nd EURO-
PEAN COMPUTING CONFERENCE (ECC’08) Malta, September 11-13, 2008, 
ISSN: 1790-5109, ISBN: 978-960-474-002-4. 
Abstract 
According to the communication from the Commission to the Council and the 
European Parliament on Critical Infrastructure (CI) Protection in the Fight 
against Terrorism, CI includes energy installations and networks; communica-
tions and information technology; finance (banking, securities and investment); 
health care; food; water (dams, storage, treatment and networks); transport (air-
ports, ports, intermodal facilities, railway and mass transit networks, traffic con-
trol systems); the production, storage and transport of dangerous goods (e.g. 
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear materials);and government (e.g. 
critical services, facilities, information networks, assets and key national sites 
and monuments).  
When assessing possible risks, it is only seldom taken into account that CI is 
critically dependent on the reliability and security of information systems. The 
Rescuing of Intelligence and Electronic Security Core Applications (RIESCA) 
project aims to offer constructive solutions to this problem. The research project 
will produce information security management methods that can be used to en-
sure the proper functioning of CI under varying circumstances. Furthermore, it 
will also lead to the development of a learning and laboratory environment for CI 
management and development. 
This paper describes the RIESCA project and proposes a new data collection 
and analysis model for CI evaluation as well as the creation of new evaluation 
methods. 
  
 22 
Rescuing of Intelligence and Electronic Security Core 
Applications (RIESCA) 
Rauno Pirinen, Jyri Rajamäki, Lili Aunimo 
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on SYSTEMS. Volume 7, 2008 ISSN: 1109-2777. 
Abstract 
There are number of systems, such as transport and logistics, power and tele-
communication, hydropower and nuclear power stations; that are critical sys-
tems for the functioning of the day-to-day life of society in Finland. 
When assessing possible risks, it is only seldom taken into account that power, 
hydropower and nuclear power plants are critically dependent on the reliability 
and security of information systems. Information security is often enhanced by 
purchasing and extending technical solutions without considering any systematic 
planning and knowledge of how to protect the different segments of the system. 
In this case study, the risk is not only considered with respect to poor investment 
in information security resources (i.e. the wrong targets) but also with regard to 
the actual increasing of risks through poor decision making. Poor decision mak-
ing can result in the haphazard integration of systems, while their related infor-
mation security components may even create new security risks. 
As a result, systems that are critical for society may not work as they should. 
The Rescuing of Intelligence and Electronic Security Core Applications (RI-
ESCA) project aims to find constructive solutions to this problem. The research 
object aims to produce information security and continuity management methods 
that can be used to ensure the proper functioning of critical systems under vary-
ing circumstances. Furthermore, it should also lead to the development of inte-
grative action and an integrative environment for critical systems development, 
management and evaluation. 
This study: (1) describes the RIESCA project; (2) proposes enhanced data min-
ing collection and analysis architecture models for critical systems evaluation; 
(3) includes the Business Continuing Management (BCM) method creation per-
spective for the context of critical systems and (4) describes the RIESCA action 
and process implementation model. 
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An Individual's Strong Electronic Identification 
Teija Mikkola 
Master’s Thesis, Laurea University of Applied Sciences, 2009. 
The aim of this study is to clarify what an individual's strong identification in web-
services is and when its use is necessary in web hosting. The most relevant 
strong identification methods used in Finland are described. One of the goals is 
to apply knowledge gathered in the T Group's online/web services. In the theory 
part of the study, the classification of web services, the authenticity of identifica-
tion and the authenticity of the user identity are discussed. 
There are many identification methods, such as the Tupas certification service 
offered by banks, the Katso ID offered by th eFinnish tax administration and 
Kela, and the Identity Card and mobile identification maintained by the Popula-
tion Register Centre. In Finland, the most widely used and known identification 
method is the Tupas certification service. The benefit of it is that most of citizens 
already have a username and password. 
The Ministry of Finance, The Government Information Security Management 
Board (VAHTI) has classified web services into seven main classes, according 
to their content and characteristics. These classes will help service providers to 
demand a uniform standard. The Identity Card project has not started as 
planned but there is strong need and wish to integrate people’s identification 
methods. Finland's national policy and government bill promotes this project. So 
far the Tupas certification service has been useful, since it is widely used and 
known to be reliable. 
New ICT Supply Process, Interfaces between Supply 
Process and the Project Management Process in the ITIL 
Service Design Framework 
Marjo Nissilä 
Master’s Thesis, Laurea University of Applied Sciences, 2009. 
The purpose of this work is to design, build and evaluate a new ICT Supply 
Process. The needs for developing the supply process are several. External 
partners, for example, expect the newest version of ITIL to be in common opera-
tion and also expect the existing supply process and project management proc-
ess tasks to have identified any problems relating to dependency. 
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ITIL is the best known framework for ICT process maintenance and governance 
within the lifecycle of the initial system. Regardless of the Service Design mate-
rials shortcoming, the material is adequate enough to build a new ICT supply 
process. 
ITIL Service Design does not include a supply process or phased project man-
agement process and only contains some relevant usable steps for various 
processes and levels. 
The research question is: What kind of process is needed when purchasing ICT 
systems? The new version of the ICT supply process is based on ITIL Service 
Design version three. 
The new process has been connected to the main support processes; the pro-
ject management process and ITIL Service Design. During the work the leading 
role of the project management process was found when an external supply 
needed to be combined with development. In the new process the supply proc-
ess is triggered by the project management process and the deliverables of the 
supply process are inputs to the project management process. To combine the 
phases of the process some major decision points have been added. The new 
ICT supply process is evaluated in theory against the two best process models. 
One is a process for public procurement and the other is a guide for non-
specialist ICT purchasers. 
Evaluation proves that the new ICT supply process is more than adequate. It ful-
fils most of the ITIL framework’s valid criteria and most organisational needs. To 
achieve better results in IT projects, in 2009 only 32 % were successful (Ga-
lorath Incorporated 2008, 1), new ICT supply processes need to work as tools 
for IT projects. 
The new process developed here should make purchasing more effective. Over-
lapping tasks have been identified and removed from the new process. Due to 
the fact that the new ICT supply process is based on existing processes, it will fit 
easily into the present environment. Implementing the new process alone with-
out considering the required support processes is inadequate. 
The research method is based on Design Research for Information Systems in 
which a researcher defines builds and evaluates in order to create something 
new and produce a new artefact. An alternative would have been Action Re-
search but is better suited to further study on this work. The case study was at 
too early a stage from the point of view of this work. 
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Chapter 5 
A Service Design Framework for ITIL 
Kati Helenius and Marjo Nissilä 
New ICT Supply Process, Interfaces between Supply 
Process  and Project Management : a Design Research 
This work focuses on the supply process for ICT systems including its phases. 
The work is based on ITIL version three Service Design. The four views de-
scribed in Service Design are studied and the findings are presented as input 
material for the supply process development. The findings are expected to give 
input to improve and create more comprehensive ICT supply process. In general 
too little time is used to prepare ICT purchases. Often too little time is spent on 
preparation and monitoring and the evaluation of alternatives is often insignifi-
cant and preparation does not support decision making. In addition, targets are 
not set clearly and they are not connected properly to the strategy. In many ICT 
investments a decision based on the investment costs underestimates mainte-
nance fees which often are many times higher than investment itself. Project 
management is needed to fill these holes in the ICT purchasing process. Project 
Management inherently includes tasks that the ICT purchasing process often 
lacks (Karvinen, Reponen & Vehviläinen 1994, 16-30). Standish Chaos Reports 
is probably the most referenced work on the issue and is adapted for Table 1. 
They define success as projects on budget and with expected functionality. 
Standish Chaos reports 2009 (Galorath Incorporated 2008, 1). 
Functionality of ICT Projects 
Failed Projects  24 % 
Challenged Projects  44 % 
Successful Projects  32 %  
Table 1: Expected functionality in projects 
ITIL version 3 was published in 2007. Version 3 focuses on the cyclical govern-
ance model based on lifecycle management. Ten separate processes of ITIL V2 
have been grouped and completed to create five approaches that include 26 
processes in V3 (Introduction to ITIL 2006; Lloyd & Rubb 2007). This work fo-
cuses on the area of V3 Service Design, but extends to other areas when appli-
cable. 
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The research method is based on Design Science Research for information sys-
tems (Hevner, March, Park & Ram 2004). In this work a new artefact is defined, 
built and evaluated. For the deliverable of this work – the new ICT supply proc-
ess – the building phase laid out in the Design Science Research Guidelines by 
Hevner et al. is used and it is evaluated against two processes. One is the proc-
ess for public procurement and the other is the guide for non-specialist ICT Pur-
chasers. The criterion for evaluation is based on ITIL V3 Service Design and is 
made according to the relevant organisation. 
Problem description and expected new results 
There are several needs for developing the ICT supply process: external part-
ners expect the latest version of ITIL in common operations, however, the new 
model of lifecycle management presents only a new version. Only a few parts of 
the supply process have been added to this new version and an overall picture 
of the requirements for the supply process is still lacking. Regardless of the 
shortcoming of the ITIL material, the material is adequate for building a new ICT 
supply process. 
In the organisation’s ICT supply process, the project management process tasks 
are only mentioned and no direct connections to either dependency are identi-
fied. Also, the roles responsible for the processes remain unconnected and the 
“leading” process for each step has been not recognised. 
In order to get the supply process and the project management process to co-
operate, a new process is needed. The connections and parallel flows of other 
processes, management and ITIL frameworks need to be described and as-
sessed. More support processes are also needed for the ITIL framework proc-
esses. The tasks of these support processes include; requirement gathering, 
service catalogues and service level requirements, which provide key informa-
tion or key inputs for the supply and project management process. 
There is a gap in organisation between ITIL versions two and three. Due to this, 
not all the needed processes from the Service Design have been implemented 
yet and the processes have been developed independently at various times in 
different parts of the organisation. Further, the triggers for implementing the 
processes have had no direct connection. Within the Service Level Management 
the V3 process is split into three processes Service Catalogue Management and 
Supplier Management processes. In the organisation it is also clear that Informa-
tion Security Management needs to be upgraded. Capacity Management and 
Availability Management in V2 and V3 are similar. There is no connection be-
tween the ICT supply process and any ITIL based process. 
 27 
The expected result of the research work is that the new ICT supply process will 
fulfil the organisation’s needs. The supply process and project management 
process phases, connections and dependences have been used as examples 
and from them it is obvious that the new process must have a framework from 
ITIL V3. Additionally, the new ICT supply process must fit into present environ-
ment. 
Existing Supply Process  
The supply process for an ICT system is triggered by business needs and is 
closed when the supply contract is signed. The process includes four main 
phases: Business requirement specification including a Request for Information 
(RFI) phase, Request for Proposal (RFP) phase, Proposal and Negotiation 
phases (Organisation 2007,). The decision points are located between the main 
phases. 
 
Picture 1: Supply process 
Connection of Supply Process to Project Management Process 
The supply process and its phases include tasks, which are executed in the pro-
ject management process. The project management process includes six main 
phases: Prestudy, Mobilisation, Design, Realisation, Preparation and Handover 
(Organisation 2005, 3-18). The first two phases are the most relevant for the 
supply processes. 
 
Picture 2: Project management process 
A business needs to react to various triggers from project management and then 
collecting the business requirements triggers the supply process. The prestudy 
phase of the project management process includes business requirement de-
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termination, which triggers the supply process. The prestudy phase also pro-
duces a functional and technical conceptualisation of the supply process. When 
the supply process and mobilisation phase are finalised, the official project 
starts. The project team includes a project manager, representatives from busi-
nesses, technical departments, security and this involves experts on quality is-
sues. 
The Connection of the Supply Process to Existing ITIL Processes 
ITIL processes have been under implementation for a long period and a few 
have been used for a long time. Implementations based on ITIL V3 are still on-
going. Simultaneously a need for upgrading the existing ones is already recog-
nised. 
The implemented processes are IT Financial Management, Service Level Man-
agement, Capacity Management, Availability Management, Change Manage-
ment, Service Configuration Management, Release Management and Incident 
Management based on the ITIL V2. Access Management is being implemented 
according to ITIL V3. Service Continuity Management, Security Management 
and Problem Management are the next processes to be implemented. 
ITIL as a Framework 
ITIL (Information Technology Infrastructure Library) is a library, where best prac-
tices have been collected to improve an organisation’s ability to advance at the 
same pace throughout all business sections and departments, and to find quality 
solutions to fit customers needs (Roos 2006, 3). It has not been standardised, 
but it has become the most widely accepted approach to IT Service Manage-
ment in the world (Lloyd et al. 2007, viii). 
ITIL is owned by the Office of Government Commerce (OGC). IT Service Man-
agement Forum (ITSMF) is the body responsible for the development (Introduc-
tion to ITIL 2006, vi-vii). 
The original version of ITIL was developed at the same time and is in alignment 
with BS 15000, the former UK standard for IT Service Management. BS15000 
was fast tracked in 2005 to become ISO/IEC 20000, the first international stan-
dard in ITSM. OGC is committed to the maintenance of alignment between fu-
ture versions of ITIL and ISO/IEC 20000. (OGC 2009.) 
 29 
ITIL version 3 
In 2007 a new ITIL V3 was published. In this version, the perspective has moved 
from a process into focusing on service lifecycle thinking (IT Service Manage-
ment Forum 2007, slide 10). ITIL V3 includes five stages, which are Service 
Strategy, Service Design, Service Transition, Service Operation, which all be-
longing to Continual Service Improvement (Lloyd et al. 2007, 6).  
Service Strategy aligns business and IT and it ensures that every element of the 
Service Lifecycle is focused on customer outcomes. Service Transition provides 
guidance and process activities for the transition of services in the operational 
business environment. Service Operation introduces, explains and details deliv-
ery and control activities in order to achieve operational excellence on a day-to-
day basis. 
ITIL Service Design 
“A service is a means of delivering value to customers by facilitating ownership 
of specific cost and risks” (Lloyd et al. 2007, 11). The purpose of the Service 
Design stage is the design of new or changed services for production. In the de-
sign, it is fundamental, that all aspects and areas are covered and all activities 
and processes are integrated. In doing so, it is ensured that there will be only 
minimal issues arising during the subsequent stage (Lloyd et al. 2007, 30). 
Service Design covers five aspects which are:  
1. New or changed service 
2. Service Management systems and tools 
3. Technology architecture and management systems 
4. The processes required 
5. Measurement methods and metrics 
The Service Design stage starts with a set of new or changed business require-
ments and ends with the development of a service solution to meet the docu-
mented needs of the business (Lloyd et al. 2007, 15). 
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Service design includes the designing of the solution and the development of the 
solution as in figure 3 (Lloyd et al. 2007, 60). 
 
Picture 3: Service design – the big picture  
Subsequent activities, the evaluation of the alternative solutions and the pro-
curement of the preferred solution must be completed during the Service Design 
stage. One of the deliverables from design activities is ITT (Invitation to Tender) 
(Lloyd et al. 2007, 30, 46).  
To enable the Service Design to get the needed information, the key supporting 
processes should be up and running (Lloyd et al. 2007, 59). In ITIL Service De-
sign version 3 the processes are Service Level Management, Capacity Man-
agement, Availability Management, IT Service Continuity Management, Informa-
tion Security Management, Supplier Management and Service Catalogue Man-
agement. 
The project manager and the project team need to manage the stages from 
Strategy to Transition. The role is illustrated in Figure 4  (Lloyd et al. 2007, 31) . 
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Project management is needed in the development stage, where service design 
is translated into a plan (Lloyd et al. 2007, 31, 47.) 
 
Picture 4: Aligning new services to business requirements 
Theory Related to ICT Purchasing 
In general purchasing mean buying goods and services. It involves customer 
needs determination, supplier selection, arriving at a proper price, negotiating 
terms and conditions, signing a contract and following up the delivery (van 
Wheele 2005, 12). Goods are tangible, for example, raw materials or books. In 
contrast services are intangible, for example, software or licences (van Wheele 
2005, 33). From this point of view the OECD (2009) defines ICT (Information 
Communication Technology) in the service category. 
Supply issues must be considered as a process approach. A process includes 
steps and regards the steps as being connected. Moving from one step to an-
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other must be completed with a decision after every step (van Wheele 2005, 28-
29). Van Wheele (2005, 13) describes purchasing as a six phase function, the 
first three phases are specified as sourcing and the last three phases as supply. 
In this work the supply process correspond to how van Wheele describes the 
purchasing function, including phases from requirement determination to follow 
up tasks.  
Van Wheele (2005, 224) defines the ICT support needed in purchasing as a da-
tabase including articles, quotations and suppliers such as SAP. The focus is on 
buying goods which have, for example, codes and quantity. Nevertheless in 
many cases these database systems are still not capable of supporting the pur-
chasing management so that required information is available. A shortage of 
overviews, vendor rating and purchasing performance reports for management 
are often lacking when purchasing transactional process supporting systems.  
Van Wheele (2005, 33) notes that ICT licences and development contracts are 
purchased by a research and development manager. This does not mean that 
companies do not have departments for purchasing. It only shows that the 
agreed disciplines within a company are actively engaged in buying services. 
Theory Related to IT Project Management 
In general a project is work which is done for some unique purpose and to 
achieve defined results. A project has a defined goal, tasks and an outcome. It 
has start and end dates and a budget. In a project the allocated resources are 
combined with knowhow to achieve the target set (Organisation Oyj 2000, 2). 
The organisation is temporary and it will be wound up when its results have 
been achieved (Luomala et al. 2001, 10). Projects for businesses often need to 
include the knowhow to build an ICT system. 
Phillips (2005, 328-329) defines the IT Project management process as includ-
ing five phases: Project start, Planning, Delivery, Project Controlling and Ending 
the Project. The start and planning phases prepare the material for decision 
making. The supplier evaluation and the supplier selection take place during the 
project start phase (Phillips 2005, 196). 
In IT projects Phillips (2005, 194-199) defines development purchasing as start-
ing from identifying suitable suppliers. The next step is to shortlist two or three 
suppliers and to send out an RFP (Request for Proposal). External help for 
evaluating technical issues is recommended. Before signing a contract, refer-
ence calls and visits are recommended. Phillips (2005, 98, 115, 195) points out 
that the purchasing unit in an organisation buys licences but the IT project man-
ager is responsible for purchasing the project development work. 
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Phillips (2005, 143, 233) recommends that ICT support tools such as the Micro-
soft Project should be used in IT projects. The tool can only support the project 
management process and it does not replace the need for project management, 
team leading or cost controlling. Project Management tools are very helpful 
when planning project tasks so that they fit into a limited schedule. A manager 
can easily see where more resources are needed or where reconstructive ac-
tions are needed. If general tools are used widely in an organisation then de-
pendences on other projects can be recognised and handled if needed. 
Research Preface 
The philosophy in this work is pragmatism. It is a philosophical trend which em-
phasises actions and the relevance of practice also in perspective of science. 
Pragmatism tries to understand the present through the past. However, as a phi-
losophy it is focused on the future. Philosophical pragmatists deny the corre-
spondence notion of truth, proposing that truth is essentially what works in prac-
tice (Rorty 1982, 5). 
March et al. (1992, 4) present Design Science Research as a method which at-
tempts to create information technology based innovative things for people and 
their needs. A number of authors have used March and Smith’s thoughts on sci-
ence in their work such as Hevner et al. and Järvinen et al. 
Design Science Research produces artefacts, models, methods and instantia-
tions and includes two main activities; build and evaluate. March and Smith ar-
gue that an artefact must produce utility and the utility must be pointed out by 
criteria. The criteria must be generated from the artefact’s environment as it will 
define how the artefact functions and how well it works (March et al. 1992, 4-5, 
11, 16). 
When research questions include verbs such as build, enhance, improve the 
scope of work then the research is probably within the scope of Design Science 
Research or Design Research (Järvinen et al. 2004, 103). Järvinen (2007, 1391, 
1395) has noted that human and informational resources could be included in 
artefacts. This type of knowledge is used in this research work in a communica-
tion context. Järvinen (2007, 1394) also believes that artefacts should be evalu-
ated against earlier best practices or example innovations. 
The Design Science Research paradigm is proactive with respect to technology. 
It focuses on creating and evaluating innovative IT artefacts, which enable or-
ganisations to address important information-related tasks. The behavioural sci-
ence research paradigm is reactive with respect to technology in the sense, that 
it takes technology as "given”. It focuses on developing and justifying theories, 
which explain and predict phenomena related to the acquisition, implementation, 
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management and use of such technologies. Hevner et al. (2004, 98) argue that 
both Design Science and behavioural science paradigms are needed to ensure 
the relevance and effectiveness of IS research. 
During this creative process, the Design Science Researcher must be aware of 
evolving both the design process and the design artefact as part of the research 
(Hevner et al. 2004, 78). Relatively little behavioural research has focused on 
evaluating models, which is a major focus of research in management science 
literature (Hevner et al. 2004, 77). 
The problem of combining “real life” and a “scientific approach” is recognised as 
a challenge for this work, too. It is recognised that a lag exists between aca-
demic research and its adoption in industry. It also recognises the possible ad 
hoc nature of technology-oriented solutions developed in various industries. The 
latter gap can be reduced considerably by developing and framing the industrial 
solutions based on proposed guidelines (Hevner et al. 2004, 98). The artefacts 
constructed in Design Science Research are rarely full-grown information sys-
tems that are used in practice (Hevner et al. 2004, 83).  
Hevner’s Guidelines 
Design Science is inherently a problem solving process. The fundamental prin-
ciple of Design Science Research from which seven guidelines (Hevner et al. 
204, 83) are derived, is that knowledge and understanding about a design prob-
lem and its solution are acquired in the building and application of an artefact. 
According to Hevner et al (2004), Design Science Research requires the crea-
tion of an innovative, purposeful artefact (Guideline 1) for a specific problem 
domain (Guideline 2). Because the artefact is "purposeful," it must yield utility for 
the specified problem. Hence, the thorough evaluation of the artefact is crucial 
(Guideline 3). Novelty is similarly crucial since the artefact must be "innovative," 
solving a hitherto unsolved problem or solving a known problem in a more effec-
tive or efficient manner (Guideline 4). In this way, Design Science Research is 
differentiated from the practice of design. The artefact itself must be rigorously 
defined, formally represented, coherent and internally consistent (Guideline 5). 
The process by which it is created and often the artefact itself, incorporates or 
enables a search process whereby a problem space is constructed and a 
mechanism posed or enacted to find an effective solution (Guideline 6). Finally, 
the results of the Design Science Research must be communicated effectively 
(Guideline 7) both to a technical audience (researchers who will extend them 
and practitioners who will implement them) and to a managerial audience (re-
searchers who will study them in context and practitioners who will decide 
whether they should be implemented within their organisations). 
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Hevner’s guidelines are adapted for Picture 5. The purpose of establishing these 
seven guidelines is to assist researchers, reviewers, editors and readers in un-
derstanding the requirements for effective Design Science Research (Hevner et 
al. 2004, 82-83.) 
 
Picture 5: Hevner’s guidelines for Design Science Research 
Used method: In this research, based on Design Science Research for informa-
tion systems (Hevner et al. 2004), the researcher defines builds and evaluates in 
order to create something new; an artefact. 
Process model method 
Modelling techniques are used for the description of processes. The reason to 
use visual modelling is to make the process easy to understand, follow and 
teach to others. They are also a part of the documentation of the processes 
used to standardise, explain and make more visible the big picture of operations. 
Documents can be used as a part of any other processes, like quality documen-
tation or training material. A good picture allows the easy understanding of mate-
rial. 
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Diagrams, especially diagrams describing business processes and software sys-
tems, can become very complex (Harmon 2003, 91). The grouping is chosen to 
reflect the way a given company or group thinks about its processes and may 
vary from company to company. A process can be subdivided to any detailed 
level. The smallest process to picture in a process model is an activity. Many ac-
tivities can be subdivided into smaller steps. 
Processes are made up of sub processes and ultimately activities and linked to-
gether to produce organisational outputs. Processes describe the flow of work; 
functions represent the reporting relationship of the company (Harmon 2003, 
109). 
The process figure of the new ICT supply process uses standard objects to pro-
vide fast familiarisation. The main phases, for example high-level processes, are 
described within the pentagonal arrows. The decision points are shown as 
hexagons. Roles or parties are provided as titles and dividing lines. The start 
and finish are indicated through squares. 
The New ICT Supply Process 
The new version of the ICT supply process is based on ITIL Service Design V3. 
The input of deliverables to this work is the existing situation of the supply proc-
ess in an organisation, together with the recognised needs of reengineering the 
process. The output of deliverables is then the revised version of the ICT supply 
process. 
The proposed process model method is used for the presentation of new arte-
facts and the 7 step guideline was used as the process for creating the new arte-
fact. The theory operates then as a framework for providing the deliverables and 
at the same time as the main framework to verify the scientific contribution. In 
addition, the new version has been evaluated and connected with the main sup-
porting processes: The Project management process and ITIL Service Design. 
The new ICT supply process was built by the authors Kati Helenius and Marjo 
Nissilä in the spring of 2009. The authors’ research question was: 
How can we connect the supply process and the project management process 
together with the relevant ITIL Service Design supply processes? 
The authors used the existing tasks from the supply process and project man-
agement process and collected relevant tasks from Service Design to be added 
to the new ICT supply process. In order to understand how these processes are 
connected and how the tasks in different processes trigger each other and which 
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task is the leading one in any phase the authors created an analysis of steps in 
parallel processes. The leading tasks were found by finding the decision points 
and the owners of the processes. This is described in detail in Figure 6. 
 
Picture 6: Analysis of steps in parallel processes 
Based on the analysis of steps a new process was designed to give a common 
overview of how these processes are connected to each other as separate 
process flows. In the new ICT supply process (Figure 7) the parties are generi-
cally described in the left panel: external and internal, where the external is the 
vendor party. 
The new ICT supply process was triggered by the project management process, 
which was triggered by a business decision. The project management process 
starts by gathering the business requirements, which provide the input for the 
first task of the supply process: requirement definition. The needs for the supply 
process are different though, as the input serves only the creation of RFI, com-
pared with the needs of the project management process, but this does not jus-
tify the processes for separate requirement gathering. 
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The new ICT supply process deliverables are the inputs to the project manage-
ment process design phase and Service Design procures the referred solution 
task. Compared with the existing supply process, where finalizing the contract 
was part of the negotiation phase, the task of procuring the solution has been 
transferred to Service Design. 
The needed ITIL support processes are excluded from the new ICT supply proc-
ess. This does not understate their necessity, as is presented in Figure 7. 
 
 
Picture 7: The New Proposal of ICT Supply Process 
The Evaluation of the New ICT Supply Process   
The new ICT supply process is evaluated against two processes and their 
phases: process for public procurement and a guide for non-specialist ICT pur-
chasers. The organisation uses government funds when purchasing and there-
fore must follow national procurement legislation. The guide for non-specialist 
ICT purchasers is aimed at business owners and managers who often see ICT 
as being a highly technical and specialised subject. The criteria for evaluation 
are based on the Service Design appendix C (Lloyd et al. 2007, 237). That pro-
vides a good basic list of the typical content of a process framework. On the 
other hand criteria are based on the organisational need to update the existing 
supply process. 
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The evaluation was conducted according to the Design Science Research static 
analysis method developed by Hevner et al. (2004, 86). In the evaluation of the 
New ICT supply process the methods of the case study, experiment, field study 
or simulation are excluded as evaluation methods. The theoretical evaluation is 
made from the customer’s (internal) point of view. 
In order to combine and analyse two other processes and the new ICT supply 
process similarities and differences and to draw conclusions, the researcher 
created a template for analysis (Yin 2009, 126-127). 
The following abbreviations are used in Figure 8: PMP, Project Management 
Process, ITIL as ITIL Service Design and SP, Supply Process. On the left Ac-
credit UK’s (2008, 3) process for purchasing ICT is described. In the middle the 
new ICT supply process which describes the phases in the process is shown. 
On the right the open procedure process for public procurement is described 
(Aarla 2003, 1-3). 
 
 
Picture 8: Evaluation processes 
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Results 
Problem solved 
An organisation’s existing supply process needs a project management process. 
While analyzing an existing supply process the project management process 
tasks are only mentioned and in the project management process supply proc-
ess tasks are also only mentioned. No direct connections to either dependency 
are identified. However, the latter project management phases like design and 
realisation need to connect and be combined with the supply process. 
A project management process is always needed for development based pur-
chased solutions but not for maintenance based purchased solutions. The im-
portance of project management became clear during the evaluations, as did its 
leading role in the new process. 
Some major decision points from existing processes related to the new process 
have been combined. Decision points were needed in order to situate the tasks 
of the supply process and separate the ITIL support into the phases of the pro-
ject management process. The supply process connections are only a partial 
view of the service design deliverable process, as the supply process is always 
connected to a vendor party. Service design does not recognise parties, only 
roles and they are generic. In order to operate effectively the steering groups 
should also be aligned. 
Service Design contains previous and subsequent phases compared to the sup-
ply process. During the work the researcher noticed that both the project man-
agement process and service design process are connected to subsequent 
phases. The basic deliverables of the supply process – a final contract with at-
tachments – should have an addressee with a task to trigger the development 
phase. In the new process, it has been connected to the project management 
decision point. The governance for the purchase decision point is now handled 
by the project management. 
The new ICT supply process uses only the deliverables of the project manage-
ment process. In existing processes some tasks are carried out by the project 
management process and in the supply process. Requirement gathering is con-
ducted in both processes. 
During the evaluation, the new ICT supply process is more than adequate. It ful-
fils most of the ITIL framework’s valid criteria and most of the organisation’s 
needs. The new process includes six internal phases and one external phase. 
However, two other processes do not recognise the parties. Also no decision 
points were included in these two processes. All three processes start with a re-
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quirement definition and purchase planning. Two of the models end when the 
implementation becomes finalised and one will end when a supplier makes a 
decision. Process measurements and metrics, tools and reports are not defined 
and included in the new ICT supply process in this work scope. 
Excellence and ITIL 
When going through the ITIL Service Design the author noticed that there was 
no integrated existing supply process and that only some relevant tasks existed. 
Tasks related only in theory were not considered to relate to each other as they 
had different hierarchical statuses in the processes. Also no decision points 
were included in the Service Design material.  
Service design either ITIL does not contain a phased project management proc-
ess. This work will be sent as a proposal to the owner of ITIL, OGC for the de-
velopment of the next version of ITIL. The suggestions are described in more 
detail in the conclusions on the recognised ITIL development needs. 
Challenges 
All three models are processes and managed on a project basis. The new ICT 
supply process is based on ITIL. Although the ITIL process framework requires 
communication content in its process, Service Design does not have a tool or 
model to describe its process. Also all the process models lack communication 
and knowledge transformation. 
The ITIL support processes are excluded from the new process. This does not 
understate their necessity. If any part of maintenance for the purchased solution 
is included in the contract – as it should be – the support processes need to 
evaluate, state in detail and plan to be up and running when they go live and the 
solution is executed. Tasks in these support processes are e.g. requirement 
gathering, service catalogues and service level requirements, which provide the 
key information or key input for supply and project management processes. 
The supply process and the project management process roles and responsibili-
ties must be synchronised and work effectively. In the existing supply process 
version, the business owner is responsible for the gathering of requirements, 
creating the business case, accepting the supply process team, the supply crite-
ria and the commercial issues. 
The supply process manager is responsible for the RFI process and the RFP 
process. The project manager of the project management process has no con-
nection to the supply process. So the role of business owner is stronger in the 
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project management process but has the same individual operating in both 
processes. 
Limitations 
Process for the first phase of public procurement includes a definition for the 
method to be used in the process. In the new process, neither the prestudy 
phase nor the first phase of the guide for non specialist ICT Purchasers includes 
a definition. 
The new ICT supply process will fit easily into the present environment. Imple-
menting the new process alone without the needed supporting processes, proc-
ess measurements and metrics, tools and reports is inadequate, though. 
Conclusions 
Improvements as a result of the new ICT supply process implementation 
To achieve better results in IT projects the results of this work show that a new 
ICT supply process can be a tool. The first phases of project management; 
preparation and supply process and requirement definition have been combined 
with a common decision point. As Karvinen et al. (1994, 16-30) point out: too lit-
tle time has been spent on preparing ICT purchases. Due to the combining, 
preparations have been synchronised. Project management helps cover for the 
faults of the supply process. IT project management includes tasks in setting the 
target (Phillips 2005, 11), defining a connection to company strategy (Phillips 
2005, 76) and setting the budget including maintenance fees and follow-up tasks 
(Phillips 2005, 98-117). 
The new ICT supply process is based on ITIL Service Design V3 (Lloyd et al. 
2007). The ITIL framework does not contain any tools for the better two-way un-
derstanding for business and ICT people; only a high level approach of aligning 
is presented. Even so the use of ITIL terms provides a common terminology 
framework for ICT. The new process supports the need for common operations 
and models with suppliers. Also in the new ICT supply process both internal and 
external parties are defined and both parties process phases. 
A result of implementing the new ICT supply process makes purchasing more 
effective. Overlapping tasks have been identified and extracted from the new 
process. The new process uses only the deliverables of the project management 
process. In existing processes some tasks for example requirement gathering to 
be carried out by the project management process and in the supply process. 
Effectiveness can also be achieved in resources. The business owner has many 
responsibilities in processes and by combining processes some operations such 
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as requirement gathering can be done only once. That does not however re-
move the need for requirement change management. 
Recommended supportive actions in the purchasing field 
The result of the evaluation of the new ICT supply process shows that imple-
menting new ICT supply processes alone without the required supporting proc-
esses, process measurements and metrics, tools and reports is inadequate.  
An organisation should have an information system to support the decentralised 
purchasing of ICT systems (van Wheele 2005, 241). This gives the possibility to 
coordinate all ICT purchasing activities. ICT systems usually lead to better disci-
pline and more systematic communication from the purchasing operations. ICT 
systems also enable better management information and reports. As a result 
suppliers are better managed, due to the greater transparency of the purchasing 
operations. In generally an IT project uses ICT tools for gathering information 
through email, Excel, other Internet forms and Microsoft Project (Phillips 2004, 
259-260). Organisations’ should evaluate the possibilities to use these com-
monly used tools to support ICT purchases at organisational level. 
In general processes should be measured and a process should have set met-
rics (Lloyd et al. 2007, 237). The main focus is to give information about process 
situation and development in clear and visual formats and point out if there are 
problems or improvements needed. A well defined and implemented measure-
ment system gives a transparent picture of results and based on that it is easy to 
understand the connection between action and measurement. A universal, sim-
ple and practical model for measurement and metrics in purchasing is difficult to 
develop (Iloranta & Pajunen-Muhonen 2008, 434-444; van Wheele 2005, 250-
267). 
The new ICT supply process is managed on a project basis when supply and 
development is needed. In such cases IT project management measurements 
and metrics can be used. Phillips (2005, 13) defines budget, target and scope 
and a schedule as project metrics. A project needs a budget to illustrate how 
much money it is going to take to fulfil the set target. A clear and well defined 
target is the most important thing for a project - or that project will fail. The pro-
ject schedule defines the time when the target is achieved and the project out-
comes are ready to be transferred to the maintenance organisation.  
In the new ICT supply process internal and external parties are described. In an 
organisation process the roles and responsibilities should be evaluated and dis-
tributed. The role of business owners is emphasised in a new process. Business 
units and their executives must take a leadership role in a handful of key ICT 
decisions. Unless business executives take responsibility for the success or fail-
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ure of ICT purchases they will end up with systems that will have no impact on 
business. IT projects. Furthermore, departments should be held responsible for 
delivering solutions that are on time and on budget. Only business executives 
can make the organisational changes needed to generate business value from 
the new system (Karvinen et al. 1994, 120-123).  
Recognized ITIL development needs for future work 
Regardless of the shortcomings of the Service Design material, the material was 
adequate to build a new ICT supply process. No real supply process exists in 
Service Design - only relevant tasks. Subsequent activities, the evaluation of the 
alternative solutions and the procurement of the preferred solution must be 
completed during the Service Design stage. One of the deliverables from the 
design activities is ITT (Invitation to Tender) (Lloyd et al. 2007, 30, 46). 
The process modelling method was chosen and used in this work (Harmon 
2003), which includes techniques to describe the decision points of the new ICT 
supply process. Neither the ITIL generic process model (ITIL Service Support 
2002, 273) nor the Service Design process framework (2007, 237) includes the 
decision points. In the ITIL process, the owner is responsible for ensuring that 
the process fits the purpose - but steering groups or comparable decision groups 
are not included. 
The project manager and the project team need to manage the stages from 
strategy to transition. Also project management is needed in the development 
stage, where service design is turned into a plan (Lloyd et al. 2007, 31, 47). 
Tasks presented in the text were not shown in Picture 4. If a phased project 
management process exists in a company, it will need to be adjusted to an ITIL 
processes. 
The ITIL framework does not contain any tools for an improved two-way under-
standing between business and ICT people, and only a high level approach to 
aligning is presented. Although the ITIL process framework requires communica-
tion content in its process (Lloyd et al. 2007, 237), Service Design does not de-
scribe it in its process. The use of ITIL terms provides a terminology framework 
for ICT with no focus on business people. For business discussions the termi-
nology needs to be trained to the business party. For service level agreements a 
two-way understanding and communication support tool would prevent some 
problems from arising. Problems might develop if the service level targets are 
not aligned with business needs, or the ICT service provider activities and the 
service levels are not aligned with business expectations. 
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Chapter 6 
Continuity Management Model for Finnish 
SME’s: A Design Science Research 
Heli Noroviita ja Katja Uusitalo 
Introduction 
The management of critical systems is no longer the sole responsibility of the 
public sector, but critical systems are also owned more and more by private 
companies. These private companies are also small and medium enterprises 
(SME), which have a significant role in society when we talk about the produc-
tion of critical services. Thus, it is important to recognise the requirements of 
business continuity managements from the information systems point of view. In 
this article we introduce a Design Science Research project that is part of our 
M.A. programme studies in Information Systems at Laurea. The goal of the re-
search was to create a model; an artefact, in order to manage the continuity of 
information systems in Finnish SMEs. 
Our research problem was ”What could be the proposal of the model for Finnish 
SMEs regarding Information System (IS) continuity management?”. We identi-
fied the following three separate research questions: 
1.  How can we define a satisfactory level for a continuity plan for small and 
medium enterprises? 
2. How can we utilise existing standards and operation models? 
3. Is it possible to create an artefact which would be light enough and user-
friendly and at the same time be assured that it will cover all the critical 
functions of continuity management? 
Adaptation of the Research Methods 
The Design Science Research method is used when new knowledge is created 
for design and implementation. According to Järvinen (2004), the Design 
Science Research method is used, when the research question includes the fol-
lowing verbs: build, strengthen, change, improve, extend. Design Science Re-
search is technically oriented and adaptive (Järvinen, 2004). 
March and Smith (1995) have discovered that an IS artefact is built in order to 
fulfill a specific task and after this artefact is built the research problem can then 
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be solved. According to Van Aken (2004) the mission of Design Science is to 
create new knowledge for the design and realisation of artefacts and new arte-
facts. In effect, a model, a method or a system that is better than the ones cur-
rently available. Van Aken (2004) also emphasises the usability evaluation of an 
innovation. 
Alan Hevner (2004) has introduced into Design Science Research a framework, 
in which business requirements define a practical relevance for IS-research and 
where the knowledge base enables both the scientific and research viewpoint. 
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Figure 1: The adaptation of Hevner’s IS research framework for our study. 
In Figure 1 we show how we adapted our research plan with Hevner’s IS re-
search framework. We collected documentation regarding the subject from the 
scientific literature and from other sources. Our main sources were previous stu-
dies, literature and standards. Based on these sources, and the work we con-
ducted in other study modules, we created our own proposal for the model. The 
evaluation part of the study is presented in a simple table. Based on the results 
of the first test round, we updated and improved the model. However, the model 
still needs further work and development before it can be implemented in a real 
world SME. In the following table we show how the seven steps of Hevner’s 
(2004) Design Science Research guidelines were adapted for the study.  
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Table 1: Design Science Research Guidelines by Hevner 
Design Science Research Guidelines 
 
Guideline 
 
 
Description 
 
 
Adaptation in our study 
 
 
1 Design as an 
artefact 
Design science research must 
produce a viable artefact in the 
form of a construct, a model, a 
method, or an instantiation. 
It is a simple, general 
model for continuity man-
agement in SME’s, which 
does not currently exist.  
 
2  Problem rele-
vance 
The objective of design sci-
ence research is to develop 
technology-based solutions to 
important and relevant busi-
ness problems. 
Continuity management is 
an essential part of risk 
management in a com-
pany. The study looks for 
solutions to improve rec-
ognised problems. 
 
3  Design 
evaluation 
The utility, quality, and efficacy 
of a design artefact must be 
rigorously demonstrated via 
well-executed evaluation 
methods. 
A simple table testing was 
conducted during the 
study. 
 
4  Research con-
tributions 
Effective design science re-
search must provide clear and 
verifiable contributions in the 
areas of the design artefact, 
design foundations, and/or de-
sign methodologies. 
.As a result of the study a 
preliminary model was 
created. 
 
5  Research 
rigor 
Design science research relies 
upon the application of rigor-
ous methods in both the con-
struction and evaluation of the 
design artefact. 
The study method was 
based on the Design Sci-
ence Research frame-
work. Some of the refer-
ences were taken from a 
scientific knowledge da-
tabase. 
 
6 Design as a 
search process 
The search for an effective ar-
tefact requires utilising avail-
able means to reach desired 
ends while satisfying laws in 
the problem environment. 
The search for a solution 
was focused on the needs 
of the Finnish SME com-
panies. 
 
7 Communica-
tion of research 
Design science research must 
be presented effectively both 
to technology-oriented as well 
as management-oriented au-
diences. 
Results have been pre-
sented in the school 
community to the relevant 
teachers and students 
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Literature Study 
IT Service Continuity management 
Information systems are an essential part of business in all companies, even if 
the main industry of the business would not be information technology. IT plays 
an essential role e.g. in customer management, order handling, accounts paya-
ble and receivable and banking transactions. It is not possible to pass data secu-
rity issues when information systems or IT services are handled. The diagram 
below illustrates how data security is an important part of a company’s security. 
Continuity planning is part of the data security (Tietoturva ry, 2006). 
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Figure 2: The tasks of data security as part of company security 
The US Department of Commerce has its own specific standard Minimum Secu-
rity Requirements for Federal Information and Information Systems in order to 
define a minimum level of data security requirements for the state’s information 
systems. Though data security requirements for the state systems are partly 
higher than the requirements for the private sector the question remains; is the 
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United States’ Federal IS security requirement listed also a good tool and check-
ing list for private sector companies. 
Continuity planning and the need for it have been defined in the above-
mentioned standard like this: “Organisations must create, manage and imple-
ment efficient plans for unexpected state of emergency. These plans must cover 
counter-measures, checking activities and return activities from state of emer-
gency for IT-systems and –services. The purpose of these activities is to ensure 
that all critical information is possible to use and thus business continuity en-
sured.” 
In the instructions to the Finnish Financial supervisory authority it is emphasised 
that a recovery plan for IT services is the most important section of continuity 
planning. An essential issue of continuity planning is preparing for different crisis 
situations in the area of information technology. For crisis situations back up ar-
rangements and a precise formulated recovery plan must be formulated. The al-
ternative arrangements include the backing up of data, the duplication of critical 
equipment and components, the duplication of telecommunication connections, 
ensuring the undisturbed supply of electricity and substitute arrangements if 
people cannot participate. The recovery plans are usually written up in IT sys-
tems, and the plan should include sufficient detailed instructions about the action 
required to get an IT system or a part of an IT system up and running in varied 
crisis situations. The starting point for IS recovery planning is the estimation of 
the critical nature of the crisis and the required time for a return to normal opera-
tions. These estimates are created by the business units of the company in-
volved (Rahoitustarkastuslaitos, verkkojulkaisu 2003). 
In the handbook ’Is your company’s information risk controlled?’ there are ex-
ample scenarios that make the importance of a security policy clear. The practi-
cal examples are given with regard to the continuity of a company’s operations 
and the recovery from a crisis situation: The confidentiality, completeness and 
usability of information should be protected against threat and damage caused 
by defective equipment, software errors, natural disasters, conscious, negligent 
or accidental human action. These threats can be for example corporate spying 
against the company, other criminal actions, unmanaged publicity and informa-
tion, privacy or data protection, the unintended leaking of information, negli-
gence or carelessness when handling information. All these areas can incur 
damage and significant financial loss, hinder operations and damage functions 
(Teollisuus ja työnantajat, 2001, s.17). 
Also mentioned are three examples that all emphasise the indispensable nature 
of IT service continuity planning. Since this is of consequence to all companies 
and organisations, in order to ensure their own competitiveness and existence 
during a state of emergency, the most important security issue to evaluate in 
every company is continuity management. Besides continuity management there 
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is the operational environment outside the company i.e. business networks. That 
is why managing the continuity of a company, guarantees the continuity of busi-
ness partners in emergency situations. Thus, in agreement between companies 
there should be requirements for continuity planning. The agreements can in-
clude qualifiers for the partner to have continuity planning at an equivalent level. 
Continuity management tasks 
The main purpose of continuity management is to ensure that a company can 
operate under unusual conditions as planned. The minimum service level for 
unusual conditions must also be planned beforehand. 
The British Business Continuity Management Standard, BS 25999, is an appre-
ciated, well known and used standard that defines principles, processes and 
terminology for business continuity management. It is a collection of guidelines 
and recommendations that have been developed from best practices. It is possi-
ble to adapt this as standard in all kind of organisations no matter what their size 
or industry or company or organisation. 
 
Figure 3: The business continuity management lifecycle (British Standard BS 
 25999) 
In Figure 3 all essential elements of the BS 25999 standard are shown. Busi-
ness continuity management must be have an ongoing cycle in an organisation. 
Continuity planning is not a onetime project. The core of the process is a conti-
nuity planning programme that consists of the following four parts: 
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An understanding of the business and organisation: Key products and services, 
critical activities and resources must be defined in the organisation. Business 
impact analysis (BIA) is part of this phase. The management evaluates the im-
pact of losing resources for business (Doswell, 2000). Based on the results of 
the analysis it is possible to make decisions on how to minimise risks and en-
sure continuity. 
Definition of continuity strategy: In the definition phase a strategy for a sufficient 
level of products and services during a state of emergency is chosen. The stan-
dard introduces the following issues for consideration: personnel, premises, 
technology, information, vendors and interest groups. 
The development and implementation of a continuity plan: The framework of 
continuity planning is created. The framework will be implemented in the organi-
sation. It will also define time limits for a sufficient return level. 
The maintenance and re-evaluation of the plan: The standard emphasises regu-
lar testing, maintenance and follow-up of the continuity plan. As a result of the 
continuity planning the processes will be well tested and regularly maintained. 
BS25999 introduces the PDCA-cycle to assure and improve continuity effective-
ly. The cycle development is seen as a spiral, an endless process – after each 
round the target is one step nearer. The idea of the cycle is based on the idea of 
continuous learning. During the development spiral it is possible to check and 
change the final target. The phases of the cycle are introduced in the following 
table. 
Table 2: The PDCA 
PDCA 
PLAN 
 
Define principles, goals, processes and guidelines in order to manage risks 
based on the principles in the organisation. 
DO  Implementation of the agreed steps 
CHECK  Follow and amend new operational models, processes and guidelines. 
ACT  Maintain and improve business procedures according to the goals set by 
management. Implications for developing. 
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IT- service continuity management in SME’s 
Small and medium sized companies are companies which have less than 250 
employees and a yearly maximum turnover below 50 million Euros, or whose 
grand total on the balance sheet is not more than 43 million Euros. It is also re-
quired that such companies are independent. Being independent means that 
companies are less than 25 % owned by large companies (Tilastokeskus 2008). 
SMEs have more special challenges than large companies with respect to IT se-
curity. They have a specific role within IT services continuity management, ac-
cording to the Ministry of Trade and Industry in Finland, which has done wide re-
search on the level of IT security and IT risk management in SMEs. More than 
four thousand contact persons from various SMEs were interviewed. According 
to the research the issues that most need development were related to adminis-
trative IT security. This means the policies, planning, sourcing and responsibili-
ties of IT security. Only 14 % of the companies had written an IT security plan 
and only 21 % had established a written IT security policy. Only 43 % of the 
companies had appointed an employee who would be responsible for IT-security 
issues (Pk-yritysten tietoturvakysely, 2006) . 
According to the research the most common reason for the failure of IT-security 
is a lack of knowledge and information, ignorance and non-proficiency. The oth-
er big reason was a lack of IT-security knowledge among entrepreneurs and 
management; also a personnel’s lack of ability to use IT systems was a major 
problem. These were explained by the lack of resources in SMEs. All employees 
work with the core business and away from its support functions (Pk-yritysten 
tietoturvakysely 2006). Also, for management the outsourcing of IT-services has 
created the impression that someone else is taking care of all IT-related issues. 
However, the fact is that outsourcing changes the risk map in a company and it 
requires more input to update a continuity plan. 
Security issues, like other essential issues in a company, have an impact on 
company culture. It is important for the management of an SME to be aware, 
that a flat organisation has the opportunity to implement changes and new oper-
ational models more easily because communication between company man-
agement, supervisors and employees is more natural. 
Risk management and IT-security in Finnish SMEs are subjects which have rec-
ognized the need for development. Already in the 1990’s at least two national 
projects were established: PK-RH, the Risk Management of SME’s and its sister 
project PO-RISHA. The purpose of these projects was to improve risk manage-
ment in SMEs by supporting SMEs and their employees and enabling them to 
forecast changes in the SMEs own operational environment. 
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The projects were executed by training the personnel and developing risk man-
agement methods. The personnel and management have a significant role in 
risk management issues. Risk management must be a conscious and conti-
nuous evaluation and improvement. The target of the projects mentioned above 
was to protect the vulnerability of SME-companies. (ESR-projektin loppuraportti, 
1999). 
As a result of the first phase in the project, a risk management tool set for SMEs 
was produced. This tool set included risk charts, checking lists, information 
packages, and guidance books. In the second phase a number of risk manage-
ment web pages were published at www.pk-rh.fi. The content of the web pages 
was similar to the previous tool set. In addition new risk areas were covered, e.g. 
environmental risks and compliance management (Työterveyslaitoksen verkko-
lehti, 1999). 
Web-pages are user friendly and free for everyone. They include several docu-
ments, listings, and other tools in the risk management area. From the IS conti-
nuity management point of view our first impression is that IT security related is-
sues are just one minor part of the whole. Risks are classified per risk types and 
each should have its own folder. In these folders there should be several links to 
other subfolders and documents. 
Risk types have been classified as follows: Business risks, Personnel risks, 
Agreement and liability risks, Information risks, Environmental risks, Project 
risks, Interruption risks, Crime risks and Fire risks. Different risk areas are han-
dled together and there is a separate evaluation form that can be used as a 
support tool when evaluating and analysing risks. 
 The Results of Design Science Research 
The Proposal of an IT Service Continuity Model for SMEs 
When gathering and studying information about IT service continuity planning 
and during the creation of outlines for the proposal of a universal model for an IT 
continuity plan for Finnish SMEs, we ended up with the conclusion that the 
model can be at most a suggestive process description. In that process descrip-
tion all the crucial and most important tasks are presented. The result of this re-
port is to propose a model which is intended to be adapted and taken into con-
sideration for every company’s own distinctive requirements. One of the main is-
sues of the research questions remains open: Can it be assumed that SMEs 
have the necessary expertise to apply the model to their situation or should this 
model be more comprehensive and detailed? Is it a risk to have a model so ge-
neric and common that it gives great 'leeway' to those who will utilise it? Would it 
nevertheless be better to add to this model a very detailed instruction of every 
phase and the steps inside the phases? When working with this model we uti-
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lised several references and previous reports which have covered the same 
theme. 
In Figure 4 there are several issues that at least should be included in an SME 
enterprise's IT service continuity plan. 
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Figure 4: Proposal for the framework of an IT service continuity plan 
The management of an SME should make the decision about the starting of a 
continuity management process and with that decision the management must 
make a commitment to the implementation of continuity process. If the man-
agement does not stand by this process, there is no likelihood of a successful 
and advantageous process. In this case the management should be aware of 
and take a conscious risk regarding operating loss, which can result from a 
threat or crisis situation. 
A continuity management process includes the gathering of information and the 
creation of scenarios that involve threats. It must be noticed that these actions 
can vary extensively based on the company and business area. The gathered 
information is founded on the plan of the divisions of the continuity management. 
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After these actions the continuity plan should be thoroughly documented and 
tested. When the test phase is concluded the continuity process should proceed 
to a maintenance phase, which also has to be planned carefully. All the relevant 
personnel in the company must be trained and acquainted with the continuity 
plan and throughout the organisation there must be a common awareness of the 
continuity process and continuity plan. The commitment of personnel to the con-
tinuity plan is crucial if the implementation is to succeed. 
Process model and the phases of the process 
The continuity planning process can be divided into phases which are described 
in Figure 5. The actual process consists of these actions. 
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Figure 5: A model of the IT service continuity planning process 
 
A model for the IT continuity planning process 
The decision to start business continuity planning will come from the manage-
ment of a company. In addition to the decision, the management must have an 
interest in and commitment to the continuity planning. IT service continuity plan-
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ning is a part of business continuity planning, therefore when the management 
supports business continuity it also offers the required support for IT service 
continuity planning. It is essential that the management realise that the continuity 
planning process is a process which has to be constantly performed and always 
after extensive changes regarding the company. The continuity planning process 
should have at least one person responsible for it - in the same way other 
projects' or business processes' have. If the nominated person responsible in an 
SME has sufficient expertise he/she can coordinate and schedule the action of 
the process. The other option is that the person responsible will have the internal 
or external expertise to work with the process. To ensure the continuance of the 
continuity planning process the recommendation is that the person responsible 
be coordinated by a company internal resource.  The tools, utilities, forms and 
metrics play a significant role in analysis phase and that they should have been 
selected beforehand. The selection of the tools for analysis may sound simpler 
than it is because there is wide range of different alternatives and a comparison 
cannot be made easily or rapidly. It is therefore appropriate to use the same 
tools and metrics in the following continuity planning rounds, which makes the 
comparison of results straightforward and the changes easy to find. 
The analysis of key process, resources, IT services 
The next phase in continuity planning process is to clarify the key processes and 
key resources of the company. In the SME this is phase is presumably quite 
easy to carry out because the core business, process owners and the other spe-
cialists are usually known throughout the whole organisation. When conducting 
a continuity planning for the first time a thorough investigation of the IT systems, 
the functionality and use of the IT systems and the connections of the IT sys-
tems to the business must be thoroughly carried out. These are topics that might 
require time and several internal and possible external specialists. If the main-
tenance and the development of the IT services are partly or totally outsourced, 
it is important to get an overview of the IT services. Also, it is beneficial to pre-
pare companies for this phase through meetings and workshops with represent-
atives of the outsourcing service provider. 
Risk analysis, disruption scenarios and reporting 
Risk analysis can be conducted by implementing the processes and using the 
resources. In the analysis phases all the risks, disruptions and threats that could 
cause a break in operation are identified and explored. This information forms 
the base for risk mapping, which happens by evaluating the probability of risk 
and its likely impacts on a company's business. The risks can be assessed by 
defining points about their probability and their likely business impact by using 
predetermined classifications or by trying to calculate the financial loss if the risk 
would actually occur. At this phase there can already be initial plans for every 
risk and how to prevent or mitigate those risks and their impact on company 
business. The results of a risk analysis and the disruption scenarios should then 
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be documented during the advanced stages of this phase. At the next decision 
point, which is the handling of the management, there should be a compact and 
unambiguous summary of the potential risks with information about the probabil-
ity and consequence of the documented risks.  
Decision point: continuation of process? 
The most efficient way to present the work and the results of the action in the 
process so far is to have the person responsible for the continuity planning do it. 
He/she ought to have the best knowledge of the situation and the needs of busi-
ness and also an understanding of the importance of the continuity planning to 
the company. The objective of the presentation is to get the management to in-
ternalise the significance of continuing the process and give a 'green light' to the 
next phases of process. 
If the management do not want to continue this process or have the opinion that 
there is no significant risk to the operation of the company, the process will end 
at this point. The management will take either a conscious risk on the potential 
operating loss that could be caused by a threat or crisis situation or argue that 
they don't see any significant risks existing. If the process ends at this phase, the 
following round can be started directly from the analysis phase by analysing the 
business situation, resources and IT services. The following round can be 
agreed after a certain time period has elapsed e.g. one year, or after major 
changes in the organisation’s operation. 
Acceptable action level and the priority of actions 
To facilitate the continued handling of the continuity plan there is already during 
this phase a considerable amount of essential information from the previous 
phases of the process. There should also be the results of the analysis of the 
company’s business and IT services, risk analysis and interference scenarios, 
the prioritisations of the business action levels and their prioritisation and de-
scriptions of the acceptable action level during a crisis situation. At a previous 
decision point the management of the company should have identified what the 
level and the intensity of the progress of continuity planning will be. In addition 
the phases that must meet with the management’s approval before moving to 
the next phase of process should be discussed. The practice is dependent on 
the commitment and the interest of the management and on how new the conti-
nuity process is. When the continuity planning is monitored for the first time in a 
company’s history it will probably feature highly motivated participants. In that 
situation the person responsible for the continuity planning process will certainly 
need as much help and support from the management and other interest groups 
as possible. 
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Back up plans and alternative solutions 
At this phase the main objective is to identify and plan the backup arrangements 
and the instructions for any threat situation that might endanger the critical func-
tions of the business. In the instructions there should be clear, complete advice 
on how to safeguard IT services, equipment, engine rooms and data communi-
cation connections. During the planning a company should pay attention to the 
different phases of a state of emergency: 
 The situation right after the state of emergency occurs 
 Action during the time when the crisis situation is occurring  
 Recovering from a crisis situation and returning to a normal situation 
In the backup plan there can be found a definition, who or what activates the In 
the backup plan there should be definitions of who or what activates the backup 
arrangements. The backup plan should include detailed instructions on how to 
start the backup action. When planning and evaluating the backup arrangements 
and the backup actions during the crisis situation all the possible alternatives 
should be estimated. From these alternatives the most feasible, reliable and cost 
efficient alternatives should be chosen. At this point of the process it is neces-
sary to estimate the financial loss resulting from the crisis situation and compare 
it to the costs of alternative solutions. 
An IT continuity plan usually covers restoring from back up media, parallel serv-
ers/environments, duplicating databases, alternative ways to take care of data 
communications among the other demanding issues which need high technical 
expertise. Based on those observations it is worthwhile preparing to use the help 
of external specialists in determining and forming a continuity plan. 
The continuity plan should also contain alternative solutions for a crisis situation 
and a communication plan. The communication plan should be a simple list of 
contact information and the communication practice of the required persons and 
interest groups. 
The Testing of IT service continuity 
The best way to ensure that the continuity plan meets the defined requirements 
is to test it in practice. With this testing the functionality of separate fields should 
be tested. The purpose is to identify possible deficiencies and notice the need 
for development. In the test plan there should be goals set for the testing, test 
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methods, different phases of testing, how to make a realistic schedule and re-
source management plan and documentation. The testing should follow the de-
signed plan, but during the testing there must be an evaluation of the extent of 
the tests. If it seems that the tests could be more comprehensive and effective 
than was planned then the original test plan should naturally be flexible and be 
able to be enhanced.  
Guidance, training, and the maintenance of the continuity plan 
When the continuity plan is ready and successfully tested, it will be published for 
the key persons of the continuity process. As there is no general advice about 
the breadth of the training and communication this must be planned case by 
case with the target groups, both internal in the SME and also externally. The 
aim of the training is to verify that all persons who are responsible for a compa-
ny’s IT systems and services are aware of the IT service continuity plan and are 
familiar with the content of the plan and they have clear instructions for the fault 
situation. 
In the continuity plan there should be descriptions and collections of the backup 
plans and a communication plan, which should include contact information for 
every key person. The IT continuity plan is actually a practical instruction, a tool 
which must be used in a crisis situation. This is one of the reasons why the plan 
must be easily accessible for those responsible for it. On the other hand the plan 
includes confidential and sensitive business information and its confidentiality 
must be secured. The distribution of the continuity plan must be taken into par-
ticular consideration. In some cases it would be justifiable to split the continuity 
plan into smaller sections. 
The maintenance of the continuity plan means that for an SME the objective is to 
ensure that the IT service continuity plan is always updated and up-to-date and 
that the plan is also developed. The IT service continuity plan is indisputably an 
essential part of the business continuity plan and risk management. The IT ser-
vice continuity plan should be checked and, if needed, updated in the following 
change situations: organisation changes, changes in business structure, new 
business partner arrangements, a change of vendors, the deployment of new IT 
services and the alteration of crucial business processes. 
The evaluation of the research method and implementation 
The Science Design research method is well suited for this study. Using the De-
sign Science frame work and the guideline with seven steps, both created by 
Hevner, we formulated a proposal for a model for IT service continuity planning 
for SMEs in crisis situations. This proposed model is a lighter and simpler ver-
sion of the official continuity planning model, e.g. the ITIL standard. This model 
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is still an unfinished artefact, because this study did not include the validation of 
its functionality in a real world SME. 
During this clarification process we completed a systematic test, after which we 
designed a proposal for an IT service continuity model for SMEs. During the 
model’s testing and iterating, it changed and developed and the final docu-
mented model is the result of several rounds of iteration. 
Conclusions and recommendations 
The research problem includes three research questions which have been ans-
wered within this research process: 
• How is it possible to define, to a satisfactory level, a continuity plan for small 
and medium enterprises? It is not possible to define one general satisfactory 
level for continuity planning outside of a company; instead the definition must be 
made for every individual continuity planning process case by case. 
• How is it possible to utilise the existing standards and activity models? Using 
standards and existing standards and activity models it is possible to survey, 
identify and apply the crucial issues of continuity management. This requires ex-
pertise and ability in applying standards the ability to cover the topics in depth. 
• Is it possible to create an artefact which would be light enough and user-
friendly and yet provide all the critical functions of continuity management? With-
in this research there is no final answer to this question. The challenge is to 
make the standards simple and clear so that nothing relevant would be lacking. 
On the other hand the models must be and will be varied - depending on the 
business area and the size of the company. 
The practical functionality of the model in an authentic environment must be 
tested and verified and that is the reason why this research is not finalised but 
needs additional research and testing. The testing should be implemented within 
several different Finnish SMEs and within various business areas. 
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Chapter 7 
IT Continuity and Risk Management of CI 
Development of the Finnish Communications Regulatory 
Authority’s Enterprise Risk Management 
Jani Arnell 
Master’s Thesis, Laurea University of Applied Sciences, 2010. 
The objective of this study was to generate an enterprise risk management 
(ERM) approach to protect the implementation of the strategic goals presented 
in the balanced scorecard of the Finnish Communications Regulatory Authority 
(FICORA) and to create an enterprise risk management policy. The practical 
section of the study was executed during 1st October 2008 – 15th November 
2009. The theoretical section of the study explores the background of enterprise 
risk management in general and the theory of the action and constructive re-
search methodology. The study was conducted partly as an action research and 
partly as a constructive study. 
In the first phase of the study the writer built up an enterprise risk management 
approach to protect the achievement of the strategic goals presented in the tar-
get organisation’s balanced score card 2009. The first part was conducted using 
communicative action research as a method, the results of which were used to 
generate an enterprise risk management approach. In the second section of the 
study a constructive method was used in which an enterprise risk management 
policy was generated. In the second section the writer became familiar with the 
regulatory environment of the target organisation, document archives related to 
enter-prise risk management and the results of the ERM self assessment exe-
cuted in the target organisation previously. The writer also carried out bench-
marking by exploring other organisations’ and companies’ enterprise risk man-
agement policies which were available on the web. Before the finalisation of the 
enterprise risk management policy of the target organisation it was introduced to 
a leading third party consultant to ensure that it would contain all the vital ele-
ments. 
The overall results of the study showed that it was possible to successfully 
merge an enterprise’s risk management and the balanced score card within the 
target organisation. This solution comes with benefits related to cost savings and 
scaling, which might be difficult to achieve in another way. By operating in this 
way, it is possible to obtain true added value from an enterprise’s risk manage-
ment as well, because ERM aims at protecting the main and the most valuable 
strategic goals of an organisation by using a familiar result-oriented manage-
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ment method. By using such a method an ERM will also be less likely to drift 
away from the general management of an organisation. 
The enterprise risk management policy integrates organisations’ risk manage-
ment efforts. When the organisation has implemented both the ERM framework 
and the method it is possible to compare results from different risk analyses per-
formed in the organisation. With the help of ERM it has been possible to gener-
ate a common risk map at FICORA and enable interdivisional cooperation within 
the selection and implementation of organisation wide safeguards. ERM is one 
of the most valuable information sources for the situational awareness of an or-
ganisation. Exploitation of that situational awareness is an essential element of 
an organisation’s success. 
Maturity modelling as a catalyst for IT continuity man-
agement implementation in a large company 
Kimmo Syrjänen 
 Master’s Thesis, Laurea University of Applied Sciences, 2009. 
This thesis will describe an IT continuity management maturity model and the 
concrete benefits this model has brought to a company and its IT unit. The or-
ganisation analysed is a large Finnish technology company that invests strongly 
in information technology due to high dependency on information systems avail-
ability. The role of business continuity and IT continuity management is to iden-
tify business requirements and provide solutions that ensure the continuity of in-
formation services and the capability to recover in case of disruptions or inter-
ruptions. Because of the large size of the target organisation and the considera-
bly high number of information services, there is a need to implement target ori-
ented and commonly accepted management models. This applies to IT continu-
ity management processes and maturity models, too. 
The target organisation developed and started to implement an IT continuity ma-
turity model in 2007. The maturity model is a combination of business continuity, 
IT governance and information risk management standards and best practices 
built on top of commonly used process maturity models. This thesis will intro-
duce the background and initial triggers for maturity model development. In addi-
tion, the maturity model’s principles and usage cases will be reviewed. 
The purpose of the study was to find out how much the IT continuity manage-
ment maturity model has improved overall planning and the level of business 
continuity in the organisation studied. The core of this research is the evaluation, 
the purpose of which is to evaluate the concrete benefits the use of a maturity 
model has brought. The benefits will be analysed from five viewpoints: informa-
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tion service management, IT line units, IT governance, corporate governance in-
cluding risk management, and the point of view of the individual. 
The evaluation is based on service quality reports, incident analyses and conti-
nuity reports. In addition to the extensive report base, open discussions and 
feedback from the IT continuity community has a significant role while assessing 
the maturity model value. The theoretical framework is mostly based on industry 
standards and best practices and the methods of canonical action research. Al-
though the extensive source material provides a solid base for the research, the 
confidentiality of this information limits what and how much information can be 
shared in this thesis. 
Building the foundations for information and communica-
tions technology continuity management in a merger 
based company 
Markus Lalla 
Master’s Thesis, Laurea University of Applied Sciences, 2009. 
This thesis case study report describes how a new global company managed to 
build the foundations for a functional IT continuity management programme and 
a framework for governance and resilience following a business operations 
merger of two major corporations. This involved the creation of an IT continuity 
management program, whereby the objectives were to analyse industry best 
practices and the maturity of the current process and to give recommendations 
on how to move forward in the event of key programme personnel not being 
available. The scope of case study is centred mainly on the beginning of the 
business continuity management programme lifecycle as defined in detail in the 
BS25999-1 standard. Therefore training and exercising are not discussed thor-
oughly. 
This qualitative thesis begins with a description of the relationship between IT 
and business continuity management as well as the relevant terminology. For a 
company of any sort, it is important to collect immediate feedback on progress 
and to understand the reasons behind decision making, especially when two dif-
ferent business cultures are being merged. Data was collected through theme 
interviews, participant observation, and group discussions with various stake-
holders and IT service management team members from IT services, who had 
been defined as crucial for the business. The methods used are also presented 
along with an assessment of their suitability for this study. 
The thesis focuses primarily on general aspects of IT continuity capability design 
and current global trends in continuity management. The actual programme im-
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plementation is not reported in detail due to the confidential nature of this work in 
practice. The thesis is of value mainly to me and the company. It is also a useful 
benchmarking case for any organisation with an obligation to ensure that 
enough IT recovery response controls are in place or planned to be imple-
mented. Information about supplier chain risks caused by vendors and hosting 
partners who have a major role in IT continuity is also provided. Furthermore, it 
was discovered that internal dependencies and single point of failures extending 
beyond the core scope need to be monitored very carefully. 
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Chapter 8 
Maturity-Based Continuity Management 
Kimmo Syrjänen 
Information Technology (IT) perspective on Maturity 
Modelling and Continuity Management: an Action and 
Design Research 
This study describes an IT (Information Technology) continuity management ma-
turity model and the concrete benefits  this model has brought to a company and 
its IT unit. The target organisation is a large Finnish  technology company that in-
vests strongly in information technology due to its high dependency on 
 information systems availability. The role of business continuity and IT continuity 
management is to  identify business requirements and provide solutions that en-
sure the continuity of information  services and capability to recover in case of 
disruptions or interruptions. The large size  of the target organisation and the 
considerably high number of information services has led to the implementation 
of target oriented and commonly accepted management models. This applies to 
 IT continuity management processes and maturity models as well. 
The target organisation developed and started to implement an IT continuity ma-
turity model in 2007. The maturity model is a combination of business continuity, 
IT governance and  information risk management standards and best practices 
built on top of commonly used process  maturity models. This study introduces 
and describes the background and initial triggers for maturity model 
 development. In addition, maturity model principles and usage cases are re-
viewed. 
The purpose of the study was to find out how much the IT continuity manage-
ment maturity model  has improved overall planning and the level of business 
continuity in the target organisation. The  core of this research is the evaluation, 
the purpose of which is to evaluate the concrete benefits  the use of the maturity 
model has brought. The benefits are analysed from five viewpoints:  information 
service management, IT line units, IT governance, corporate governance includ-
ing  risk management, and the point of view of the individual. 
The evaluation is based on service quality reports, incident analyses and conti-
nuity reports. In  addition to the extensive report base, open discussions and 
feedback from the IT continuity  community have a significant role while assess-
ing the maturity model value. The theoretical  framework is mostly based on in-
dustry standards and best practices and the methods  of action research. Al-
though the extensive source material provides a solid base for the  research, the 
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confidentiality of this information limits what and how much information can be 
 shared. 
This study utilises the premises of design research and action research analysis 
methods that are  institutionalised in the context of information system innovation 
and development. This work focuses on the supply process for ICT systems and 
their phases. The work is based on ITIL version three Service Design. The four 
views described in Service Design are inspected and the findings are brought as 
 input material for the supply process development. The findings are expected to 
 provide inputs to improve and create more a comprehensive ICT supply proc-
ess. 
Abbreviations 
AirMiC Association of insurance and risk Managers 
AR Action Research 
BCM Business Continuity Management 
BCSC Business Continuity Steering Committee 
BS British Standard 
DR Design Research 
CMMI Capability Maturity Model Integration 
CoBIT Control Objects for Information and related Technology 
ICT Information & Communication Technology 
IEC the International Electro technical Commission 
IRM Institute of Risk Management 
ISO the International Organisation for Standardization 
IT Information Technology 
ITCM Information Technology Continuity Management 
ITIL Information Technology Infrastructure Library 
ITSCMM Information Technology Services Capability Maturity Model 
NFPA National Fire Protection Association 
PAS Publicly Available Specification 
PDCA Plan, Do, Check, Act – model 
RACI Responsible, Accountable, Consulted & Informed 
RPO Recovery Point Objective 
RTO Recovery Time Objective 
SOX Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
 
Risk and Continuity 
Risk, by its very definition, always includes uncertainty about the severity of im-
pact and probability as the risk may or may not actualise (Suominen 2003). 
Risks that have a higher impact on the  organisation may require special atten-
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tion. According to the Finnish Financial Supervisory Authority  (FIN-FSA) opera-
tional risk management publication, financial institutes and organisations should 
 regard continuity planning as an ongoing process and a natural part of their 
business operations  and risk management. Business continuity planning in this 
context means preparations for  interruptions in business activities so that the 
business can continue its operations and mitigate  losses in various business dis-
ruptions. Disruptions may be due to damage to the employees,  business prem-
ises, IT systems or data communications or intentional acts, water damage, fires 
or  utility outages (Management of operational risk 4.4b 2004, 20-21). 
The British Standard (BS) 31100 is a standard for risk management established 
by the British  Standard Institute. It describes how to develop, implement and 
maintain effective risk management within a business by providing clear frame-
work components as to how risk management  governance should be arranged, 
what is a good policy, and processes and instructions on how to  evaluate the 
outcome of the risk management framework used. The standard is aligned with 
several other  risk management standards e.g. ISO 31000 (in preparation), En-
terprise Risk Management COSO,  and the risk management standard devel-
oped by the Institute of Risk Management (IRM) and the  association of insur-
ance and risk Managers (AirMiC). (BS 31100 2008). 
BS 31100 (2008, 11) emphasises that, as part of the risk management function, 
there are specific risk  areas where a detailed management or control framework 
is needed. Standards list the following  as areas of specific risk management: 
Compliance risk, operational risk, health and safety,  information security, and 
business continuity management. This Standard keeps information  security and 
business continuity separate management entities for specific risk management 
 purposes. What is interesting in the above standard is that it does not stress the 
role of IT as a  separate risk management topic. IT, as it is understood as a lar-
ger function, is listed as a critical  asset on several occasions and in all stan-
dards. 
The British Standards Institution has published the Business Continuity Man-
agement standard BS 25999  which can be applied for various types and sizes of 
organisations. According to the standard,  Business Continuity Management 
(BCM) is complementary to a risk management framework that  sets out to un-
derstand the risks to operations or business, and the consequences of those 
risks. By  focusing on the impact of disruption, organisations can recognise what 
needs to be done before any  incident occurs and to protect its people, premises, 
technology, information, supply chain, stakeholders  and reputation (BS 25999–1 
2006). 
According to Westerman and Hunter (2007), the first logical step in improving 
the foundation of the  information risk management is to address availability 
risks. This can be done by addressing  business continuity management as a 
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base for setting risk management in place. This powerful engine  lays the ground 
work for managing at all layers of the 4As where the A means risks related to: 
 availability, access, accuracy and agility. (Westerman & Hunter 2007, 60-68). 
The examples above demonstrate that business continuity management is an 
important part of risk  management practice. One can say that in order to extend 
an organisation’s capability to manage  the risks, which cannot be simply in-
sured, transferred or compensated for by money, the implementation  of busi-
ness continuity management will secure an organisation’s mission and continu-
ity. 
 Business Continuity Management System 
BS 25999 defines the business continuity management system as a business-
owned, business-driven  process that establishes a fit-for-purpose strategic and 
operational framework. A system should  proactively improve an organisation’s 
resilience against the disruption of its ability to achieve its  key objectives. The 
basic assumption is that the system should include a rehearsed method of how 
to  restore an organisation’s key products and services to an agreed level within 
an agreed time after  a disruption. So, as an end result, a business continuity 
management system may at its best deliver a  proven capability to manage a 
business disruption and protect the organisation’s reputation and  brand against 
threats (BS 25999-1 2006, 6) . 
The ISO standard 21827 (2008, 117) for technology security capability maturity 
model refers to Dr. W.  Edwards Deming’s observation as follows:  
 “In a manufacturing plant, a manager observes problems with a certain produc-
tion line. All he  knew, though, was that people on the line make a lot of defective 
items. His first inclination might  be to plead with the workers to work harder and 
faster. But instead, he collected data and plotted  the percentage of defective 
items. The plot showed that the number of defective items and the  variation from 
day to day were predictable.” (ISO 21827 2008, 117). 
Moen & Norman (2009) introduce the history of the PDCA model development. 
The PDCA model  became well-known through W. Edwards Deming, although 
Deming called the model the Shewhart Cycle after its inventor and shape. It is 
also known as Deming’s Wheel. Deming published the  methodology in his book 
Out of Crisis (1982). He regarded the PDCA model as “a flow  diagram for learn-
ing and for the improvement of a product and a process”. The PDCA model 
 corresponds to the general principle of managing a system according to general 
systems thinking,  systems dynamics, or cybernetics. A modern application of the 
PDCA model is the Six Sigma  methodology for an organisation’s performance 
improvement (Brue 2002). Its most general  activity phases are DMAIC – Define, 
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Measure, Analyse, Improve, and Control. As an example of another application 
area Figure 1 provides a comparison between the information technology ser-
vice  management ISO standard 20000 and BS 25999 business continuity man-
agement system standard.  Snap shots (figure 1) of the given “Lifecycles” provide 
a good example of how the PDCA model is  used in different contexts in busi-
ness continuity and IT service management. 
Even though the content of the lifecycles are different, both approaches highlight 
the importance  of continuous improvement when using the key phases of the 
PDCA model. Both processes start with the  planning and understanding of the 
current situation. The second phase is the execution of the plan by taking 
 controlled steps after which one move on to the third phase; learning from the 
results. Checking  the results provides the insight into which actions are needed 
in order to improve the process and,  by that, to reach the optimum result. 
 
Figure 1: A Comparison of the Plan, Do, Check, Act model’s adaptations be-
tween the International Organisation for Standardisation and the International 
Electro Technical Commission (ISO/IEC) 20000 (2005,  5) and BS 25999-2 
(2007, 3). 
A consistent link to quality models enables BS 25999 to be integrated with re-
lated management  systems standards, such as BS EN ISO 9001:2000 (Quality 
Management Systems), BS EN ISO  14001:2004 (Environmental Management 
Systems), BS ISO/IEC 27001:2005 (Information Security  Management Systems) 
and BS ISO/IEC 20000:2005 (IT Service Management). (BS 25999-2 2007,  3) . 
Even though the standards provide common models agreed on by the different 
industry representatives and standardising bodies, it is important to keep in mind 
that each country’s standardising bodies and institutes often promote their own 
 73 
approaches and this also applies to the BS  25999 as it is not the only standard 
related to business continuity management. When the number  of available stan-
dards may start burdening the implementation, it is good to recap the  ultimate 
goal of business continuity planning. Graham and Kaye (2006, 11) summarise 
the  essence of business continuity management into four key points that apply 
to all relevant systems: 
  BCM is not just about response, it is also about building resilience to 
strengthen an  organisation 
  BCM is not just about fighting fires, it is about understanding what might 
be at risk and  developing strategies if things go wrong 
  BCM is not just about having plans to recover a business that are over-
elaborate, it is about  having plans that suit the nature of your business 
  BCM is not an extension to the business, and for it to be effective, it 
must be an embedded  management process – as part of risk manage-
ment, and in turn, as part of the business  management (Graham & Kaye 
2006, 11). 
BCM “lifecycle” provides a solid structure for developing the business continuity 
management in  organisations, whether private or public. Implementation of a 
high level management  process as part of current organisation processes may 
become challenging, if it is not understood by  those who should carry out the ac-
tual implementation. One way to solve this problem is to provide  a tailored model 
of how business continuity management principles can be applied to in specific 
 areas, such as information technology (IT). 
 Continuity Management 
U.S. Federal information processing standard (FIBS PUB 87 1981) introduced 
the fundamentals of  contingency and disaster recovery planning in automated 
data processing almost 30 years ago. At  the time the standard development 
group identified the key topics that contingency planning should  cover in order to 
have a working plan in case of adverse situations. The list below summarises 
the  content of the FIBS PUB standard. 
  Risk analysis and management’s role in planning 
  Preliminary planning scope, objectives and roles 
  Preparatory actions related to people, critical assets, data and infra-
structure 
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  An action plan for emergency response, backup operations and recov-
ery, and 
  Practice and exercises for testing the plan 
Even then the FIBS Publication 87 emphasised that contingency planning 
should be an integral part  of a programme for any data processing operation. As 
the standard continues, minor problems may  become major and major problems 
may become catastrophic without a tested and effective plan on  how to respond 
to and re-cover from unexpected and sudden disruptions of service (FIBS PUB 
87  1981). 
Since FIBS PUB 87, IT contingency and recovery planning has evolved into a 
managed process in  which BS 25777 established by the British Standards Insti-
tution in 2008 represents the latest approach  to IT continuity management. BS 
25777 provides a common approach for information and  communications tech-
nology (ICT) continuity management. The primary objective is to ensure that  the 
organisation has plans in order to continue information and communications 
technology  services at an acceptable predefined level in case incidents and dis-
ruptions should occur. The  cornerstones for BS 25777 (2008, 3-4) are the six 
key principles for ICT continuity management: 
1.  Protect: Protecting the ICT environment from incidents, failures and dis-
ruptions by  improving the resilience of ICT services  
2. Detect: Detecting incidents at the earliest opportunity and minimising the 
impact on services  
3. React: Reacting to an incident in the most appropriate manner will lead 
to a more efficient recovery and minimise any downtime  
4. Recover: Identifying and implementing the appropriate recovery strategy 
will ensure the  timely resumption of services and maintain the integrity 
of data 
5. Operate: Running in ICT disaster recovery mode until a return to normal 
is possible  
6. Return: Devising a strategy for every ICT continuity plan that allows an 
organisation to  migrate back from ICT disaster recovery mode to a posi-
tion where it can support normal  business 
 75 
As these six principles demonstrate, today’s ICT continuity management is not 
only limited to  response and recovery phases but is extended to cover also pre-
work and actions for prolonged  interruptions and for returning to normal opera-
tion. In order to promote the managed  implementation of the given principles, BS 
25777 applied BS 25999-1 business continuity management lifecycle model 
(figure 2). This model consists of six elements which should be implemented 
phase by phase starting with understanding business needs and moving from 
strategy  determination to implementation and testing the strategy. The outer cir-
cle represents the  implementation of continuity management into an organisa-
tion’s culture. 
 
Figure 2: Relationship between ICT continuity management and business conti-
nuity management  (BS 25777, 3) 
The central governance element in both BS 25999 and BS 25777 is continuity 
programme management. The purpose of continuity programme management is 
to ensure ongoing development  and implementation by steering all the planning 
phases consistently and in a goal-oriented  manner. Goals and objectives should 
be carried out so that they fit an organisation’s objectives as  well as possible 
within the given timescales, resources and the budget. 
BS 25777 (2008, 9)  provides examples of what successful ICT continuity man-
agement programme should achieve: 
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  The ICT continuity management objectives should be clearly stated, un-
derstood and communicated 
  Top management’s commitment to ICT continuity management as part 
of business  continuity management should be demonstrated 
  Necessary resources should be allocated, and 
  Those with ICT continuity management responsibilities should be com-
petent at performing their  roles  
As the programme evolves and the organisation becomes more aware of the 
continuity management benefits it may become a part of the normal manage-
ment process. In order to secure this  change successfully it is imperative for the 
overall governance structure that a business continuity  steering committee 
(BCSC) is appointed. The implementation of this steering committee ensures 
 that an organisation’s continuity plans are regularly considered, reviewed, 
tested, and updated  when organisational change occurs. This group should be 
comprised of the most senior managers  from the organisation and each key unit 
should be represented (BS 25999 -1 2007, 13-16) . 
Brue (2002, 36) refers to the famous William Thomson a.k.a. Lord Kelvin: “When 
you can  measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you 
know something about it;  but when you cannot measure it, when you cannot ex-
press it in numbers, your knowledge is of a  meagre and unsatisfactory kind. It 
may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have scarcely, in  your thoughts, 
advanced to the stage of science”. 
Brue (2002, 36) states that if you do not have measurements, you cannot make 
progress because  you do not know where you are. This underlines the common 
management problem which  also applies to business and IT continuity man-
agement, that is, how can we measure change? The continual  monitoring of 
progress against an organisation’s objectives ensures that actions and re-
sources can be  allocated accordingly. This can be done by having relevant and 
valid measurement methods that  reveal issues and deviations on the process 
before they escalate into major problems. Basically,  measuring change is one 
way to carry out risk management as the target is to predict and prevent 
 incidents that would weaken the achievement of the business objectives. 
BS 25999-1 (2006, 11) requires that a business continuity capability should be 
measured and BS  25999 part 2 specifications for business continuity manage-
ment underline the importance of  continual improvement based on objective 
measurement. U.S. National Fire Protection Association  (NFPA) has created a 
standard for disaster, emergency and business continuity management. This 
 NFPA 1600 standard (2007, 5) states that performance measurements should 
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be established and  periodically reviewed as a part of continuity management 
programme. The problem is that this  standard does not provide principles on 
what the performance indicators for successful programme  management should 
be. From the continuity management point of view a common relevant and 
 reliable measurement model would bring significant benefits when assessing an 
organisation’s  continuity capability, especially when managing large scale opera-
tions both in business and in IT. 
 Organization 
The company studied (referred herein simply as the Company) operates in tele-
communication  globally. Because of its position, external expectations from 
shareholders and the Company  community are relatively high, especially in mat-
ters of business continuity. The Company places a high  priority on enforcing 
practice and exercises and controls balanced with informed risks, which will pro-
tect both  shareholders’ and the Company community’s interests in the most op-
timal way. 
The Company has a robust crisis management programme that has proven its 
effectiveness in real life  situations; still, further development was seen necessary 
in order to be able to work more  proactively to prevent risks. The corporate risk 
management unit started to formalise practice and exercises for business conti-
nuity management by collaborating with company security, infrastructure 
 services and IT units. After exploring all relevant possibilities, the publicly avail-
able specification  56 (PAS 56 2005) was seen as a framework that could be best 
adapted into the current operation  model for the Company. One reason for the 
selection was the fact that PAS 56 had a strong  development community behind 
it and was linked to the respected British Standards Institution.  Since then PAS 
56 has evolved into BS 25999, which today is the globally recognised  business 
continuity management standard. 
The Company already had established risk, information security and crisis man-
agement policies  when the business continuity management policy was under 
development. Business continuity  management policy statements were embed-
ded into other relevant management policies, as the  objective was to keep the 
number of policies as low as possible. As a general guideline each  business unit 
was responsible for ensuring business continuity in their own area at a level that 
fitted  the mode of operation best. Since operations in a large organisation differ 
considerably from one  business unit to another, the policy was written in a man-
ner that allowed business continuity plans  to be delivered in either a project or a 
programme mode. Delivering business continuity plans in a  project mode was 
seen as beneficial for those units which had limited resources for a dedicated 
 management system. The approach was especially successful in situations 
where fast actions were  needed due to a sudden change of risk level e.g. pan-
demic outbreak, natural hazard, political  restlessness or technological vulner-
abilities. 
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The programme approach was seen best for situations where the business unit 
had a critical role in  other company operations on a large scale. This role would 
set a high standard for maintaining a  high preparedness and response level. 
When the scale of continuity planning increased inside the  unit the continuity 
management programme provided an effective method to steer and control sev-
eral  planning streams at the same time. Continuity management programme 
subject matter expert’s  facilitated the planning process in order to make sure 
that plans were consistent and overlaps with  other plans could be avoided. The 
continuity programme was seen as a first step in a process in which the  long 
term objective was – and still is – to embed continuity management seamlessly 
into the  organisation’s normal operations and management. 
 Building the Continuity Management System 
The initial step was to define and agree on the IT continuity management scope 
and relation to  business continuity management. As a result, it was agreed that 
IT will take responsibility for all  information services’ continuity management, in-
cluding the infrastructure such as data centres,  network connectivity and IT per-
sonnel. This scope of the work resulted in business continuity management in 
 which IT continuity plans are a subset for business continuity plans, allowing 
business units to focus  on their response in case IT plans should fail. 
The second phase was to define and agree on the level of implementation as 
that would affect the  whole management concept. Basically it was question of 
which IT sub unit should act as the primus  motor and who should take the re-
sponsibility for each system’s continuity plans. As each IT service  already had 
responsibility for the business requirement and information systems manage-
ment, it  was only natural to include IT service continuity planning as part of their 
role. 
IT service and  computer managers’ role became critical for continuity manage-
ment as they were responsible for  managing the various applications’ lifecycles 
and collecting requirements from business owners. To support IT  managers and 
to ensure the consistent implementation of the IT continuity process, a team of 
 continuity management specialists was established. The objective of the team 
was to develop the  process and the tools, to provide training and consult when 
needed, to communicate common  objectives and to follow the planning pro-
gress. 
At the time PAS 56 provided the structure for continuity management but the 
terminology was seen  as too confusing and vague for practical implementation 
in IT. In order to solve these problems the  terminology and the model were 
modified in such a way that the user would better understand the  given action 
and the main deliverables in each phase. Table 1 shows the changes between 
PAS 56  and the Company IT continuity planning model planning phases. 
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Comparison of Planning Phases 
PAS 56 (BS 25999) IT continuity planning model 
Understanding the organisation IT Continuity risk and impact analysis 
Determining BCM strategy IT Continuity management strategy 
development and business approval 
Developing and implementing BCM 
response 
IT Continuity strategy deployment 
and plan delivery 
Embedding BCM in the organisa-
tion's culture 
IT Continuity plan communication 
and training 
Exercising, maintaining and review-
ing 
Maintain & exercise IT Continuity 
Plan 
Table 1: The comparison of BS 25999 and Company IT Continuity planning im-
plementation 
As the example above shows, the planning process included several phases. In 
order to ensure  that continuity planners would understand that each phase 
needed to be completed before starting  the next one, a simplified process flow 
was created (Attachment.1). 
Continuity plan exercising  was seen as the most important part of the process, 
so the PDCA lifecycle was integrated as a part  of the whole process. Using the 
PDCA lifecycle the importance of continuous improvement by  rehearsing and 
practising the plans became visible to the planners. It was also clear that infor-
mation  systems are under constant change pressure due to new business initia-
tives and mandatory  configuration updates. This change pressure was covered 
in the process by adding a clear  loopback from the continuity plan maintenance 
phase to the planning and creating phases at the  beginning of the process. The 
overall objective for drawing a single IT continuity planning process  was to en-
hance communication and steer the continuity planners’ actions in a desired di-
rection. 
 Continuity Maturity Model 
IT continuity management can be part of either the business continuity man-
agement or the IT  governance discipline, depending on how responsibilities are 
shared between the organisations.  Regardless of the responsible entity, man-
agement needs to have information about progress and  capability from the 
processes and other activities in order to be able to steer the organisation. For 
example, the British Standard for Information Technology Service Management 
(ISO/IEC 20000-1  2005, 6) states that the service provider shall apply suitable 
methods for monitoring and, where  applicable, measurement of the service 
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management processes. These methods shall demonstrate  the ability of the 
processes to achieve the planned results. From the Company’s IT unit’s continu-
ity  management point of view it was necessary to capture the current continuity 
planning status across  the IT and be able to follow its progress. In order to build 
a working maturity model for IT  continuity management and IT governance pur-
poses the following expectations were set by the senior  management after rec-
ognising and specifying the problem area to be researched:  
  The model must be simple and easily understandable for those imple-
menting the process 
  Key performance indicators must be scalable with the organisation and 
measured subjects 
  The model must support senior management decision making 
  The model must direct actions so that users will understand what they 
are expected to  achieve 
  Key performance indicators must reveal changes in order to identify 
possible gaps and  forthcoming issues 
  The model should support the reward system and, 
  Demonstrate the level of assurance of the organisation’s ability to re-
spond and react  during events that cause an interruption or a disruption 
In order to comply with industry standards and internal expectations, the need 
for a maturity  model was obvious. For this purpose the IT continuity planning 
process model provided a  foundation for creating maturity measurement. The 
planning process was translated into a  roadmap for IT services system devel-
opment as part of a standard planning cycle used by the IT.  In practice this 
means that the IT service team could plan how to allocate resources between 
the 1st  and the 2nd half of the year (Table 2). This approach allowed the IT ser-
vices that manage several  information systems with different service level re-
quirements to set balanced continuity objectives  between the business critical 
systems and the standard systems. The fundamental part of this  model was the 
decision that the unit of maturity measurement was not the IT service or the 
team  but the information system itself. The rationale for this approach was the 
fact that failures in the  information systems would cause an interruption directly 
in the business process. Due to this direct  dependency measuring the systems’ 
resiliency and recovery capability was seen as more important  than the organi-
sation’s capability to respond and work in a problem situation (Company IT 
 Continuity management process 2007). 
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Table 2: An example of the common planning cycle showing how IT continuity 
planning phases are  connected  (Syrjänen 2009) 
In order to ensure that each planning phase would be completed, a simple suc-
cess  criteria model was established based on the PAS 56 planning phases. The 
rule was that each criterion  of success must be complete and validated by a 
continuity specialist team before the planning  process could progress to the next 
phase (Company IT Continuity management process 2007) . 
The purpose of phase 1 is to build the rationale for why the continuity planning 
process must be  initiated by conducting the business impact and risk analysis. 
The business impact analysis aims to  identify and quantify impacts on a busi-
ness if an interruption or a disruption should occur to its  information systems. It 
is essential to understand and prioritise information about interdependencies be-
tween the business processes and systems. The outcomes of a business  impact 
analysis are the recovery time objectives for the system and recovery point ob-
jectives for the  data. Risk analysis aims to identify any operational risks which 
may cause extreme damage to the  information systems which would then cause 
a failure or extended outage of the business  operations. Based on the risk 
analysis findings and a business owner’s risk tolerance a decision on  further 
continuity development can be made (Company IT Continuity management 
process 2007). 
The target of phase 2 is to identify available continuity solutions for an informa-
tion system. When selecting the solutions, the costs to benefits calculation must 
be completed in a  balanced manner. In this context balance means the cost of a 
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solution versus how effectively the  solution can reduce the risk of failure or en-
sure a fast and controlled resumption of  business. The final stage is to propose 
solutions to business owners and seek approval for the  implementation for the 
one selected (Company IT Continuity management process 2007). 
The success criteria of phase 3 contain two key actions, continuity solution build-
ing and  documenting the IT continuity plan. Solution building is made according 
to standard project  management and system development practices, and there-
fore this has not been defined  separately. The criteria for the success are that 
the solution is implemented according to the risk  and the business requirements 
and that the IT continuity plan document is available for validation  by subject 
matter experts (Company IT Continuity management process 2007) . 
The target of phase 4 is to ensure that the plan is shared between all relevant 
teams and units;  i.e. those who have a role in continuity solution management 
and the possible recovery actions, if  it is necessary to invoke the IT continuity 
plan. This phase also includes IT service team training for  the IT continuity plan 
use so that each team member understands their role and the role of other  team 
members in case there is a need to initiate recovery and restoration actions 
(Company IT  Continuity management process 2007). 
Phase 5 demonstrates whether the continuity solution and agreed recovery ac-
tions will work as  planned. The term technical exercise is used here as it com-
bines both the crisis management and technical capability testing. Even though 
practice and exercise methods vary, depending on the solution in  use, all of 
these practices aim to validate whether response, recovery and restoration can 
be done  within the time targets set by the business (Company IT Continuity 
management process 2007) . 
As remarked earlier, the continuous improvement of continuity management was 
based on information  systems’ IT service teams constantly conducting practice 
of a technical nature. Successful technical  practices provide evidence of the abil-
ity to recovery and restore information systems and  data if needed. The result 
given by the Company demonstrated the highest level of assurance of mitigated 
risks and, by  that, justified retaining the maturity level 5 (Company IT Continuity 
management process 2007). 
Failures in the technical exercises and practices revealed weaknesses and de-
viations that would require special  attention leading to corrective actions and 
dropping the maturity level down the scale e.g. a technical exercise might reveal 
that a back up process did not work promptly due to a  technical mismatch. This 
finding would initiate the reconfiguration of the back up process that would  be 
done at maturity phase 3. Even though a technical exercise is normally required 
for  maintaining the highest maturity level, there is one exception. If the continuity 
solution has  worked as planned during a real incident, the technical exercise 
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does not need to be completed. This  is regarded as proof of a working solution; 
therefore the maturity level can be kept on level 5 until the  next review round 
(Company IT Continuity management process 2007). 
The model has now been used for three years and it is time to analyse and re-
flect on how well  original expectations were met. According to Järvinen & Jär-
vinen (2004, 103) scientific research  can be divided into two main areas, basic 
research and applied research. The objective of basic  research is to observe 
and analyse an environment in order to create and test new theories. Applied 
 research uses results from basic research as scientific foundation to create new 
innovations for  everyday use. According to Pirinen (2009, 10), the diversity of 
ways to generate innovation is huge  and the nature of innovation generation is 
multidisciplinary. Pirinen provides a concept of six  perspectives on research and 
development in integrative action (integration of research and development in 
education) which are not exclusive and all of  which are needed to successfully 
consider processes of integrative action. This concept sets the  framework for the 
following two chapters, which will reflect the journey of the IT continuity  maturity 
model innovation in the context of Design Research and action research. 
 Design Research and IT Continuity Maturity Model 
 The aim of Design Research (DR) is to solve identified problems by delivering 
practical solutions  and innovations (artefacts). An additional target is to provide 
new information for solving problems  in the future. To decide whether the IT con-
tinuity maturity model belongs in the premise of DR, one must understand the 
concept of an artefact. 
According to Hevner, March, Park & Ram  (2004) both DR and the behavioural 
sciences are inseparable as technology and behaviour  are not dichotomous in 
an information system. The fundamental idea lies on the fact that information 
system research is always at a confluence of people, organisations and technol-
ogy, so it is  more than a product. Based on this, IT artefacts can be defined 
broadly as constructs (vocabulary  and symbols), models (abstractions and rep-
resentations), methods (algorithms and practices) and  instantiations (imple-
mented and prototype systems). 
IT artefacts are implemented in an organisational context i.e. information sys-
tems are for people  and organisations, not an end in itself. This is the rationale 
for the object of study in information  systems behavioural science research. Be-
havioural sciences research objective is to predict or  explain phenomena that 
occur with respect to the use of an artefact, its perceived usefulness and its im-
pact on  individuals and organisations. Most of behavioural science is focused on 
instantiations i.e.  information systems but it is used also with the evaluation of 
constructs and methods. In  conclusion, even though the DR focus is on technol-
ogy-based design, its link to  behavioural science allows us to cover organisa-
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tions, policies and work practices as design  artefacts (Hevner, March, Park & 
Ram 2004). 
Perspective of Design Research 
Effective design research must provide a clear contribution in the area of the de-
signed artefact.  According to Hevner at al. (2004), DR may provide three types 
of contributions based  on the novelty, generality and significance of the de-
signed artefact. One or more of these must be  found in a given research project. 
The first contribution is related to the design artefact itself as it  may solve the ini-
tial problem. From this perspective the IT continuity maturity model has solved 
the  initial problem of improving the implementation of the continuity management 
practice. The  second contribution is the foundation, i.e. the creative development 
of a novel construct, model,  method or instantiation that extends and improves 
the existing foundations. The IT continuity maturity  model is a method that was a 
novel approach - as it was a totally new approach in the field of  continuity man-
agement practice in the target organisation. The third contribution is methodolo-
gies,  i.e. the creative development and use of evaluation methods and metrics 
for design research  contribution. Finally, Hevner et al. (2004) mention that arte-
facts must be implementable and contribute to the business  environment. The IT 
continuity maturity model was implemented in the case study organisation and 
its output improved the level  of business continuity from the information system 
viewpoint.  
When one considers these DR definitions, a loose connection between the ma-
turity  model development and the premises of DR can be seen. As an example, 
the IT  continuity management maturity model is an outcome of a design proc-
ess. Even though there  seems to be a link between the DR and methods of de-
velopment, Hevner, March, Park  & Ram (2004) clearly state that design is both a 
process of (a set of activities) and a product  (artefact). 
Building the artefact for a specific problem may solve the initial problem, but the 
basic question is  how well does it work? The evaluation of the artefact provides 
feedback information and a better  understanding of the problem and improving 
the quality of the product and design process.  Hevner, March, Park & Ram 
(2004) provide a guideline for design evaluation. According to them,  the utility, 
quality and efficiency of a design artefact must be rigorously demonstrated via 
well- executed evaluation methods. IT artefacts can be evaluated in terms of 
functionality,  completeness, consistency, accuracy, performance, reliability, us-
ability fit with their organisation  and other quality attributes. The core of this the-
sis is the value evaluation of the IT continuity  maturity model. Design Research 
provides the premise for the maturity model evaluation. 
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 Perspective of Action Research 
Action research (AR) is, by definition, active and tightly bound to real life prob-
lems in organisations, it may also provide a practical means to reflect theory and 
practice on a highly pragmatic  level. In order to have a working connection to 
real life problems, the research test subjects are all  the actors related to a re-
search problem e.g. developers and tools. This method provides a  structured 
approach for problem solving; finding innovations and solutions for developing 
 organisational capabilities. As action research progresses gradually from prob-
lem identification to  implementation and thorough testing with the users of a so-
lution, such a relationship may also change  the way the community thinks and 
the way it works, which might affect the research  results. For the researcher this 
means that in practice he must be able to make theoretical  interpretations about 
the new findings and the reasons behind them and, at the same time, be  able to 
contribute to the practical use of the research results (Järvinen & Järvinen 2004, 
128 - 131). 
According to Baskerville and Meyers (2004) there are four premises to consider 
in order to conduct  pragmatic AR. The first is the necessity to establish a theory 
beforehand for any  action. The rationale for this is to avoid actions that are not 
relevant or valid from the research  point of view. The theory behind the IT conti-
nuity maturity model innovation originates from  learning and improvement mod-
els like PDCA model (Moen & Norman 2009) and Six Sigma (Brue  2002). The 
assumption was that the capability to measure continuity planning and delivery 
process  utility would lead to identifiable improvements in IT continuity manage-
ment. The second  premise is that the problem setting must be pragmatic. In this 
study, the  identification of the most tangible problem related to the IT continuity 
management led to strict  requirements set by the senior management. The third 
premise requires that the action must  inform the theory. According to this, the 
theory must be validated by its practical outcome. The  validation of the IT conti-
nuity management maturity model value is at the core of the thesis’  objective. 
The fourth and last premise is related to  social situation. This means that the ac-
tion researcher must be a participant in the action and at same  time be an ob-
server. Accordingly there must be collaborative team participation during the 
 action. This ensures that there will be reasoning and social realities while the 
problem is being solved (Baskerville & Meyers 2004). This implies that actors 
 must trust and be willing to share information with the researcher. This challenge 
puts the  researcher’s social and communication skills to test as failure in com-
munication and getting the  commitment will probably lead to failure as the re-
search targets will not be as easy to attain (Järvinen &  Järvinen 2004, 128 -131). 
According to Järvinen & Järvinen (2004, 128 -131), instead of just observing the 
process and the  response, researchers are expected to work closely with the ac-
tors and participate in the problem  solving. In order to meet this expectation, the 
researcher has to participate in the actual use of  new solutions or at least be 
present when the theory is put into practice. Close relations with the  actual work 
 86 
may not work for all personalities and may lead to motivational problems. Other 
 challenges are the high expectations of the client or end user. A client may give 
a lower priority  to the theoretical part of the action research as identifiable results 
matter the most. As a result, the  research may turn into a routine and the original 
scientific research targets may be lost. 
According to Davison, Martinsons and Kock (2004), the principle of learning 
 through reflection stems from the multiple responsibilities of the action re-
searcher: to clients and  to the research community. This is consistent with the 
common call for research reports to specify  the implications for both practice and 
(further) research. Clients focus on practical outcomes,  while the research com-
munity is interested in the discovery of new knowledge. Since the  beginning of 
the IT continuity maturity model development, the collaborative arrangement be-
tween  the author and the client organisation has been clear, regardless of the 
author’s dual role between the  target organisation and the academic field. 
From the viewpoint of the target organisation the  author’s responsibilities in-
cluded both the key developer and the change agent roles. In the  beginning of 
the maturity model development the author worked as a specialist in the field of 
IT  continuity management. Gradually the initial responsibilities changed from 
that of specialist to being a  member of the senior management at the same pace 
as the maturity model was being implemented  across the organisation’s IT. As a 
result, the role of facilitator of change turned into the overall  management of the 
IT continuity. One could say that the implementation of the maturity model  also 
increased the author’s own professional maturity. Throughout the whole process 
the author was  also a member of an academic community, completing an M.A. 
degree at Laurea University of  Applied Science. The dual role as a researcher 
and the change agent provided an opportunity to  share knowledge beyond the 
boundaries of academics and business. 
Evaluation Questions 
The IT continuity planning process success criteria have now been in use for 
three years in Company IT.  Continuity management objective settings and 
status monitoring are based on this maturity model  throughout the IT organisa-
tion. Although the practice may represent the best practice approach  and is 
linked to industry standards there are still some questions to be asked: 
  How well is the model adapted into the organisation’s governance model 
and management? 
  Does the approach support the actual implementation of IT continuity 
planning and has the model increased awareness of continuity man-
agement? 
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  What concrete impacts does this have for service delivery promises and 
does the maturity model really build assurances that information sys-
tems and services can  be recovered and restored as required? 
To summarise all the questions above; has the Company really gained such 
tangible benefits that this  maturity model can be regarded as a reliable approach 
for IT continuity management  performance measurement and should it be used 
in the future? Can we verify the theory that the  maturity model will work as a 
catalyst for IT continuity management implementation and the  improvement of 
the actual capability to react and respond to continuity related incidents? 
The objective for this analysis is to evaluate the IT continuity maturity model de-
velopment, implementation and implications in the Company’s IT department be-
tween 2007 and 2009. The  outcome of this study should provide insights into the 
role of a measurable maturity model’s continuity  management implementation in 
an IT organisations’ management frame work. The ultimate  objective is to verify 
if the model works as a catalyst for improved IT continuity management. 
 Evaluation Data 
According to Järvinen & Järvinen, the most common methods are interviews, 
 observations, surveys and documentation reviews for collecting information for 
 empirical research. All these methods can be divided into  subcategories based 
on the tools used during the research and the role of the researcher. The rela-
tionship  between the author and the organisation made it possible to use several 
methods of data  collection, of which the most important data sources for this 
analysis were reviewing the documents and  observing the process and its pro-
gress. 
According to Järvinen & Järvinen (2004, 154-157), data collection using the ob-
servation is based on  the notes taken by the researcher. In practical terms this 
means that the quality of the data is fully  dependent on the researcher’s own ex-
perience and training. Even though the research subject’s  behaviour may in-
crease uncertainty, the flexibility of this approach allows capturing of events and 
 details that could not be found by other means. According to Järvinen & Jär-
vinen, observation as a  data collection method fits well with situations in which 
the research subjects are social groups and  processes. This method allows the 
researcher to be a part of the research subject e.g. participate  in the process 
implementation or its development. Based on the author’s role in the maturity 
 model development and the research subject itself, observation as a data collec-
tion model was a  obvious choice. 
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During the IT continuity maturity model evaluation data about the use of the ma-
turity model and  its perceived value was collected from the following research 
subjects by use of discussions  and observation: 
  20 IT service teams (10 of these managing critical information systems) 
  An IT continuity specialist team 
  An IT Service management team 
  A senior IT management team 
  Corporate and IT assurance related specialists (total: 15 people) 
According to Järvinen & Järvinen (2004, 154-157), perhaps the biggest chal-
lenge in collecting the  data by observation is the researcher. The reason for this 
is the fact that the researcher’s own  perception about the research subject will 
have an effect on the interpretations he will make.  Basically there are no controls 
that prevent the researcher from collecting the wrong data and  from making in-
correct interpretations. Another challenge is how to observe people so that the 
 researcher’s presence will not affect the research subjects’ behaviour. In order 
to mitigate the known  issues related to the observation method, the author re-
viewed relevant document and reports on the  IT continuity maturity model. 
Järvinen & Järvinen (2004, 156) underline that any documentation that is not 
designed for the  purpose of the research is a secondary data source. Regard-
less of this statement the available  documentation concerning the IT continuity 
maturity model analysis were mostly statistical reports  about the process imple-
mentation and recovery capability. So, even though the documentation was  not 
designed for the research, evidence for the maturity model evaluation was avail-
able. The following document types were reviewed and analysed by the author; 
  documented statistics from information services’ quality and trends 
  critical incident reports and business impact analysis 
  continuity maturity monthly reports 
  documents about ongoing continuity development actives 
  individual incentive score cards 
  IT score cards. 
Measuring the Maturity Model 
Hevner at al. (2004) provide a guideline for design evaluation. According to 
them, the utility,  quality and efficiency of a design artefact must be rigorously 
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demonstrated via well-executed  evaluation methods. IT continuity management 
maturity model evaluation is based on both  qualitative and quantitative meas-
urements. The qualitative measurement is based on the perceived  value of the 
maturity model for the users and the stakeholders. In practice this is based on 
how  well the IT continuity maturity model serves the users’ and the stakeholders’ 
objectives. The  analysis is based on the author’s observations and impressions 
of how the users and stakeholders  utilise the IT continuity maturity model. In this 
context users are all individuals, teams and units  who utilise the IT continuity 
maturity model partly or fully in their work and objectives.  A stakeholder in this 
context refers to the people in charge and representatives of governance and 
 management models related to IT continuity management. Based on this, the 
taxonomy of the  organisation entities and subjects represents the users’ and the 
stakeholders’ viewpoint; 
 service management 
  line unit organisations 
  IT governance 
  corporate governance, and 
  individuals. 
The quantitative analysis is based on statistics derived from the incident and ma-
turity level reports.  The following chapters will introduce the concept of quantita-
tive analysis used while estimating  the value of the IT continuity management 
maturity model for the organisation. Quantitative  analysis is based on the;  
 documented statistics from information services’ quality and trends 
  critical incident reports and business impact analysis 
  continuity maturity monthly reports. 
Tangible outputs from continuity planning are solutions that are not only reactive 
controls but  also increase the level of an information system’s resilience. Not all 
incidents can be avoided, but if  the IT environment is designed to be fault toler-
ant and resilient, incidents should not escalate to a  critical level as controls will 
prevent this from happening. The theory is that there should be a  positive corre-
lation between the number of critical incidents and the continuity maturity levels. 
The  basic assumption is that when an IT service has a tested plan of how to re-
spond to different situations  they should be able to limit the damage so that the 
incident will not escalate to a critical level. As  a result, the number of critical inci-
dents should decrease as the maturity levels rise. 
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The total time of service recovery and restoration is dependent on the incident 
respond time so it is  important to keep this time as short as possible. One way to 
assess the success rate is to collect  actualised incidents and evaluate the speed 
of the incident response. The basic assumption is that there is a  positive correla-
tion between the short resolution time and the continuity maturity levels because 
testing  and exercising should improve the response time.  
If a critical incident occurs, despite all the preventative actions, timely recovery 
actions are required. Successful recovery can be analysed by using two units of 
measurements. Recovery time  objective (RTO) is the target time set for the re-
sumption of product, service or activity delivery after a  incident. If recovery is 
successful the recovery time should not be more than that agreed on in the con-
tinuity  plans and service level agreements. The second unit of measurement is a 
recovery point objective  (RPO), which is a point in time by which data has to be 
recovered in order to resume IT services. In  practice successful recovery is 
made if the usable data restored is not older than that agreed on in the  continuity 
plans and service level agreements. In order to define what successful recovery 
is, both  RTO and RPO requirements must be fulfilled. 
The bottom line from the business point of view is that IT continuity management 
should be able to  reduce the loss of business and the cost of downtime. If the 
continuity management maturity model  creates real value for a business, it must 
be visible in terms of money saved. The basic assumption is  that higher maturity 
levels correlate with a decreased level in the total cost of a downtime. The total 
cost of downtime in this case includes the sales value lost,  service and product 
production costs and the cost of the resource (time, money and tools) used dur-
ing the  recovery. 
 Evaluation of the Maturity Model 
ISO/IEC 20000 (2005) standard provides a management system for information 
services. This  model integrates a number of IT processes into one management 
system allowing the IT organisations to avoid overlapping between the proc-
esses, to allocate resources, to measure activities  against objectives and to im-
prove process performance.  
The overall goal is to meet end customer  quality requirements by managing 
costs with a balanced level of assurance of service continuity.  Service manage-
ment follows the plan, do, check, act methodology, whilst simultaneously man-
aging process to  process alignment, change management and linking to the 
business objectives and requirements.  Service continuity is one of the main 
processes the objective of which is to ensure that agreed  service continuity and 
availability commitments can be met in all circumstances (ISO/IEC 20000, 
 2005). 
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The purpose of  service management was to provide a central management en-
tity and unify all IT service demand  and delivery processes. At that time all rele-
vant IT processes were reviewed against the ISO/IEC  20000 standard before 
implementation. In order to have successful integration between the  processes it 
was seen as vital that; 
 roles and responsibilities were defined in each process 
  process terminology and deliverables were equivalent to ISO/ IEC 
20000 
  the monitoring, measuring and review methods for each process were 
defined. 
The IT continuity planning process was built on five phases. The first phase ob-
jective was to understand reasoning, requirements and risks  regarding continuity 
management. This phase required strong competence in business case building 
 and impact analysis as well as direct interaction with business stakeholders. The 
objective of the  second phase was to identify and list available solutions with 
cost/benefit calculations.  
Approval for  the final selection was received from the business owner before 
starting the implementation. As the  service managers’ role was considered im-
portant in requirement management it was natural that  responsibility for the first 
two phases was given to service managers. 
The objective of continuity planning phases 3, 4 and 5 was to implement se-
lected solutions, ensure  competencies and verify continuity solution functionality 
by carrying out technical exercises. The  implementation of the three phases was 
assigned to computer managers and technical  configuration managers, who 
were already responsible for service deployment and delivery.  
Due to the similarity between the tasks in continuity management the general IT 
 management workloads did not grow. Resulting from this, incorporating the con-
tinuity planning  responsibilities as part of managers’ current roles increased their 
commitment significantly. 
In order to support the implementation of the Responsible, Accountable, Con-
sulted and  Informed (RACI) table (table 3) it was published and communicated 
widely throughout the Company: 
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Table 3: IT continuity management “Responsible, Accountable, Consulted, In-
formed” model  (RACI) (Syrjänen, 2009). 
According to ISO/ IEC 20000 (2005, 12), an IT service continuity strategy should 
be based on  the maximum acceptable continuous period of lost service and de-
graded service levels during a period  of service recovery. Continuity plans 
should be extended to take into account dependencies  between service and 
system components. These documents should be stored and maintained so  that 
they are up-dated and available when needed for recovery purposes (ISO/IEC 
20000,  2005). 
The validation process of the IT continuity documentation verified that the out-
comes of each phase  were  consistent and the document quality met the stan-
dards. Having validated the service  continuity planning  deliverables, the valida-
tion team informed the IT service team about the results.  This information was 
also  delivered to the IT continuity management process owner, whose 
 responsibility was to provide an IT level  continuity status report to senior man-
agement, as described in figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Maturity status validation process (Syrjänen 2009). 
However, it was found that the overlapping documents could create confusion 
among users, and it was thus imperative to review all  IT  planning and operative 
documents and align these with IT continuity related documents. For  this  reason 
the IT continuity team developed and released document templates for continu-
ity planning  purposes.  For example, IT backup, recovery and restoration instruc-
tions were defined as sub- documents for the  purpose of combining all the proac-
tive and reactive controls together. In  addition to the IT continuity plan  template, 
risk, impact analysis and technical exercise result  templates were released. 
In order to ensure that relevant IT continuity documents are created and stored 
appropriately, IT  services must pass a validation before they are allowed to 
move on to the next phase of the  maturity model. This validation was carried out 
by continuity professionals, who reviewed the  content and the result. To make 
sure that IT services understood the reasoning for approval and  rejection, valida-
tion criteria have been published and shared with all services. The validation cri-
teria  contain a checklist that IT services can use for self-assessment before 
sending documents to the  validation team. The openness with the maturity level 
evaluation and the use of a common scale for measuring  the progress built con-
fidence between the continuity specialist team and the service managers. 
After reviewing the process used in IT continuity management, the IT service 
management  developers supported the idea that the process could be inte-
grated directly into the IT service  management model without additional 
changes. This impartial expert review also proved that the  model was consistent 
with industry standards and could therefore be easily used either as an 
 independent management system or as a subsystem of another management 
system. One of the  findings was that the true driver was not the process itself 
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but the use of simple tools and the division of clear  responsibilities between 
teams and managers. 
Value to the Organisation 
Company IT is a matrix organisation. On the vertical axis operations were proc-
ess driven and on  the horizontal axis dedicated units were responsible for man-
aging resources and assets. The time  allocation of the resources was based on 
the bi-annual planning process. In practice, business  objectives were converted 
into unit, team and individual level objectives for the upcoming 6  months. After 
the closure of each planning cycle, managers reviewed how well the objectives 
were met by using criteria for minimum, target and maximum level performance. 
A successful  performance result would lead to a high payout to teams and indi-
viduals, while a poor performance  would lead to a smaller reward, if any. 
As IT continuity management was one of the key areas for having strong busi-
ness support, the ability  to link planning phases into the objective setting and 
performance evaluation was seen as important  by the management. In order to 
support the units’ planning processes and the service team members’  objective 
settings the continuity team developed an IT continuity objectives scorecard. 
The  scorecard provided the baseline objectives and performance criteria for 
each maturity level. The  IT teams were able to reflect on the current continuity 
maturity status - the one defined in the scorecard and were also able to  set new 
objectives. The important part of each scorecard implementation was to general-
ise it in such a  manner that the scorecard could be adapted across the IT or-
ganisation. This allowed a wider  group of IT professionals to be part of the conti-
nuity maturity model’s objective settings. 
Team objectives on the scorecard were initially designed so that IT service 
teams’  achievements were expected to progress level by level until the highest 
level of maturity was  reached. After the highest maturity level was obtained the 
teams’ objective was to focus on different  types of continuity exercises. Later, 
the objective scorecard contained two measurement parts, which  focused objec-
tives on the continuity exercises only. 
The target groups for the first part were all the IT service teams whose applica-
tions’ continuity  maturity status were at phase 5, meaning that all their phases 
were completed and validated by the  continuity team. For this target group the 
objective was to maintain a phase 5 status by providing  sufficient evidence on 
how well the technical exercises were conducted and what action plans for 
 improvements were available. The target groups for the second part were the 
teams whose  applications’ continuity maturity status was below phase 5. For 
these teams the objective was  to complete the planning and implementation 
phases including the technical exercises. 
 95 
In order to achieve the maximum performance level IT teams had to complete 
the continuity  exercise. Integrating the reward system with the maturity model 
increased the number of technical  exercises and the assurance of working re-
covery solutions. One of the key challenges was  the fact that, due to several 
reasons, the technical exercises often needed to be postponed. This might have 
 decreased motivation and affected the teams’ commitment. The challenge was 
solved by designing  the risk acceptance criteria that would be signed by the 
business owner, thus freezing the IT  continuity progress until it could be contin-
ued. This approach ensured that even if the IT continuity  planning progress was 
on hold, it would not have a negative impact on the reward system for  individual 
employees. 
The overall perception is that the IT continuity management maturity model pro-
vided a solid foundation for line management purposes as the planning phases 
were linked to people’s roles. One of the success  factors in getting teams and 
individuals to commit to the continuity objectives were the transparent  and equal 
performance metrics used. 
The value to the IT governance 
IT governance integrates and institutionalises good practices to ensure that an 
enterprise’s IT  supports its business objectives. It enables an enterprise to take 
full advantage of its information,  thereby maximizing benefits, capitalizing on op-
portunities and gaining a competitive advantage. IT  governance is the responsi-
bility of executives and the board of directors, and consists of the  leadership, or-
ganisational structures and processes that ensure that the enterprise’s IT sus-
tains and  extends the organisation’s strategies and objectives (COBIT 2007, 5). 
To put it short, a well established IT governance model should ensure that; 
 IT enables the business to maximise benefits and opportunities 
  IT resources are used responsibly 
  IT risks are managed appropriately 
According to COBIT (2007), strategic alignment focuses on ensuring the linkage 
between a  business and its IT plans by defining, maintaining and validating the 
IT value proposition and  aligning IT operations with enterprise operations. Due 
to the nature of the business and end  customer expectations and regulations, 
business continuity management has an important role in  the Company’s strate-
gic initiatives and operations. For example, business continuity related  policies 
require each business and support unit to implement continuity management 
practices  throughout a whole organisation. With the help of the IT continuity ma-
turity model, the IT  directors were able to demonstrate that continuity manage-
 96 
ment was aligned with the strategic and  operational objectives of the Company. 
The capability to demonstrate the managed approach has  strengthened the 
business directors’ trust in IT’s capability to ensure the continuity of the IT ser-
vices. 
Value delivery is about executing the value proposition throughout the delivery 
cycle. In practice  this means that IT delivers the promised benefits against the 
strategy by concentrating on optimizing  costs and proving the intrinsic value of 
IT. The IT continuity maturity model was designed so that  process steps, which 
would normally be extensively documented, were summarised into few pages 
 and support documents. In addition, the work routines were embedded in the 
normal management  processes to avoid overlaps with similar processes. All the 
above reduced the complexity of the  process and optimised the planning and 
implementation work. 
One of the key objectives for the business critical processes was to decrease 
unplanned  downtimes. After the comparison of the monthly availability reports 
and the IT continuity maturity  levels the correlation between decreased down 
times and higher maturity levels was undisputed. For example, one of the busi-
ness owners reported an incident related to a failure in IT:  “We faced a serious 
incident and invoked the continuity plan. Thanks to the exercises  we managed to 
recover and restore the system so fast that there was neither downtime nor slow 
 down” (Major incident report 2009). Due to the continuity management maturity 
model the  Company has gained remarkable savings and increased customer 
satisfaction. Whether this could  have been achieved without the maturity model 
is not known, but the results displaying the  correlation should not be ignored. 
Resource management is about the optimal investment in, and the proper man-
agement of, critical  IT resources: applications, information, infrastructure and 
people. Key issues relate to the  optimisation of knowledge and infrastructure 
(COBIT 2007). In order to ensure the optimal  implementation of the IT continuity 
management maturity model it was enforced only for the IT  systems and ser-
vices related to critical business processes. For the non-critical IT services the 
use  of the maturity model was optional. As a result, this increased teams’ com-
mitment as now there was a  rationale for why the IT service team should use 
time and resources for continuity planning. 
The tangible benefit of using the maturity model reporting function was that it 
provided a  transparent information hub between the critical IT services. In prac-
tice, IT services could  collaborate and plan objectives that would support the re-
solving of mutual challenges - like reusing  a common recovery solutions. As a 
result IT service teams avoided double work and increased the  efficiency of the 
organisation. 
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The primary target of the IT continuity maturity model was to steer planning 
teams step-by- step to continuity planning and implementation. Even though the 
focus was more on overall  process management, the deliverables from each 
process phase provided information for  other management purposes. As the 
business impact analysis included loss value calculations and  information about 
cross dependencies, the results could be used for information systems 
 classification. Communicating the findings of the continuity tests and exercises 
improved end-to- end continuity planning between the business and IT units. 
According to COBIT (2007), risk management requires risk awareness by senior 
corporate officers,  a clear understanding of the enterprise’s appetite for risk, un-
derstanding of compliance  requirements, transparency about the significant risks 
to the enterprise, and embedding risk  management responsibilities into the or-
ganisation. From the risk management viewpoint the maturity  model and its de-
liverables provided valuable information for several purposes. Firstly, the phase 
 performance criteria required that each critical IT service must complete a risk 
analysis in order to  progress to the next maturity level. Continuity risk analysis 
provided insight into risks related to  technology, people, processes and infra-
structure. All these may interrupt the services for a  prolonged time or, even 
worse, cause a total loss of data. By comparing the results of risk analysis 
 across the IT services and IT units, risks managers were able to identify signs 
that may indicate  changes in the risk level and which would therefore require 
more attention from the management. 
Risk, by its very definition, always includes uncertainty about the severity of an 
impact and the probability  of occurrence. The phase 5 performance criteria of 
the continuity maturity model required that  an application and service should 
have undergone technical exercises. The technical exercises  provided risk man-
agement with information about the Company’s capabilities to respond to inter-
ruption  and disruption risks, and thus reveal the residual risks. The ability to 
measure and provide validated  technical exercise reports was valuable for cor-
poration risk management, as this information could  be used for group level risk 
reporting. One of the most concrete benefits was that maturity level  information 
could be used for insurance negotiations. The ability to demonstrate tested and 
validated  continuity plans did have a positive impact on the insurance premiums. 
According to COBIT (2007), the purpose of performance measurement is to 
track and monitor  strategy implementation, project completion, resource usage, 
process performance and service  delivery. For example, this can be done by us-
ing balanced scorecards that translate strategy into  action to achieve goals. The 
assessment of process capability based on the COBIT maturity models  is a key 
part of IT governance implementation. After critical IT processes and controls 
have been  identified, maturity modelling enables gaps in the capabilities to be 
identified and demonstrated to  management. Action plans can then be devel-
oped to bring these processes up to the desired  capability target level (COBIT 
2007, 5). 
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With the help of the IT continuity maturity model it was possible to create a scal-
able scorecard that  transformed planning phases into measurable actions. The 
standard unit for measurement was a  single IT system and its maturity level. Ta-
ble 4 demonstrates how to measure the number of  critical IT systems that have 
met the continuity maturity performance criteria on each of the four  IT units (A, 
B, C and D). 
 
Table 4: The simplified scorecard for maturity measurement. The given values 
are only examples,  not real figures (Syrjänen 2009) 
The simplified scorecard provided a snapshot of the current situation of target 
units and IT  systems, but as such did not provide enough information for con-
tinuous monitoring and reporting.  The gap was solved by combining each sys-
tem’s maturity level with the time dimension. This  simple approach made it pos-
sible to create an IT continuity maturity scorecard that could be used  for report-
ing the continuity management status of the whole IT. For the purpose of this 
thesis the  author has designed an illustration of the IT continuity maturity score-
card (Attachment 3) with  pseudo data. 
Status bars on the IT maturity scorecard (attachment figure) show how the 
imaginary IT teams are  progressing with the given continuity planning objectives. 
As this example demonstrates, the first  part of the year shows that most of the 
measured IT systems were at the initial phase of making  business impact analy-
sis and collecting requirements. Based on this information the conclusion is  that 
there is 0% assurance that systems are recoverable in the case of a major inci-
dent. Status  information from June shows that 25 systems out of 40 have com-
pleted the technical exercise  required in phase 5 by successfully demonstrating 
verified capability in recovery and restorations.  The remaining 15 cases have 
progressed well and their continuity capability is not yet proven. When  reviewing 
the year end results, we can make a few observations. There have been 
changes  between the initial number of the measured units and the end year 
numbers. The most common reason for  this is the natural lifecycle of the IT sys-
tems e.g. ramp downs and integrations. Approximately, 95% of the systems 
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 managed complete technical exercises, which can be translated as an increased 
level of assurance  in recovery capability. Even though this is merely an example 
of how to use the IT scorecard, it does  underline the importance of consistent 
and comparable metrics. A useful side benefit is the power  of visualisation when 
communicating the results to the senior management. 
The office of CIO (CIOO) was responsible for collecting and consolidating all in-
formation about the  quality of operations and the progress of strategic initiatives. 
Along with other priority IT processes  IT continuity was one of the key processes 
that needed to be reported to senior management.  A challenge for a small unit 
was how to be able to keep the reporting process light and still be able to 
 provide reliable information for the IT scorecards. This problem was solved by 
using the IT continuity  maturity model reports. 
Due to the simple model, continuity status information was collected directly 
from the IT service  teams and analysed in a relatively easy manner. The status 
of continuity management was easily  adopted by the senior management, as the 
link between the continuity objectives and performance  was consistent and 
traceable. For the first time senior management could set measurable  objectives 
for the whole IT with regard to continuity planning and be able to follow its pro-
gress. Possible issues  on the progress were easy to spot and, if necessary, 
management could initiate corrective actions  and allocate extra resources for 
continuity management. 
 Value to Corporate Governance 
According to the Finnish Central Chamber of Commerce (2003), corporate gov-
ernance can be  defined as a system that helps managing and controlling the en-
terprise. In order to succeed in this  objective, enterprises are expected to comply 
with several regulations and external drivers. The  term compliance is either a 
state of being in accordance with established guidelines, specifications  or legis-
lation or in the process of becoming so. In the legal system, compliance usually 
refers to  behaviour in accordance with legislation. Compliance in a regulatory 
context is a prevalent  business concern; in the Company compliance can be 
split into two areas 1) compliance against  external regulators and 2) compliance 
against internal regulators. 
The information security and crisis management policies of the Company state 
that information  services must provide documented business continuity and dis-
aster recovery plans. This requires  rigorous action in order to ensure that busi-
ness continuity arrangements will work within critical  timescales as planned. 
Corporate IT has responsibility for developing a framework that includes  plans 
and procedures for building resilience on such a level that it will support busi-
ness in a  balanced manner. The given policies underline the importance of the 
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validation of the agreed action,  therefore plans should be reviewed and tested 
on a regular basis and in case risk levels have  increased. 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), issued for U.S. legislation by the Securities and 
Exchange Commission  (SEC), requires enterprises to document audit and use 
controls to ensure the correctness of  financial reporting. The common assump-
tion is that continuity management is part of the SOX control  frame, however the 
standard clearly states that a company’s business continuity or contingency 
 plans have no effect on its current ability to report financial status. Although con-
tinuity management  is not a mandatory control, daily backup procedures should 
be addressed in a management’s  assessment of internal control over financial 
reporting. Appropriate backup and recovery  procedures allow for proper control 
over the restoration process and ensure the integrity of the  information; therefore 
it provides an important financial reporting control (Price Waterhouse  Coopers 
2004, 67). 
New York Stock Exchange NYSE Rule 446 (2004) requires that members and 
member organisations  must develop and maintain a written business continuity 
and contingency plan establishing  procedures relating to an emergency or a sig-
nificant business disruption. In addition, each member  or member organisation 
must disclose to its customers how its business continuity and contingency  plan 
addresses the possibility of a significant business disruption and how the mem-
ber or member  organisation plans to respond to events of varying scope. 
Security, internal control and risk management functions’ role is to ensure the 
implementation of  the control framework according to relevant regulations and 
operating principles. As the Company’s own  policies and the external regulations 
require it should be able to demonstrate its  continuity capability, which also cov-
ers information systems. In addition to the need to comply with the  regulations 
and policies, external groups can request information about the current continu-
ity  status while securing their own delivery channel and business. For example, 
insurance  companies regularly assess risk levels as a part of an insurance prac-
tice and information system  related risks are given on this assessment. 
Regulations, policies and best practices emphasise that IT continuity manage-
ment and recovery  planning are two of the key controls in minimising the loss of 
critical data and ensuring continuous  business processes. An important success 
factor for an external audit or assessment is an  organisation’s capability to pro-
vide fact-based information about the effectiveness of its controls and  coverage 
over the company’s critical functions and its assets. Due to a consistent and 
verified  maturity model, the Company’s IT has the ability to deliver up-to-date 
fact-based information about  the capability of the IT services and systems to re-
spond and recover in case an incident occurs. In  addition, the demonstration of 
rigorous continuity management system builds trust between the  Company and 
its partners and co-operation with the local emergency authorities. 
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From an internal control, security, and risk management point of view, the matur-
ity model has  provided an excellent tool whenever there has been a need to re-
view and report IT continuity  capability to stakeholders. In addition, the continuity 
maturity model has been so effective that it  has been benchmarked by other 
process areas and adjusted for their own use. This may  provide an excellent an-
swer to the question “did the model bring any value to business”?  
Value to individuals 
“What’s in it for me”?  This is a question we all would probably want to ask when 
we start working with new tasks like IT  continuity management. For the past 
three years my position has allowed me to have constant  communication with 
the IT service team members. This communication has contained two main 
 topics: 1) explaining to the new service managers what IT continuity manage-
ment is all about and  why they need to do it 2) discussing and agreeing on a 
given team member’s individual objectives  and incentive planning. 
What our continuity management team and I have found out is that the topic 
continuity management is a difficult subject for many. Resistance to change 
seemed too high at the start of  communication but disappeared soon after. 
Based on the feedback from the IT managers the  workflow was easy to follow as 
the steps were practical and target oriented. The success criterion  of each 
phase emphasises the end result and allows the person responsible to decide 
how to  accomplish a result. So when I collected feedback about the model, in 
most of the cases the  answer was “I understand what is expected from me and I 
can choose how to do that”. In my  opinion this demonstrates how important it is 
for the doers to control their own work in order get a  high level of commitment to 
the objectives. 
Individual incentive planning is one of the most important reward systems in the 
Company. From  an individual’s point of view it is important that objectives can 
be set and measured explicitly in  order to avoid any interpretations about the 
level of achievements. Another important feature was  that the objectives are 
fixed, not changed randomly. For both viewpoints the maturity model  provided a 
structured solution as IT continuity management objectives are based on static 
and  measurable success criteria. This transparent approach allowed IT manag-
ers and their team  members to include continuity management related tasks as 
a part of the individual reward  system. 
 Conclusion 
The overall goal of this thesis was to review what kind of value the IT continuity 
maturity model  has brought to the target organisation and its business objec-
tives. Based on the findings, my  perception is that the model has worked as a 
catalyst for increasing awareness about  continuity management. 
 102 
At the time of writing this, the maturity model has been used for three years and 
is a widely  adopted method of setting objectives and measuring success in con-
tinuity planning. The way  people communicate continuity capability demon-
strates how well the model has  been accepted among various interest groups in 
the IT organisation. It is notable that stakeholder’s  from business and IT man-
agement understand in a consistent manner the reported maturity  levels. When 
communication reaches a level where a single value and its implications are 
 understood widely in the same way, it indicates the successful implementation of 
a common  model and terminology. It is safe to assume that one of the success 
factors for the  implementation was a simplified process model using terminology 
that is familiar for most of  the process-oriented teams instead of using business 
and IT continuity terminology. This,  in turn, made the simplified senior manage-
ment reporting possible, as senior management  understood the content of the 
report. I believe that this was the key for increased management  commitment 
and support for IT continuity management. 
The maturity model was tightly linked to individual objective setting and the re-
ward system, so it is natural to assume that using the maturity model the teams’ 
commitment to the timely planning and  implementing of continuity solutions was 
increased. Recent observations among the IT service  units revealed that the IT 
service teams are interested in using the maturity model as part  of their incentive 
planning. This kind of feedback increases confidence that the model  measures 
the right things at the level of personnel management. Linking the model to the 
reward  system has also increased curiosity among other sections than the criti-
cal IT service teams. 
Observations revealed that IT services that had reached maturity level 5 man-
aged critical  incidents and recovery actions successfully in all reported cases. 
Even though the number  of incidents was not significantly reduced, the number 
of critical incidents decreased as incidents were handled in a timely manner be-
fore they could escalate to a serious level. In terms of  money, the correlation be-
tween the cost of downtime and the maturity level was obvious: the higher  the 
maturity level, the lower the total cost of downtime. Thus, the IT continuity man-
agement  maturity model business benefits were realised in a very tangible ob-
servable way. 
In this study, the success factor for the maturity model implementation was the 
way it connected  IT service teams’ incentive planning to the completion of suc-
cessful technical practise and exercises and  gained the senior management’s 
attention. As an indirect consequence of this method the  increased management 
support enabled IT service teams to build solutions that prevent and limit  the 
critical incidents in practice. The inevitable conclusion is that the maturity model 
(soft  approach) had a positive effect on the designing of resilient information sys-
tems (hard  approach) and increased the assurance of effective IT continuity 
management. Summa  samarium, the maturity model did make a difference as it 
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pulled the IT organisation into an IT  continuity management practice in which no 
previous method had succeeded. 
Discussion 
As the scope of this thesis was a large and relatively homogenous organisation, 
the observations  may not apply to other organisations in a similar way. In order 
to validate the results from this  study, one should conduct a similar type of re-
search in another organisation. By extending this  research to cover more than 
one organisation a researcher should be able to do benchmarking  between the 
organisations studied. This may be somewhat challenging as, based on my per-
sonal  perception and experience in the field of business and IT continuity man-
agement, maturity models  are rarely used. 
Although the research results were surprisingly positive, one question remains: 
could this  achievement have been reached without the IT continuity maturity 
model? In order to be able to  answer this question, the unique element of the 
maturity model that underlines its success must be  identified. In my opinion the 
key was the means to convert a standard process into pragmatic and 
 measurable steps so that the whole concept was understood by the senior man-
agement. In brief; the model succeeded in drawing the management’s attention. 
Regardless of the method,  standard or language I strongly believe that any 
method will succeed if it has management support  from the very start of imple-
mentation. Thus, this research also reveals the necessary success  factors for 
implementing any type of process. My conclusion is that this achievement could 
have  been reached by other means too as long as management support was 
secured. I believe that in  order to design a working maturity model, an under-
standing of an organisations’ management practices  and a dynamic that moti-
vates people, such as individual incentives is required. 
When discussing the results, it is sensible to take a few steps back and reflect 
on the results using  an objective method of measurement. This can be done by 
using a commonly accepted maturity model  originally created by P. Crosby in 
1979 and later developed and maintained by Carnegie Mellon  University and 
Software Engineering Institute. The Capability Maturity Model integration (CMMI 
for  Services 2009) also known as CMMI is a collection of best practices from 
government and industry.  Over time, the model has evolved and the latest ver-
sion is targeted at the evaluation of information and IT  related process maturity 
levels reflecting the following industry standards; 
  Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL)  
  ISO/IEC 20000: Information Technology—Service Management 
  Control Objects for Information and related Technology (CobiT) 
  Information Technology Services Capability Maturity Model (ITSCMM) . 
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CMMI highlights that the quality of a system or product is highly influenced by 
the quality of the  process used to develop and maintain it. In practice this means 
that the maturity level of an  organisation provides a way to predict its perform-
ance in a given discipline or set of disciplines e.g. BS 25999 and BS 25777 con-
tinuity standards. According to the standard, experience has  shown that organi-
sations do their best when they focus their process improvement efforts on a 
 manageable number of process areas at a time. The standard provides five ma-
turity levels, which  are used to characterise organisational improvement relative 
to a set of process areas, and  capability levels to characterise organisational im-
provement (CMMI for Services 2009). 
On maturity Level 1 processes are usually ad hoc and chaotic. The organisation 
usually does not  provide a stable environment to support processes (CMMI for 
Services, 26). Reflecting this  definition, the Company IT continuity management 
model is far more sophisticated as it is fully  managed and organised. 
On maturity level 2, projects, processes, work products, and services are man-
aged. Process  adherence is periodically evaluated and process performance is 
shared with senior management  (CMMI for Services, 26). Reflecting the maturity 
level 2 definitions, the IT continuity management  evaluation proved that the 
process is managed as there are nominated people whose responsibility  it is to 
develop and implement the model. As demonstrated earlier, the maturity model 
is used for  management reporting and providing information to senior manage-
ment on how the IT continuity  management implementation is progressing. 
On maturity level 3, rules are integrated into the current process portfolio. Proc-
esses are well  characterised and understood and are described in standards, 
procedures, tools, and methods. On  maturity level 3, processes are described 
more rigorously than on maturity level 2. A defined  process clearly states the 
purpose, inputs, entry criteria, activities, roles, measures, and verification  steps, 
outputs, and exit criteria (CMMI for Services, 27). 
The IT continuity maturity model is defined, documented and provides tools for 
each process phase.  Roles and responsibilities are defined and, furthermore, 
there are clear verification steps in order  to keep the quality of the process out-
puts on a desired level. In this case the desired level is the  capability to respond 
to incidents and continue operations without interruptions. Evaluation has  proven 
that all the CMMI maturity level 3 requirements are carried out; in some cases in 
a  rigorous way e.g. when it comes to technical exercise requirements. 
On maturity level 4, the service providers establish quantitative objectives for 
quality and process  performance and use them as criteria in the managing proc-
esses. Quantitative objectives are based  on the needs of the customers, end 
users, organisations, and process implementers. Quality and  process perform-
ance is understood in statistical terms and is managed throughout the life of the 
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 processes. Performance models are used to set performance objectives for ser-
vice provider  performance and to help achieve business objectives. A critical dis-
tinction between maturity levels  3 and 4 is the predictability of process perform-
ance. On maturity level 4, the performance of  processes is controlled by using 
statistical and other quantitative techniques and is quantitatively  predictable. On 
maturity level 3, processes are typically only qualitatively predictable (CMMI for 
 Services, 28). 
A fundamental part of the IT continuity maturity model is the ability to incorporate 
process steps into  the performance evaluation of people and teams. If there is a 
known level of performance it is possible to  predict the remaining assurance re-
garding the continuity capability. This information can be used for  setting new 
objectives with delivery time requirements. As demonstrated earlier, the capabil-
ity of  the IT continuity maturity model was linked to the metrics that are used for 
statistical analysis  about the process effectiveness and realised benefits. 
On maturity level 5, an organisation continually improves its processes based on 
a quantitative  understanding of the common causes of variation inherent in 
those processes. A critical distinction  between maturity levels 4 and 5 is the type 
of process variation addressed and accepted by the  organisation. In practice 
processes tend to evolve as other processes and renewed requirements  affect 
the model. (CMMI for Services, 28). 
IT continuity maturity model evaluation did not reveal how the continuity man-
agement process  variation is controlled. However, the study showed that the 
maturity model itself has had an effect  on other IT service processes. While writ-
ing this thesis, ITIL 3 implementation had progressed to a  stage where all IT 
service processes are integrated into one manageable entity. That also includes 
 the IT continuity management process. This raises the question and concern of 
whether ITIL 3  implementation will affect the maturity model. Initially the maturity 
model was designed so that  ITIL 3 was noticed among other standards. Due to 
the consistency between ITIL 3 and the maturity  model it is likely that the change 
will have a minimum impact on the integrity of the maturity  model and its capabil-
ity to enhance continuity management execution. I am confident that the  maturity 
model will remain intact when it encounters pressure from process development. 
I  believe that the biggest risks are to those individual contributors who will pro-
mote change based on  their own preferences, even if this conflicts with recog-
nised benefits. It is hard to predict the  future, but I feel that as long as the matur-
ity model provides fact-based status information, guides  the activities, and has a 
link to individual level rewarding the integrity of the model will be  secured. 
Based on a comparison between CMMI maturity levels and the results of the 
maturity model evaluation  results, a few conclusions can be drawn. First of all, 
CMMI level evaluation would not succeed  unless the relevant information was 
available. The reflection with the recognised industry  standard strengthens my 
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opinion that this thesis managed to focus on the most relevant topics and 
 produce information that can be used for overall maturity evaluation. Second 
and perhaps a more  important observation was the fact that the current IT conti-
nuity management status has almost  reached CMMI maturity level 5. Maturity 
evaluation provides an accurate and adequate amount of  information to con-
clude that IT continuity management maturity CMMI level is at least 4.  The 
evaluation does not provide enough information to answer the question of 
whether the IT continuity  management maturity model complies with CMMI ma-
turity level 5. The reason for this might  be the fact that there has not yet been 
any major transformation activity, the result of which could  be used for the CMMI 
level 5 reasoning.  
My conclusion based on the results of this maturity model evaluation strongly in-
dicates that the  model has reached a high level of maturity. In considering this I 
do not see any reason to continue the  action research and recommend closing 
the cycle and entering a new area of research. 
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Appendix 
Standard name Standardisation body Issued 
Management of operational risk Finnish Financial Supervisory Au-
thority 
May 2004 
31100 Code of practice for risk manage-
ment 
British Standards Institution October 2008 
BS 25999-1 Business Continuity Man-
agement Code of practice 
British Standards Institution November 
2006 
ISO/IEC 21827 Information technology — 
Security techniques — Systems Security 
Engineering — Capability Maturity 
Model 
ISO (the International Organisation 
for Standardisation) and IEC (the In-
ternational Electrotechnical Commis-
sion) 
February 
2009 
ISO/IEC 20000-Information technology 
— Service management — Part 1: Speci-
fication 
ISO (the International Organisation 
for Standardisation) and IEC (the In-
ternational Electrotechnical Commis-
sion) 
December 
2005 
BS 25999-2 Business Continuity Man-
agement Code of practice 
British Standards Institution November 
2006 
Federal Information Processing Stan-
dards Publication 87- Guidelines for ADP 
Contingency Planning 
U.S. Department of Commerce, Na-
tional Bureau of Standards 
March 1981 
Information and BS 25777 communica-
tions technology continuity management 
— Code of practice 
British Standards Institution November 
2008 
PAS 56 Guide to Business Continuity 
Management 
Business Continuity Institute, British 
Standards Institution 
March 2003 
CMMI for Services Carnegie Mellon University and 
Software Engineering Institute 
February 
2009 
Appendix table: A list of industry standards that affect this study (Syrjänen 2009) 
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The Continuity Planning Process 
 
 The continuity planning process as linked to BCM life (Syrjänen 2009) 
The Maturity Scorecard 
RTO= Recovery time objectives and RPO=Recovery point  objectives  
 
 
Objectives scorecard comparing initial performance metrics to mature level or-
ganization  (Syrjänen 2009) 
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Implementation Example of Maturity Scorecard 
 
 The Continuity Maturity scorecard example (Syrjänen 2009) 
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Chapter 9 
Security Management Co-operation with Au-
thorities and Local Community Operatives 
The Management of Common Security 
Sami Rusanen 
Master’s Thesis, Laurea University of Applied Sciences, 2009. 
The aim of this study was to explore how security is managed in certain multiple 
tenant state administration premises and housing organisations representing dif-
ferent fields of state administration. On the basis of the achieved knowledge, a 
model for the management of common security was created. The security man-
agement in multiple tenant premises was reviewed in a case study from the 
point of view of the main organisational actors in the building studied for the re-
search project. 
The theoretical part of the study combined the theoretical basis of performance 
guidance, which is used as the governmental guidance model, and the organisa-
tional security management; thus forming an entity with descriptions of the 
means of achieving its security management objectives. In the empirical part of 
the study data were gathered from the official documents guiding the security of 
the multiple tenant premises and by thematic interviews. 
The gained information was analysed with the help of theoretical content analy-
sis and guided comparison. The means of achieving the security management 
objectives were first compared to security management carried out in each or-
ganisation, which provided a common basis for measuring the organisations. Af-
ter that a comparison of results of the organisational actors was made, which fa-
cilitated the understanding of the state of the management of common security 
in multiple tenant premises. The evaluation chart developed within the study is 
meant to be used in similar studies or reports. 
In the security management of the multiple tenant premises several areas for 
development were found both in the organisations and between them. The rea-
sons for that were mostly due to the lack of a comprehensive security manage-
ment strategy. The security management of the authorities located in the same 
building was carried out almost entirely according to the administration’s specific 
requirements. Between the actors, no co-operation was carried out in practice 
with reference to security management and no agreements were made on 
common procedures. 
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Methodical, comprehensive and well-functioning security management would 
require the forming of a comprehensive picture of security risks in the multiple 
tenant premises by the actors, as well as guidelines and plans for further devel-
opments that should be made on that basis. It is argued that security manage-
ment should be reviewed through the management of common security for all 
the actors in the same premises, which in turn would necessitate close coopera-
tion between the actors as well as common principles of action and practices. A 
particularly important issue is the organisation of common security exercises and 
training as well as the preparation of harmonised guidelines for different inci-
dents and emergency situations. 
Security management carried out in cooperation would increase the synergy be-
tween different administrations and improve cost effectiveness by reducing over-
lapping. Cooperation would particularly reinforce the possibilities of different ac-
tors to prepare themselves for common security risks. 
Chapter 10 
Border Security 
A Facial Recognition System as a Maritime Security Tool 
Jyri Rajamäki, Tuomas Turunen, Aki Harju, Miia Heikkilä, Maarit Hilakivi & 
Sami Rusanen 
Proceedings of the 8th WSEAS International Conference on Signal Proc-
essing Istanbul, Turkey, May 30 - June 1, 2009, ISSN: 1790-5117, ISBN: 978-
960-474-086-4. 
Extended abstract: Administrating and processing information has been devel-
oping fast in the past decades. The human face as a digital image is much eas-
ier to produce and to treat compared to our ability to do so in the last century. 
Digital cameras have replaced traditional photographic methods. The internet is 
expanding continuously, giving more possibilities to produce and to transmit in-
formation. 
With the Schengen agreement the inner border inspections were closed down; 
e.g. the Finnish Border Guard no longer observed and controlled the traffic at 
the harbours of Helsinki. Freedom of movement has brought new challenges 
both to the authorities and privately owned companies (shipping companies, ex-
peditors, passenger and cargo transportation etc) in the harbour environment. 
Without regular border inspections criminals and stolen goods are more easily 
moved from one country to another. It is likely that the level of active monitoring 
of the public peace and security has decreased and that alternative monitoring 
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and control methods are needed. To keep a harbour safe is not just a local issue 
- it is also important at national and international levels. Today, the government 
of Finland has a productivity plan which means cutting down man power from 
the police, the border guard and other governmental agencies. However, as we 
become more and more international new issues need to be taken care of and 
new challenges arise as to how to maintain our security. Hence, new kinds of in-
vestments are needed in order to maintain security. The facial recognition sys-
tem (FRS) could be one solution. 
This study maps the relevant expertise on the scientific and technical issues re-
lated to facial recognition. Experiences are collected from the FRS currently in-
terpretation. When studying these facts the research provides possibilities for 
adapting and implementing FRS in a real environment. If and when a reliable 
and cost-effective FRS can be build, it could lead the way to launch the system 
as a common security tool in harbours. 
 
Face Recognition as an Airport and Seaport Security Tool 
Jyri Rajamäki, Tuomas Turunen, Aki Harju, Miia Heikkilä, Maarit Hilakivi, 
Sami Rusanen 
WSEAS TRANSACTIONS on INFORMATION SCIENCE and APPLICATIONS, 
Issue 7, Volume 6, July 2009. 
Abstract: The transportation industries have been subjected to unprecedented 
scrutiny and regulatory mandates in the post 9/11 era. On the other hand, the 
inner border inspections were closed down in Europe with the Schengen agree-
ment. Freedom of movement has brought new challenges to authorities and 
transportation companies. Effective camera surveillance with a facial recognition 
system (FRS) could be a realistic solution. FRS requires camera(s) and a control 
device; a computer with special software. The software processes the material, 
e.g. facial images, collected by the cameras. FRS has been used as a monitor-
ing and controlling tool for major events and border crossings. The aim of FRS is 
to maintain and improve safety and security in a cost efficient way by saving 
manpower. However, FRS is an additional security tool and therefore not to be 
trusted on its own. FRS is being used mainly as a verification method where the 
human face functions to provide access or as pin code. The optimal operational 
environment for FRS is a dry environment with stable illumination; most likely an 
indoor environment is needed to guarantee the operational ability. Images of 
faces should be viewed from a close distance and the persons, who are to be 
identified, should cooperate. FRS is composition of technical elements and ap-
plications which are commonly used in everyday life. FRS can be used when 
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profiling the environment and setting reasonable aims and in various places. 
Hence FRS is challenging traditional methods as a sophisticated security tool for 
the sophisticated situations. So far, the only operational FRS in Finland started 
in summer 2008 at Helsinki-Vantaa airport. This paper has examined and col-
lected experiences from the airport pilot project, from the relevant literature and 
by interviewing experts in the security and facial recognition field. The aim of the 
paper is to specify the desired goal; how can FRS be applied as a new seaport 
and maritime security tool. 
 
The International and Transorganisational Information 
Flow of Tracking Data 
Jouni Viitanen, Markus Happonen, Pasi Patama, Jyri Rajamäki 
WSEAS International Conference on INFORMATION SECURITY and PRI-
VACY (ISP '09) Puerto De La Cruz, Tenerife, Canary Islands, Spain Decem-
ber 14-16, 2009, ISSN: 1790-5117, ISBN: 978-960-474-143-4 
Extended abstract: In the past decade, tracking has become an essential and 
valuable tool for authorities to prevent and investigate crimes. At the same time, 
criminals and organised crime have internationalised - mostly due to European 
integration. Within the last decade, criminals have also become more technically 
orientated. Some counter measures for tracking applications have been found in 
the hands of the criminals, and therefore international cooperation between offi-
cials has become even more vital. The change has been rapid and therefore law 
enforcement authorities (LEA) have failed to create protocols and procedures to 
deal with international tracking issues.  
It is more efficient to prevent than to repair damage. Unfortunately, prevention is 
even more difficult than crisis management, due to information and time critical-
ity. Currently, the Geographical Information System (GIS) is mostly used for ana-
lyzing situations after they have happened or trying to make logistics more effi-
cient, but not for preventing unwanted events from happening. 
This paper addresses the problems of LEA with regard to cross-border opera-
tions and explains how they differ from other operations. It focuses on the opera-
tional level of action and addresses issues across the range of LEA operations. 
Its goal is to reveal the need for technical help and guidance focused on tasks at 
borders or co-operation over borders. It examines the special considerations re-
quired when conducting operations regarding the complex modern border envi-
ronment. Many of these problems are also present in non-national or state bor-
ders. 
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Chapter 11 
The Critical Mobile ICT Systems of Law En-
forcement Authorities and Rescue Services 
Designing Emergency Vehicle ICT Integration Solutions 
Jyri Rajamäki, Timo Villemson 
 In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Communications 
and Information Technology (CIT'09) Vouliagmeni, Athens, Greece Decem-
ber 29-31, 2009, ISSN: 1790-5109, ISBN: 978-960-474-146-5. 
Abstract: E.g. Finnish police cars have about 40 different user interfaces (radio, 
navigation, command and control systems, radar, alarm lights, etc) in addition to 
a car’s standard user interfaces. In cold weather conditions, not all police vehi-
cles create enough electricity for such intensive operations. Also, the wiring and 
ergonomics are problematic. The annual delivery amount of emergency vehicles 
is, however, so low that traditional business models, where devices and systems 
are sold to the end-user, do not motivate suppliers to invest significantly in sys-
tem development. Therefore, other business models, such as digital service 
concepts, are needed for security services. In this paper, the concept vehicle 
discussed is the Volkswagen Transporter used by the Finnish police but the 
possibility of extending this concept to other emergency vehicles is also pre-
sented. A new mobile platform for police cars is proposed, and the digital service 
design parameters of the potential ICT integration solution are defined. Further 
research subjects are also presented. 
Creating a Service Oriented Architectural Model for 
Emergency Vehicles 
Jyri Rajamäki and Timo Villemson  
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMMUNICATIONS Issue 2, Volume 3, 
2009. 
Extended abstract: Emergency vehicles used by police, customs, frontier 
guards, as well as fire and rescue services are increasingly dependent on ICT 
systems, especially wireless and mobile communications. In the past decade, an 
increasing number of new technical devices and systems have been installed in 
these vehicles, and it is necessary to ensure that information and “on-demand” 
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services provided by these technologies are delivered reliably and securely 
through one or more of the recently developed wireless architectures. 
There are, however, serious challenges to overcome. As the number of ICT sys-
tems has increased, the number of user interfaces of emergency vehicles has 
increased considerably. This has resulted in functionality problems; for example, 
the space for airbags to function has decreased. Also, technical problems with 
regard to electric supply and cabling arrangements have occurred. In addition, 
the documentation of applied solutions is not always adequate. Another issue is 
that the longed for standardisation in the field has not taken place. This may be 
due to the large variety of equipment suppliers or because the annual delivery 
amount of emergency vehicles is so low that the standardisation has not been 
given priority by experts in the field. The challenge is to use infrastructure-based 
communications and ad hoc networks to provide on-demand services in a 
highly-volatile, complex environment. Thus there is a need to study the smooth 
interoperability of architectures with regard to emergency vehicles. 
This paper (1) illustrates the operating environment: communication networks of 
public authorities, emergency vehicles, as well as the ongoing change towards 
service business; (2) describes the main ICT systems of an emergency vehicle 
with an emphasis on the police car; (3) presents the research method applied in 
this study: the digital design service approach; (4) presents the findings of this 
study: a new mobile platform for a police car is proposed, as well as the digital 
services and the design parameters of the ICT integration solution; (5) outlines a 
new service model that could be outsourced to 3rd party vendors and the meth-
ods that could be used to refine these models; and (6) presents the needs for 
further research and conclusions. 
Information Security in Satellite Tracking Systems 
Pasi Kamppi, Jyri Rajamäki, Robert Guinness 
In Proceedings of the 3rd International Conference on Communications 
and Information Technology (CIT'09) Vouliagmeni, Athens, Greece Decem-
ber 29-31, 2009, ISSN: 1790-5109, ISBN: 978-960-474-146-5 
Abstract: Satellite tracking is one of the most rapidly growing business areas in 
the world, and there are already many commercial applications available. Bene-
fits for the customer are advertised, but there is no mention of the information 
security. Modern satellite tracking systems contain communication on many lev-
els, so they are vulnerable to many risks of information security. This paper cov-
ers the main satellite tracking system information security vulnerabilities and 
gives guidelines on how to make systems more secure. 
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PART III 
Security of Critical Events 
Part III includes four chapters. Three of them deal with security of large public 
events and political meetings; one addresses crisis situations. 
Chapter 12 deals with communication and security management co-operation at 
large events by examining the IAAF World Championships, 2005 in Helsinki. 
Chapter 13 researches the usability of TETRA networks in a large multi-
organisational event. The target event was The Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) meeting in Helsinki, December 4-5, 2008.  
Chapter 14 includes three studies covering the nuclear security of public events 
and political meetings. Mobile measurements are needed to search for nuclear 
material. Traditionally, GPS is used for positioning outdoors as positioning in-
doors is difficult. In the first study, Syrjälä demonstrates that it is possible to track 
radioactive sources by utilizing indoor positioning systems based on the wireless 
local area network. In the second study, Garlacz created a Java application, 
IPARM, in cooperation with the Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(STUK), with the aim of reducing or removing human error from the accurate po-
sitioning of measurement equipment within buildings. The third study carried out 
by Ilander, Toivonen, Meriheinä and Garlacz, e.g. reveals what encouraging ex-
periences of the field tests were. 
Chapter 15 discusses school shootings and other crisis situations as well as the 
transparent authority of power in law enforcement. In the first study, Sund devel-
ops a model of the behavioural threat assessment and management process for 
educational institutions in the Finnish educational system; in other words it aims 
to recognise access and manage risks concerning the occurrence of severe vio-
lent behaviour in school-like environments. The second study carried out by 
Ojasalo, Turunen and Sihvonen, is a case study in the context of school shoot-
ings. In the third study, Turunen researches the acquisition and dissemination of 
facts, role shifting and managing the related risks from the perspective of differ-
ent operations in the public safety field as well as from the perspective of a field 
actor with the writer’s personal experience and experience from the interviewed 
professionals within this context. The fourth study carried out by Viitanen, 
Patama, Knuuttila, Rajamäki and Ruoslahti, balances LEAs’ video surveillance, 
audio surveillance and technical tracking rights against the privacy of citizens. 
The study also outlines a scenario of how common ground can be found with a 
constructive approach facilitated by advanced technology. 
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Chapter 12 
Communication and Security Management Co-
operation in Large Events - Case: IAAF World 
Championships 2005 in Helsinki 
Juho Reivo, Jari Vuoripuro and Nina Pelkonen 
Abstract 
Inter-organisational co-operation and co-operation between authorities is usually 
planned but co-operation with private sector security actors has been mostly for-
gotten. Yet, it is the private security that is commonly the first responder in inci-
dents and responsible for most event security. 
Large events can be identified as creating the need for a separate security and 
safety organisation and preparedness planning where several security actors 
are involved. Here communication is critical but systems in events are set up 
more ad hoc than normal. A communication and management system that is 
created on top of any technology has to be planned well and take the human 
element into account or usability is lost. TETRA based equipment is up to the 
task but it may not be used efficiently. Omissions in regulations also hinder ho-
mogenous co-operation across the whole security and safety field. 
As the presented research and case study show there are five themes that 
should be noted in co-operation between organisations. The themes were identi-
fied from interviews with management level operational security staff and are; 
trust, attitudes, knowhow, planning and underlying modus operandi. 
To tackle the increasing security needs of large events, public authorities and 
private security actors have to integrate in better ways in order to manage 
safety. 
Introduction 
Security and safety services are in most cases listed as the critical infra-
structure of any society. Security and safety include many actors, both public 
and private. In today’s world, the role of the different private security actors is in-
creasing as governments can’t provide all the required security alone. In particu-
lar, large events require additional resources. In Finland there is practical ex-
perience in planned co-operation between all security actors. This paper analy-
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ses criticalities in communication and security management co-operation suc-
cess at the IAAF World Championships in 2005, in Helsinki, Finland. 
The IAAF Championships as an event is relatively large and takes the resources 
of Finland as a venue comfortably close to their limits so that every organisation 
has to be utilised in some capacity. These levels of time (duration), area (size), 
participants (amount) and security staff (amount), among others, visibly reveal 
the challenges and problems there may be when managing such a complex 
challenge as these organised large events pose.  
In fire and rescue services as well as police organisations, command centres 
and the preplanning of activities is standard but does the private sector security 
actor fit into those plans? How can all security and safety be better integrated 
into co-operative security and safety management? These were the questions 
that we came up as we approached our topic.   
Working co-operation and integrated activities are not as simple nor straight for-
ward in actuality. As one of our conclusions is, it is not the technology that pre-
vents the most effective co-operation, it is the human element. This research 
should build one bridge between the gap that separates technical design from 
critical communication and the actual manifestation of how it is used in a com-
plex situation. 
We will first present some key definitions of this research and its concepts. After 
a brief background review of the case event, the analysis of the interviews will 
be presented. We will then reflect on the discovered themes in the three sec-
tions centred on management, regulation and organisational culture. Our final 
section will include suggestions to improve the observed situation as well as 
concluding remarks. 
Definitions of this Research 
The topic of this research revolves around event security management and 
communications and co-operation between organisations. The principal thought 
driving this work has been to discover what underlying aspects affected the dif-
ferences within the overall security organisation and between three security 
command and communication centres that were part of the security and safety 
management structure of our selected case, the IAAF World Championships in 
Helsinki, Finland in 2005.  
The framework for this research is to look at both co-operation between police, 
fire rescue and private security. According to Finnish law, the organiser of the 
event is principally responsible for its security and safety but, as is expected in 
an event of this size and importance, the roles of governmental agencies and 
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authorities are very central and directly linked to all security and safety activities. 
This creates a combination of security actors where in practice the aforemen-
tioned three play the most important parts and others – military, customs, Red 
Cross first aid, volunteers, etc. - act in more supportive roles.  
One of the most important parts of complex organisations is communication. In 
this case it was supported by having most of the security organisation use 
TETRA-based radio communication as their main communication line. This and 
other known experiences by the authors of the event led to the communications 
approach in our research. Our main question is: how can all security and safety 
actors can be better integrated into co-operative security and safety manage-
ment? In this, we focused on operational activities in our case study. 
Research Methods 
The decision was made that themed interviews (Juholin 2006, 355) with the rep-
resentatives of the main security and safety organisations were the most suit-
able approach. Research was limited on the management level and the three 
areas had centralised security and safety commands. Neither physical layouts 
nor the roles of the people nor the number of the staff were identical. Therefore 
they were simplified – treated as being equal – for this research.  
Interviews were conducted between May 2008 and September 2008. They were 
done mostly with two sets of questions - preliminary and more topics specific. 
Some answers were gathered by email and some in face to face interviews. The 
research team then analysed the answers, identified commonalities, discussed 
them and proceeded to reflect on them from each member’s area of expertise. 
Central Terms and Definitions 
1) Attitude and Attitude Transference: In this case example, attitude(s) became 
central in understanding some of the answers from our interviews. Attitudes are 
based on accustomed practices and traditions, for example whether or not co-
operation is a new thing or already experienced. Attitude may manifest as indi-
vidual like or dislike or organisational attitude where likes and dislikes are learnt 
from peers and superiors. (Shockley-Zalabak 2006, 55, 140-141). 
2) Event Size and Preparedness for It: Events of a big enough scale require a 
special approach. Large events by definition, we believe, need to be handled as 
separate entities outside regular daily security management. They often (directly 
or indirectly) monopolise almost all other activities within their vicinity in a way 
that it is not possible to include required security measures within daily routines.  
 122 
No one has made a clear distinction when an event stands out as a "major spe-
cial event". Some signs are that there is a very large crowd – possibly in relation 
to the local population. The size and classification of the controlled area; nature 
and type of the event; VIPs and combination of these and other circumstances 
("(inter)national importance" for example) may warrant the special management 
of security and safety, a joint operation, a (security) project organisation (Turner 
1999,124), even though a big event may not be defined by big risks.  
3) Communications and a Communication plan: Communications means broadly 
all exchange of information in any form, be it text, radio message, touch, “body 
language”, signs or even organisational actions. It is plural and includes all ac-
tivities – verbal and non-verbal as well as intended and unintended. Communi-
cation is a complex activity or process in which the effects are hard to predict 
(Juholin 2006, 16). 
The communication plan is the instructions in which it is specified as to who 
communicates with whom and who may have specific details on what and how 
something is to be communicated and by what method. With reference to radio 
communications it specifies for example the equipment used, talk groups 
(“channels”) and call signs. With TETRA, it must be noted that for all talk groups 
prioritizing and handset management could be done over the air, which makes it 
possible to more flexibly change to several possible alternatives - if so planned 
and trained (Keikkonen, Pesonen & Saaristo 2004, 30-40). 
4) Culture of Activities and Organisation: Culture in a broad sense includes all 
human activity and its products. Our research is very much a study on certain 
activities of security and safety management culture: “Is knowledge sharing en-
couraged and facilitated?”, “Is there an atmosphere of openness and trust” etc. 
[6]. In this case we are talking about culture defined more in terms of organisa-
tional culture: a complex system of shared traditions, signs, assumptions and 
other activities that affect how we behave in a given organisational context. Cul-
tural affects and cultural differences should not however be over emphasised. 
Even when comparing police, rescue services and private security, in most 
cases (especially in small setting on a national level) we have much more in 
common than we may think at first (Pinnington 2004, 209-210; Shockley-
Zalabak 2006, 47-48, 55).  
5) Safety and Security Actors(s): Actors are here considered the organisations 
involved in making the event, acting in a way that supports it. Specifically we 
discuss the security and safety actors. Depending on context, this may apply to 
all security and safety organisations or in some cases an actor may refer to only 
private security personnel as opposed to public authorities, such as police and 
fire rescue.  
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For translation purposes, it has to be mentioned that security officer includes 
both security guard (fi: vartija) and steward (fi: järjestyksenvalvoja) which have a 
separate legal status in Finland. Safety and security are understood as separate 
in English but translated with one word in Finnish and thus security is here un-
derstood to include safety if not otherwise explained in the text. 
6) TETRA and VIRVE: VIRVE is a secure communications system network that 
is used in Finland. It is based on the TETRA (TErrestial Trunked RAdio) stan-
dard that European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has ac-
knowledged as the only official radio technology meant to be used by public au-
thorities. VIRVE is used by all Finnish authorities nationally, including fire and 
rescue services, police, border guards, health and social services, customs 
agency and to some extent the military. Around the metropolitan Helsinki area 
there is also HELE-NET, which is a TETRA network based system used by an 
electricity company. VIRVE and TETRA are emphasised as TETRA-based radio 
equipment was used extensively and played a major role in the organisational 
behaviour studied (Pursiainen, Lindblom & Francke 2007, 102-110). 
IAAF World Championships Helsinki 2005 Background 
The 10th IAAF World Championships in Athletics was the largest public event 
ever held in Finland as well as the most important sporting event in 2005. More 
than 3,000 participants from over 100 countries, 4,000 media representatives, as 
well as some 5,000 volunteers helping the organisers and the athletes took part 
in the event (Hänninen 2005). 
The actual World Championships lasted for 10 days. However, the security ar-
rangements were fully functional for two weeks. The security planning had be-
gun as early as two years before the games. 
Distribution of Work and Duties 
Under Finnish law, the organiser of the event had the primary responsibility of 
maintaining order and security. To perform this, the organiser employed a pri-
vate security company, which, in turn, used subcontractors.  
During the games, the police had a staff of approximately 1,200 persons at its 
disposal, rescue services totalled approximately 500 (staff at Helsinki and 
Espoo, including normal readiness), private security totalled approximately 1,200 
in security and hundreds of others were involved as first aid medicals, accredita-
tion officers and in other positions. 
Security measures to be undertaken by the organiser under the Assembly Act 
included providing a necessary number of security guards to maintain order. The 
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sphere of authority of the organiser included the compound area of the Athletes’ 
Village as well as the immediate surroundings at the various exit gates of the vil-
lage and the compound area of the Olympic Stadium. The organiser was also 
responsible for the entry screening of persons and their personal belongings. 
The police, who were the main authority, had assistance from other authorities 
such as the Rescue Department, the Finnish Defence Forces, the Finnish Cus-
toms and the Border Guard as well as from private organisations such as the 
Finnish Red Cross. For this purpose, the police requested executive assistance 
from other authorities, who then acted under the command of the police author-
ity. In addition to this, the police supervised the organisers in the fulfilment of  
their duties defined in the Assembly Act. 
When necessary, the police took operational command and assumed overall re-
sponsibility for performing the security duties by issuing orders to security 
guards and deploying units inside the Athletes’ Village.  
When outlining the role of each authority, certain rules were to be considered. It 
was agreed that the ultimate command authority rested with that authority under 
whose statutory duty it was to carry out the assignment at hand.  
Structures of People and Resources 
There were three main operational security command centres. The main com-
mand centre was situated at Pasila Police Station. The other command centres 
were in the Olympic Stadium and at the Police College in Espoo, which was one 
kilometre from the Athletes’ Village. Even though the organisation structures in 
all of them were similar, there were some differences with the view to the role of 
the management of the private security. In Helsinki, the management of the pri-
vate security company took part in the operational command centre, whereas in 
Espoo it did not. In Espoo the private security had a centre inside the compound 
where there were representatives from the military (that were under the com-
mand of police) and also some informal co-operation with police task groups op-
erating next door.  
For communication security actors used VIRVE and other TETRA networks, se-
cure data networks, email, mobile phones and most importantly regular and 
casual face-to-face meetings to either officially or unofficially convey information 
and manage event tasks. Different authoritative organisations had some shared 
VIRVE call-groups but private security actors especially operated with their own 
radios having only direct connection to operational command centres through 
their area managers. The centres had at least one handset for listening in to all 
security related networks. 
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The Risk Analysis and the Outcome 
According to the risk assessment, no serious security threats hung over the 
games and it was likely that the games would run safely. The potential risks in-
cluded incidents, traffic jams and accidents. The main objective of the security 
arrangements was to create a secure and trouble free games in a safe environ-
ment. 
The analysis of the threats was found to have been a success after the games. 
The only disturbances during the games were some thefts of TV-sets in the Ath-
letes’ Village, occasional “snags” at the security checks, traffic jams, power cuts 
due to storms and harsh weather, some harassment cases and the removal of 
an old wartime anti-aircraft grenade from the construction site in the vicinity of 
the Athletes Village - all in all fairly uneventful for an event of this size. 
Interviews with Operational Security and Safety Manage-
ment Staff 
The themed interviews took place between May and September 2008. Most of 
the interviewees were asked background questions first and a second set of 
more specific questions later but the first part was skipped when information was 
available. The answers by and large emphasised the social (human) aspects of 
the security and safety, communications and management. To emphasise im-
partiality, it must be stated that none of the generalisations or examples made 
were based on single answers or one faction’s views. Common sentiment on the 
most interviewed supported all conclusions, although not all expressed any opin-
ion on some points. A definite fault in this research must be identified in the un-
evenness of interviews as some were conducted via a combination of phone and 
email and some, at length, face to face.  
The Background and Identification of those Interviewed  
The interviewees chosen from the police organisation for the interviews were 
senior officers in charge of the security arrangements in the World Champion-
ships 2005, and officers in charge of field and overall operations in the command 
centres. There were four interviewees; two of them worked in Espoo and two in 
Helsinki during the games.  
From private security the highest ranking members of the management, each 
working at one of the areas were selected for interviews. All three are veterans 
with decades of experience in handling event security in demanding high profile 
settings and they also had extensive experience of working with authorities. 
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Helsinki rescue services fire chief was also interviewed and he acts as an au-
thority and liaison to the event organisers and to other authorities in regard to 
events in the Helsinki area. In Helsinki in 2005 he acted as a general coordinator 
without a specific operational area of responsibility.  
The medical organisation selected for their interview a person who works for the 
Finnish Red Cross’s first aid organisation's management and is responsible for 
the Olympic Stadium area.  
Answers – Viewpoints on the Topic 
The answers from the interviewees reflect the details they observed that are 
linked to our presented topic and the sometimes rather specific view of the 
whole event they had during the games. 
All the security and safety related actors had some general notion about and aim 
towards total security at all levels. One could argue that there was a common 
goal but the aims were formed separately. All security actors also embraced, on 
some level, the ideas of shared operational command centres; TETRA based 
communication, secure and backed up communications and co-operation with 
all the other security actors. These were their wishes and will – even if the exe-
cution was not always smooth. 
Besides the common aim five central themes emerged from the analysis of the 
interviews; trust, attitudes, knowhow, planning and underlying modus operandi. 
Each theme touched on several issues but these were noticed only in the break-
downs. Also it must be noted that only those themes that evoked memories of 
problems (own or others) and issues that were seen relevant and worth mention-
ing in the interviews are presented here.  
1) Trust: A very central issue in security is trust. Organisations did not trust each 
other enough to mix and integrate fully but instead worked “alongside” or “at 
arm’s length”. Organisational distrust manifested in “officiality”: sticking to formal 
interaction and strict organisational division. The main concerns mentioned for 
this were confidentiality and information security. The latter was particularly 
mentioned as a reason for using separate communication networks and equip-
ment instead of a joint channel for general command.   
When trust manifested, it stemmed strongest from individual level connections. 
Individuals from opposite organisations knew each other from previous occa-
sions, although they were not personal friends. However, it took only the few key 
people to know each other for it to spread by example to all who were working in 
those particular groups, thus affecting how that local organisation acted in real-
ity. When there was familiarity with the other (person or organisation) there was 
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no need to prove one’s worth and abilities. However, often an organisation was, 
in some circumstances, excluded or not taken seriously or not listened to.  
2) Attitudes: Attitudes towards co-operation and other organisations played a 
significant role. Again, these manifested at both individual and organisational 
levels, some apparently as faint notions all the time and some sporadically and 
stronger. Specific attitudes mentioned were around views on roles each organi-
sation had (or should have had). There were signs of not knowing or being able 
to decide who was or should be in charge at times, if no clear imperative was 
present. There was an attitude of trying to take over and adopt a position over 
others – “to be the boss” manifested by “telling, not discussing”. This caused fric-
tion between all organisations. This was also tied to “blindness” – a denigrating 
of the roles of others. 
3) Knowhow: The biggest difference between authorities from different areas 
and between authorities and private security actors was mentioned as the theme 
of “knowhow”: knowledge and wisdom about what the events are and how to 
work in them in general and with reference to security. In the interviewees or-
ganisations there were also seen to be differences in levels of event knowhow. 
The authorities were seen by all as having a superior basic level of general se-
curity training and experience but the private security possessed more event re-
lated specialist knowledge and experience. The requirement to be flexible, which 
was mentioned as an example, was not understood by those who had not 
worked closely with events before. By and large, joint exercises had been omit-
ted and would have been wanted, according to the results of the interviews, as 
tools for both better organisational integration as well as basic special training. 
4) Planning: Planning was considered to be neither lacking nor particularly over-
extensive. Te answers reveal some problems. Some practicalities and opera-
tional procedures were not thought of, which especially manifested in gaps in the 
communication plan that had not been taken into account on how two side-by-
side organisations (private and public authorities) could or should communicate 
and on what issues. No plan was known to the interviewed on how security 
communication would have been handled had all organisations needed to be 
utilised in an emergency incident. The framework and interface of actual co-
operation and its level was apparently worked out at the operation sites. Where 
possible, old acquaintances “reused” their previous understanding of working to-
gether and recycled that familiar way of working into their organisational reality.  
5) Underlying Modus Operandi: Two operational mode pairs were also discov-
ered amidst the answers. Where problems were seen there was a strong pres-
ence of juxtaposing hard (“inflexible”, “security overrides customer needs“) and 
soft (“flexibility”, “event needs before security procedures”) approaches to secu-
rity. Similarly, the “daily activities” and “preparedness to crisis” were juxtaposed, 
where in the former the focus was on handling the small more numerous prob-
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lems and participant service, while in the latter the focus was more on the less 
likely larger catastrophes and reserving resources for those. For example, in 
Espoo, the police had an excellent operational command centre that was ready 
for catastrophes but was too far away and not ready to handle the more com-
mon daily activities that were taken care of at and within the gates of the ath-
letes’ village where another command centre was set up, mostly by private secu-
rity. 
Technology Assisting Management 
The Rescue Services College’s Command Manual (Kaukonen 2005) sums up 
the basic principles of the management in a rescue operation as requiring real 
time information, careful planning and long term anticipation as well as easy 
transference from small to large organisational structure depending on the need. 
They also apply to the security management of a large event.  
Management Responsibility 
In the so-called basic state of a public event, where everything is as it should, 
overall command rests usually with the security management. However, if the 
situation becomes threatening or in an incident occurs, the overall responsibility 
is transferred to the appropriate public authority. Managing a hectic emergency 
situation should run as smoothly as managing a normal, small-scale situation. 
This means that management organisation is planned to suit all regardless of 
the agency. A coherent joint operation has the best potential for scaling up to 
meet any emergency. 
The Communication Equipment  
The primary users of the Finnish Authorities’ Telecommunications’ Network, 
VIRVE, are the various public authorities. However, other users may be allowed 
access to it on certain terms. A temporary licence could be granted for example 
to a private company providing security services. Suomen Erillisverkot Oy, who 
is in charge of the licences, scrutinise each case separately before granting the 
right to use VIRVE. Using the network does not necessarily mean access to any 
of the talk groups (“channels”) used by authorities (Suomen Erillisverkot Oy 
2008). 
In practice, the only way for private security providers to gain access to TETRA 
is to borrow handsets from public authorities. Even then there are not always 
enough handsets available for the biggest events. Without equipment there is no 
uniform and unhampered communication across organisations. The terminals 
are too expensive to purchase for one single event. Even renting them is costly 
because of their high rent rates which exceed the purchase price in a couple of 
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days. Thus, handset terminal rentals are not financially feasible if no there is no 
incentive to do so (Orakoski 2008). 
Even though it is possible to receive simultaneously several talk groups with a 
TETRA handset, in practice it is not always possible in a management situation. 
Monitoring even as many as two talk groups proves too challenging with regard 
to the enormous amount of messages, especially during a crisis. In the rescue 
organisation plan it was mentioned that a manager operating at the Stadium 
needs two handsets in order to handle the defined talk groups. Technical com-
munication between groups had thus, in a way, been noticed - at least in one in-
stance. 
Communication Planned For Authorities 
Among the authorities the communication instructions and the use of VIRVE is 
routine. Since the private sector only rarely use VIRVE, communication plan-
ning, which includes private security providers, has been neglected. Only on a 
few occasions have there been scenarios in which the use of VIRVE by the pri-
vate security sector has been noted.  
Our interview study indicated that some public officials have difficulties in ac-
cepting that the authority network can be used by other organisations as well. 
They do not seem to appreciate all the benefits of the use of TETRA network. 
Some even seemed to suspect that VIRVE talk groups can be eavesdropped so 
that confidential information is in danger “insider risk” (Pursiainen etc. 2007, 
95)). This is not at all likely technology-wise but weighing the legal ramifications 
of “overhearing” against the effective distribution of information may be some-
thing to consider in a joint command centre environment.  
Laws, Degrees and Acts 
For this study case we focused research on some of the laws fundamental to the 
cooperation between various authorities in Finland. The duty of each authority to 
provide executive assistance is decreed separately by law. Each authority has a 
duty to provide and a right to receive executive assistance. In addition, each au-
thority has the right to engage persons to assist, if the situation so warrants. 
There is no uniform legislation concerning the relations between authorities and 
private security services. This expert opinion was confirmed by the Research 
Service of Parliament. Only in a section of the Constitution of Finland are these 
relations mentioned. However, even this section, of course, does not apply to 
event security as such. A private security provider is not defined in any legisla-
tion as a provider or receiver of executive assistance.  
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There is however the relationship between public and private that stems from 
the legislation – the supervisory role that authorities have. In events it is also a 
dual role as they are at the same time both the actor whom should be working 
shoulder to shoulder with the private colleagues but while also overseeing simul-
taneously that the stipulations of permits and regulations are met. So, according 
to the law, private security actors are considered separate and having no inter-
face with public authorities other than in regulatory settings. This mostly works 
fine with smaller events but disregards the needs of the likes of our case study. 
As declared, the aforementioned legislative situation is based on the situation in 
Finland. Since the initial research, a ministry workgroup to develop legislation in 
this field in Finland was initiated. There is reason to believe that similar situation 
regarding private security exists in most countries (Button 2008). Co-operation 
has been deemed one sided or perhaps even been left undefined.  
The "Bigger Picture" of Interaction, Co-Operation and 
Social 
The big picture in all this is how should the parties involved interact, co-operate 
and, in some ways, integrate. The grander picture is where we have to contem-
plate what societal and human needs, wants, requirements and risks and oppor-
tunities are at stake.  
The Economics of Resources  
There is a logic that supports integration and co-operation; the logic of econom-
ics and scarcity of resources. It is precisely in large events that the need to co-
operate is underlined to use the human and other resources available in the 
most feasible manner possible. In shared and co-operative management human 
resources are the unit of interest and communication in interaction between hu-
mans. The Helsinki games could not have been made without participation 
across organisational limits.  
The smart deployment and effective use of scarce resources is only half of the 
story. The other is to understand the somewhat mechanical thought sensory ac-
tivity that all security and safety personnel are engaged in. They all act as sen-
sors to feed information to a command and communication nexus: normal activi-
ties, abnormalities and more serious security concerns. They not only serve as 
first responders but also create a larger distributed network than that any single 
organisation could. The different groups involved feed information into the sys-
tem, dissect it, add their own expertise to others and accumulate tacit knowledge 
about the event. Shared knowledge then supports satisfactory results through 
the enhanced speed and quality of work (Probst, Raub & Romhardt 2000, 170). 
Such synergy benefits are critical for preventative measures as well as after the 
fact efforts. 
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As important as security and safety are, they are still support activities and struc-
tures for society, economy and events. Economically, as well as per individual 
events, joint operations create efficiency and thus safety and security (or at least 
the image of). This is a real advantage that international events look for in a 
venue. This point can be noted from the reports about the Helsinki games appli-
cation process (MTV3 2002) as well as from the report from Ministry of Educa-
tion about the national strategy for major international events (Linna, Hakala-
Zilliacus & Tolonen 2006, 34-36) 
The Trust Issue  
Trust is the base that every joint- and co-operative action is built on. A simplistic 
way to estimate trust is "either-or" or "trust/distrust", the black-or-white binary 
pair, which rarely describes the actual situation accurately. For security and 
safety to actualise and function, there has to be some level of trust towards the 
general public, audience, the (paying) customer as well as performers and other 
staff.  
For any kind of meaningful interaction to exist, there has to be some ba-sic level 
trust towards the other. The security guard expects to be taken seriously by the 
authorities as well as the other way around. The basic level of trust is interwoven 
in the roles we have and take while interacting. Mostly these are social norms 
but in some cases these expectations may be written down as guidelines or law 
- contracts of sort. Whether written down or not, these are the generally ex-
cepted norms by which we set our trust (Tourish & Hargie 2004, 12-13). 
The general acceptance of these social contracts makes them formal and thus 
they can be called formalised trust. This is the level of trust we usually operate 
between people and organisations we do not really know. Sometimes a situation 
is even hindered by the fact that we do not fully understand the extent, specifics 
and dynamics of an applicable contract. Thus we keep to the parts that are sim-
ple, clear and understood - while at the same time enforcing the idea of them to 
be the most central parts of a vague contract, pushing it inadvertently askew 
from its originally intended form. In communication theory this is termed “uncer-
tainty avoidance” (which is not the same as risk avoidance). Uncertainty avoid-
ance means unspecified, unclear and unpredictable are avoided and strict codes 
of behaviour and absolute truths are used or at least preferred (Turner 1999, 
490; Hofstede 1994, 163-172, 260, 263). 
The basic interaction is based - and limited - on the trust framed by the contract 
between organisations. If the individual has some experiences with the other or-
ganisation or individuals, that will come in to play either as a positive or negative. 
Personal experience based trust is the most common informal form of trust. In-
formal trust is often gained by doing things together, creating an understanding 
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of a common language (jargon) and the working methods of all involved (Probst 
etc. 2000, 192-194, 276-277). 
Formal trust is often forced and rarely flexible. Trust between organisations is 
mostly formalised and the formal level is easily seen as the maximum. An ex-
ample of this is to limit the access and communication to formal channels and 
methods (although sometimes organisational and technical systems set similar 
requirements but that should not be mistaken here). Informal trust stems from 
actually knowing the other and is usually stronger but more prone to fluctuation. 
The gap between the required level of trust, for example, on the cooperative use 
of resources, and the level found can be overcome (at least locally) by personal 
informal trust. Both of the aforementioned examples and their reasons were pre-
sent in our examined case. Informal trust was accepted as a sufficient level to 
form joint security management in the areas that were seemingly most efficiently 
and smoothly run. Similar findings on informal knowledge sharing were reported 
in (Jarvenpaa, Majchrzak 2008, 260-276). 
The Experience Issue  
Legislation does not define the security providers in the private sector as an offi-
cial operational partner. The public authorities are not always aware of the ca-
pacities and knowhow of the private security sector. Most of them lack personal 
contact with private security management and planning professionals. Instead, 
many of them perceive the private security branch only as security guarding and 
have little experience of working with security guards. 
The public authorities, especially police and fire rescue, are highly trained and 
their expertise is revered almost without question. However, this may have de-
veloped blindness on an individual level to the fact that the public authorities lack 
special expertise and experience with regard to event security, which differs 
from their daily functions. Hard security approach goals cannot be accomplished 
without also taking care of soft security needs. Vice versa, soft security must 
also prepare for risks that can only be tackled by the hard security approach. In-
cidents themselves within events are basically similar regardless of the setting 
but the event setting does generate new challenges that affect how these inci-
dents can and should be approached. One could even speak of “project secu-
rity”. 
There are individual public authority members that are especially knowledgeable 
and experienced from having worked with events but even then that knowledge 
does not spread effectively. Some localities also benefit by having a yearly large 
event but a few large events a year do not ensure expertise. Even within private 
security there is similar division as one should not expect a doorman or a shop-
ping centre guard to be keenly aware of the intricacies involved in working at a 
large event. Private security in general has the advantage in learning by doing 
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more, especially with reference to events. This is in contrast to authorities taking 
part in event security operations (besides the permit process). In fact, the au-
thorities become involved after some incident has occurred, which results from 
working separately in the first place.  
All security actors should acknowledge each other’s proficiency and capabilities. 
Furthermore, to be able to effectively work together this needs to be rehearsed 
(Zarraga & Bonache 2003, 1238-1240; Das & Teng 1998, 504-509). 
Suggestions and Conclusions 
Seamless communication is the key when providing security at public events. 
Our case study suggests possibilities for improvement and acts as a reminder to 
all who are planning a large event.  
A good Structure for an Organisation's Activities 
Different agencies - including those in the private security sector - should have 
predefined operations models and compatible equipment in order to fulfil effec-
tive communication. A carefully prepared communication plan involving all the 
security providers, private as well as public, should have special emphasis on 
communicating across organisational boundaries. Even more so if the organisa-
tions and their members are rarely in contact with each other. 
A great part of the activities requiring communication takes place in the actual 
event area between actors on the same level. However, an emergency or a 
threatening situation requires centralised management and proper support for it 
and a common command and communications centre for all the security provid-
ers, similar to that in the studied case.  
Regulatory and Legislative Enhancements 
All security actors are currently seen still as somewhat separate in the field of to-
tal security - despite political level integration efforts everywhere. Even in 
Finland, which has been considered as a prime example of different agencies 
working together, there is still a clear “segregation of roles”. A holistic framework 
for total security is missing that would better define different organisational inter-
action, especially in a joint operation at a large event such as Helsinki 2005 was.  
At some level interaction and co-operation may be an “extra legal” non issue, but 
by updating the legislation, a homogeneous operations model could be created. 
In particular, the role of the private security provider should not have to be de-
pendent upon the diverse methods and routines of different organisations as it is 
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under the current system in Finland and many other countries. Thus, for exam-
ple communicating in the same authority network and the presence of the man-
agement of the private security companies in the operational command centres 
should be based on law and not on the unofficial practices of different authori-
ties. This would guarantee a continuous and swift flow of information in the 
emergency situations in a way it has been customary between authorities in pro-
viding and requesting executive assistance at large-scale incidents. Such regu-
latory support for the integration of intentions could boost longer term co-
operation planning.  
Attitude Adjustment and Training 
Genuine trust that also tolerates minor faults is something far deeper than trust 
based on law, and usually requires a personal level of familiarity. This manner 
may not be easily changed but the level of current trust and familiarity with each 
security actor’s competence can be raised. Ways to tackle this are large joint 
exercises; specific courses on the subject together with other security actors; an 
exam/audit system for private security individuals operating at management 
level; and new guidelines and/or legislation to support joint activities better. 
Some combination is most likely needed.  
Should formal mechanisms not be possible or, as bureaucracy is slow, new leg-
islation and systems take time, informal levels of trust can be enhanced as well. 
Seminars, recurring meetings; local or event related drills; and generally working 
together in genuine cooperation – not just side by side – in a manner where all 
learn from previous experience and share their knowledge with their respective 
organisations will help address the issues raised. With these actions underlying 
attitudes can be changed, if they are promoted decisively, and especially if they 
are carried out prior to a common task – the next large event to be handled 
jointly. 
Conclusion 
In this research we touched only on some themes that emerged as points to 
consider and develop. The issue mainly concerned the effectiveness of com-
mand and control room operational management and its communication. The 
best technologies are seen to be useless if they are not used right and they will 
not be effective if co-operation is not trained for planned and agreed upon be-
forehand. Laws and regulations can be used to give a homogenous form to the 
methods and interaction used, a readymade basis that can be built depending 
on what kind of event is in question and what kind of security organisation it 
needs.  
To take this research further, it is proposed that a similar review could be made 
regarding situations in other countries about 1) current methods of handling ex-
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ceptionally large events and the use of communication technology to support 
them; 2) laws and regulations governing this topic and whether meaningful co-
operation in this context is supported; and 3) the level and type of interaction 
and co-operation between all the security actors. The size of an event may be 
relative but the type could be any event not just one held yearly in the same lo-
cation. 
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Chapter 13 
Nuclear Security at Public Events and Political 
Meetings 
The Use of Indoor Positioning System for the Security Ar-
rangement of Radiation Sources 
Jari Syrjälä 
Master’s Thesis, Laurea University of Applied Sciences, 2009. 
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority of Finland (STUK) has taken advan-
tage of Global Positioning System technology with respect to radiation level 
measurements. For the indoor positioning of radiation sources, however, the 
GPS technology is not applicable due to the lost of direct line of sight to satel-
lites. 
Indoor positioning is mainly used in industry and healthcare. Within industry it is 
mostly used for tracking goods and within healthcare for locating equipment and 
people. The indoor positioning systems on the market today are based on the 
fingerprinting method which utilises existing wireless LANs. When applying the 
fingerprinting method, the calculation of the location of an item is based on the 
measurement of the received signal strengths of the wireless LAN’s action 
points.  
The goal of this master’s thesis was to study the positioning systems which are 
based on the fingerprinting method in general and their suitability for locating ra-
diation sources. The applicability of the fingerprinting method was evaluated by 
using the equipment and software provided by Cisco Systems and Ekahau Inc. 
The objective of this thesis was to evaluate how the fingerprinting method could 
be applied to locate radioactive sources. 
The methodology followed in this thesis is the one typical to the applied sci-
ences. The starting point for the study was to setup a well known construction 
within the STUK premises, since the contribution of this study was not to prepare 
any new indoor positioning systems but, to study its applicability for locating ra-
dioactive sources. In this M.A. thesis, the scientific literature and technical arti-
cles dealing with the indoor positioning technology were studied and form the 
theoretical basis of the study. 
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In this work the required measuring environment was established for locating ra-
dioactive sources. The applied part of the thesis set up an application for binding 
together the radiation measurement data and location data in the database and, 
for representing the results on building layout plan. 
This study was able to demonstrate that it is possible to track radioactive 
sources by utilizing indoor positioning systems based on a wireless local area 
network. However, due to the very laborious and time consuming implementa-
tion of the indoor positioning systems using the fingerprinting method, the con-
clusion is that they are not well applicable for tracking on an ad-hoc basis, in 
which the fast set up of a system in an unfamiliar environment is a very basic re-
quirement. 
Indoor Positioning for Nuclear Security 
Jolanta Garlacz 
Master’s Thesis, University of the West of Scotland, 2009. 
Abstract: In this research project, an existing real-time location system based on 
multiple Wi-Fi signals was developed for use as an Indoor Positioning System. A 
Java application, IPARM, was created in cooperation with the Finnish Radiation 
and Nuclear Safety Authority, with the aim of reducing or removing human error 
from the accurate positioning of measurement equipment within buildings. The 
effectiveness and accuracy of the system was estimated and found to be benefi-
cial for use in equipment monitoring during radiological emergencies. 
Introduction: The undertaken project will evaluate the benefits of using an indoor 
positioning system to support nuclear security in indoor environments. To inves-
tigate available indoor systems, carefully study on existing solutions has been 
done. The next chapter presents a critical review of the current state of publica-
tions regarding indoor positioning systems and possibilities of their application. 
After analysis, the Ekahau Real-Time Location System (RTLS) has been chosen 
as an indoor positioning system. Ekahau is a Finnish company specialising in 
indoor positioning systems. 
While searching for new possibilities for applying the Ekahau RTLS, radiation 
measurement has been taken into account. Nowadays, radiation levels are 
monitored all over the world. The Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
(abbr. STUK) monitors radiation levels in Finland. They possess specialist 
equipment for measuring radiation levels. They agreed to provide a portable ra-
diation-measuring unit for the purpose of testing. The project intends to imple-
ment the indoor positioning system to the portable radiation-measuring unit. For 
that reason, a java application - IPARM – has been created. 
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The research is a ‘technology demonstration’ that will be tested in an indoor en-
vironment. The main aim of the thesis is to find the benefits of applying a WLAN 
based indoor positioning system to a portable radiation measuring unit. The re-
search is based on an internship at the Laurea University of Applied Sciences, 
Leppävaara, Espoo, Finland. 
Indoor Positioning for Nuclear Security 
Tarja Ilander, Harri Toivonen, Ulf Meriheinä, Jolanta Garlacz  
In the Proceedings of Third European IRPA Congress 2010 June 14−16, 
Helsinki, Finland. 
Abstract: Mobile measurements are needed to search for nuclear material not 
under regulatory control at major public events and political meetings. The mo-
bile measurement teams may have to screen hotels, living quarters and other 
venues before an event and during the event. Measurement and positioning in-
formation are crucial for planning such missions and for reporting findings. 
Traditionally the global satellite navigation system is used for positioning out-
doors. Positioning indoors is difficult. Various indoor positioning technologies are 
available on the market. However, they often need a specific infrastructure in-
stalled in a building which limits their use. 
The Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK) has performed indoor posi-
tioning tests with Ekahau’s wireless network based system. The experiences 
with the field tests were encouraging. Also a novel indoor positioning system has 
been developed by VTI Technologies. In this system navigation is based on the 
measurement of the length and direction of every step of a person. It uses a 
chest-worn speed and distance measurement module, originally developed for 
the sports market, together with an instrument-grade gyroscope and a magne-
tometer. 
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Chapter 14 
School Shootings and other Crisis Situations 
Behavioural Threat Management: The Prevention of Se-
vere Targeted Violence at Educational Institutions 
Peter Sund 
Master’s Thesis, Laurea University of Applied Sciences, 2009. 
Severe violence in schools and other educational institutions has become a ris-
ing concern in many developed countries in recent years, especially in the U.S. 
and Europe. This is due to the devastating violent attacks that have occurred 
across a wide range of western educational institutions. There has been much 
discussion about how to deal with this issue. However, a large part of the dis-
cussion has been directed towards general problems in society, cultural changes 
and of course how to react to the attacks when they occur and what to do after-
wards. These questions have initiated a notable amount of different develop-
ment projects. Consequently, not many of these projects have been concen-
trated on the tactical and operational level of prevention, specifically on precise 
and timely prevention of severe targeted school violence. 
This thesis is a report of constructive research on the behavioural threat man-
agement process of educational institutions. It is tied to the larger aim of an ac-
tion research project within the Finnish educational system to learn more about 
the implications of the process. The goal of this thesis was to develop a model of 
the behavioural threat assessment and management process for educational in-
stitutions in the Finnish educational system; In other words to recognise, access 
and manage risks concerning the occurrence of severe violent behaviour in 
school like environments. The model was constructed through the utilisation of a 
comprehensive literature analysis and thematic expert interviews. 
This paper is meant to fill the gap — the relatively short timeframe — be reactive 
security measures implemented during and after an attack and the early inter-
vention measures tackling the origins of risk related to school attacks. The pre-
ceding argumentation documents that there is an effective way to fill this gap; it’s 
called behavioural threat management. This proactive approach seeks to identify 
and manage students threatening severe targeted violence. 
Furthermore, within the developed contemporary threat management model, the 
pathway to violence is incorporated for the first time to consider risk mitigation 
strategies in the context of targeted school violence. The strategy encompasses 
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both multi-professional and cross-organisational cooperation in the assessment 
and management processes. Additionally, the whole process is embedded into 
the standard operating procedures of a school. 
Responsibility and Decision Making Transfer for Public 
Safety and Security Emergencies - A Case Study of a 
School Shooting 
Jukka Ojasalo, Tuomas Turunen, Hanna-Miina Sihvonen 
In the Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Technologies 
for Homeland Security (HST 2009), May 11-12, 2009, Boston. 
Abstract: The purpose of this study is to increase the knowledge of responsibility 
and decision making transfer in public safety and security emergencies. The 
vast amount of literature dealing with emergencies includes surprisingly little 
empirically grounded knowledge of responsibility and decision making transfer in 
emergency management. The article is based on the case study method in the 
context of school shootings. The contribution of this article relates to the follow-
ing findings. Firstly, most of the decision making in the emergency examined is 
ad hoc and situation driven. Secondly, effective operation requires that the on-
scene-commanders of different authorities and organisations share the same 
on-scene-command post or the same situational awareness - preferably in real 
time. Thirdly, the first authority, or the first law enforcement patrol, etc., reaching 
the scene in a time critical emergency, usually has a paramount role in develop-
ing and implementing a solution to the situation. Several management ap-
proaches are suggested related to these three findings in order to make respon-
sibility and decision making transfer more efficient and effective in emergency 
management. 
Communication, Information -Transfer and Role -Shifts in 
a Challenging Public Safety and Security Field Operation 
Tuomas Turunen 
Master’s Thesis, Laurea University of Applied Sciences, 2010. 
Criminal incidents, such as the high jacking of a ship in international waters or a 
multiple homicide in a school, require effective action from all safety and security 
organisations involved. Many rescue and law enforcement operations require a 
transfer of information during a change of personnel from morning shift staff to 
evening shift staff, for example. This exchange is referred to as role shifting. In 
the case of a high-jacked ship, role shifting may become complicated as the op-
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erational area and context may change from one country to another or to inter-
national waters as the ship continues its journey. The issues of transferring in-
formation and role shifting during a multi-actor operation are the focus of atten-
tion in this study.  In this thesis a model for managing a complicated operational 
entity is constructed that addresses the issues of acquiring and disseminating 
facts, role-shifting, effective decision-making, and managing related risks. 
In this thesis the acquisition and dissemination of facts, role shifting and manag-
ing related risks are studied from the perspective of different operations in the 
public safety field as well as from the perspective of actors with personal experi-
ence and professionals in the field. The context of all the above mentioned is an 
operational entity, which in the best cases consists of planning, action and the 
post-action phases. The operations may be in response to natural or manmade 
disasters that may be long-term or short term and require decision making dele-
gations and role shifts due to their dynamic nature and rapidly changing condi-
tions and environment. 
The government officials working in such operations usually follow a predefined 
command and control model in which the decision making is the duty of high-
ranking officials. One needs information to effectively make a decision. Even in 
modern society an inability sometimes exists, due to either technical or human 
reason, which prevents the expeditious transfer of necessary information. In 
many time-critical, life-threatening and rapidly changing situations (an opera-
tional entity) decisions must be made in a split-second and often on the frontline.  
Therefore, time constraints do not allow for decision making to follow the chain 
of command; decisions must be made in an ad hoc way depending on the situa-
tion. 
Towards the Transparent Authority of Power in Law En-
forcement 
Jouni Viitanen, Pasi Patama, Juha Knuuttila, Jyri Rajamäki, Harri Ruoslahti  
Security in Futures – Security in Change, The 12th Annual Conference of 
the Finland Futures Research Centre and the Finland Futures Academy, 3–
4 June,  2010, Turku, Finland. 
Abstract – To prevent and investigate crimes, Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) 
conduct various operations which affects the privacy of citizens. These activities 
include such controversial areas as video surveillance, audio surveillance and 
technical tracking. Currently, the LEA has the power to conduct these operations 
based on legislation. Furthermore, law enforcement is applying more jurisdiction 
based rights in order to open up new frontiers, which could intrude even further 
into ordinary citizen’s privacy. Consequently, public concern is rising and openly 
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discussing: Do LEAs really need more powers of surveillance?  Are they exercis-
ing given powers according to legislation? Is there a balance to be found be-
tween LEA’s operational security needs and individual freedoms? These ques-
tions have been raised by civil rights activists opposed to the increasing surveil-
lance conducted by the state. This paper outlines a scenario how of common 
ground can be found with a constructive approach that can be  facilitated by ad-
vanced technology. 
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RIESCA 
In the RIESCA project (The Rescuing of Intelligence and Electronic Se-
curity  Core  Applications) Laurea aimed at developing further evaluation 
methods for  systems that are critical to  the functioning of the society. The 
aim of the RIESCA project  is addressed to analyse of  methods, which 
could contribute processes of evaluation and the continuous system’s 
development. Special attention was given to the analysis of moving from 
 situations of normal activity to critical situations, and studying how such 
 systems could be recovered from their crisis state and returned to their 
normal  state. A further aim was to  develop different scenarios related to 
critical events  (mass events, high level political meetings, crisis situa-
tions), security  management and  communication systems and assesses 
various methods for  evaluating their functionality. 
During the project Laurea’s researchers and students, as research col-
leagues in  co-operation with other RIESCA project researchers, analysed 
existing standards  and methods, and evaluated their applicability for the 
evaluation and development of critical systems and event  security man-
agement. The target of the  project was to create a process that could 
evaluate and develop  security management for critical systems and 
events. This was done by making as much use  of existing methods and 
 standards as possible. The pilot projects concerning  these methods were 
mostly carried out with organisations that took  part in the  project. The 
whole process (operations model) was supplemented by solutions  that 
were  developed during the project. 
This report is a record of the output of the RIESCA project and serves as 
a  ‘toolbox’; a series of procedures for the evaluation and development of 
critical  systems and event security management. 
